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ABSTRACT 
 
 The Olympic Movement has a constantly expanding mandate which has seen it venture into 
many fields other than simple staging of the Olympic Games. For example, it has extended its mandate 
into the equal representation of women in sport, but more importantly, this thesis examines its new 
mandate of building peace through sport, which is contained in the Olympic Charter’s 2nd Fundamental 
Principle of Olympism. It has also indirectly influenced the production of the UNGA Olympic Truce 
Resolutions, by calling on the UN to revive the ‘concept of ekecheiria’. However, the Olympic Truce 
Resolutions are frequently flouted, and more often than not, by the Host Nation itself, including the UK 
and the USA in recent years. This thesis examines a possible solution to this failing, which is the 
Olympic Truce Resolutions codification into a binding Treaty where states and the entire Movement 
are party to it.  
 This thesis recognises that there is the inherent problem in this, in that the Olympic Movement 
is not comprised of states. Its core actors are the International Olympic Committee, National Olympic 
Committees, and International Sporting Federations (and to a lesser extent OCOGs). Hence this thesis 
submits the novel concept of Olympic Singularity, eight unusual features that amplify the EU doctrine 
of the specificity of sport on the Olympic playing field. These eight cumulative features unite to allow 
the Movement to be co-signatories to the Truce Treaty, alongside states. It also enables the Movement 
to govern the Truce Treaty and any sanctions thereof. Again, this is because of the features of Olympic 
Singularity, the most notable of which is that the Movement is unusual because of its universal singular 
webbed framework which necessitates its consideration as a single powerful organ capable of action on 
the international stage equivalent to states. Olympic Singularity justifies the Movement’s special 
treatment before law, in the form of an atypical international law subject, in that it unites independent 
actors into one organ, enabling them to have capacity on a par with those reserved to states and 
international governmental organisations. This would only take the form of governing and sanctioning 
a Truce Treaty. This thesis examines precedent for this in that the ancient Olympic Games were 
governed by a single state who dispensed real sanctions for the breach of ekecheiria. It also examines 
in a case study, South Africa which shows that the end of apartheid was assisted by the UN and the 
Movement uniting and using sport by way of a binding international Treaty, ICAAS 1985. Hence the 
capacity of the state system was required alongside the recognition of all involved that it was a Treaty.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Supposition of Thesis 
A literal interpretation of the Olympic Charter (Charter) suggests that the Olympic 
Movement (Movement) is a hierarchical pyramid with the International Olympic Committee 
(IOC) at the apex.1 That it governs the other entities of the Movement: the International 
Sporting Federations (ISFs), the National Olympic Committees (NOCs) and the Organising 
Committees (OCOGs). However, this thesis aims to demonstrate that this pyramid framework 
is only partially correct. Instead this thesis will build on the commentary that the Movement is 
to an extent hierarchical, but instead of a pyramid, it is a web of national and international 
symbiotic actors, with the IOC at its pivotal centre.2  
The supposition of a web framework is, however, only the foundation upon which this 
thesis is built. Namely that the individual Movement’s actors that comprise this web, in certain 
circumstances, cannot be separated from each other. The web of Movement actors together 
have a sufficient amount of international legal recognition, international personality 
(personality), accountability and capacity for action that require their conception as a single 
Olympic Movement placed in the jurisdiction of international law with regard to peace and 
security. Specifically, this is with regard to enforcing and sanctioning the Olympic Truce 
(Truce) in a newly codified Truce Treaty. It uses as precedent other atypical subjects of 
international law, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), to justify the 
Movement’s propulsion to the international system.  
 
1.2 Research Questions and Methodology 
This singular collective grouping of the Movement, begs two general research 
question(s). Firstly, why should the Olympic Movement be viewed as one legal entity? And 
secondly, why in the weighty field of international peace and security?  
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 Rule 1.1, Charter, which states that the Movement is under the IOC’s “supreme authority and leadership”, 
Charter, IOC, 2nd August 2015. 
2
 Foster, Ken, ‘Is There a Global Sports Law?’ (2005) Vol 2(1) Entertainment and Sports Law Journal 1-18. 
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The thesis proposes that the answer to the first question of ‘why should the Movement 
be viewed as one entity?’, lies in a new concept, ‘Olympic Singularity’. This new concept of 
Olympic Singularity is developed in this thesis. The thesis submits that Olympic Singularity 
arises from eight factors that demonstrate that the Movement is a unusual organisation, unlike 
any other International Non-Governmental Organisation (INGO).3 That it is more akin an 
atypical subject of international law, like the Holy See, the Sovereign Order of Malta or the 
ICRC, and as such, should have status as an international law subject, limited personality and 
a focused mandate with regard to a Truce Treaty. 
The Movement must be viewed as a singular organisation here, as it is only by so 
viewing it, that it possesses the features justifying its special treatment under international law. 
It needs the independence and law-making power of the ISFs, the universalism of the NOCs, 
their and the OCOGs state links and the recognitions given to the IOC. Each body has only one 
or more of the features that justify the existence of other atypical subjects, such as the ICRC.4 
As they cannot be separated from each other, this leads to the idea of the Movement as a state-
linked web. 
This Olympic Singularity is also in part the answer to the second research question of 
‘why in the field of international peace and security?’ This singular Movement, resting on the 
concept of Olympic Singularity, is the right actor to successfully affect this field. The 
Movement has a proven record of success in peace and security, such as contributing to the end 
of South African apartheid.5 This thesis will examine whether the Movement’s success here is 
because it operates on a multitude of different levels, sub-state and yet internationally. It can 
command the attention of world leaders and individuals. Furthermore, this thesis shows in its 
comparison to the ICRC, that a self-designated mandate in international peace and security can 
lead to special treatment and recognitions under international law. Whilst other fields may open 
up to the Movement in the future, they are beyond this thesis. This study uses the ICRC as 
precedent - where a peace and security mandate justified widening the subjects of international 
law, which were then recognised as such and further extended by the Geneva Conventions 
(GCs).6 
This thesis also answers the second research question of ‘why peace and security’ by 
offering new solutions to the age old problem of how to enforce international peace and 
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 With the potential exception of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). 
4
 Universality and its mandate being the primary reasons for its special treatment. 
5
 Discussed in Chapter 7. 
6
 The Geneva Conventions 1949 and their Additional Protocols 1977.  
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security. This thesis proposes two solutions to this second research question. Firstly, that the 
non-binding UN General Assembly (UNGA) Olympic Truce Resolutions be considered 
binding by their codification into an international Treaty, with states and a singular Movement 
as signatories.7 Secondly, that the singular Movement, as the UN’s agent, be able to sanction 
NOCs and Hosts for their state’s breach of this Treaty, as was the case with the ancient Games.8 
This thesis will therefore also examine the extent to which the Movement links and infiltrates 
the international state system.  This in turn leads back to the features of Olympic Singularity – 
such as the specificity of the Movement’s institutions and web framework. Olympic Singularity 
is therefore both the cause and the effect and can answer both general research questions. 
 
As far as methodology is concerned, this thesis uses three methodological approaches 
to prove that the Movement should be treated as a singular organisation able to govern and 
sanction a Truce Treaty: a black letter/literal interpretation of sources; a comparative approach; 
and a historical approach. 
It uses a black letter interpretation of various legal sources analysing them for their 
literal or intended meaning. It does this with regard to the Charter in Chapters 2 - 4, the Olympic 
Truce in Chapter 5 and the ancient Truce in Chapter 6. 
Chapter 6 uses a historical, and somewhat comparative approach, to demonstrate that 
the successes of the ancient Truce - ekecheiria - are attributable to its status as international 
law, promulgated by a state, with real and dispensed sanctions. 
This thesis adopts a comparative approach in Chapter 7 by using the case study of South 
Africa and apartheid to investigate whether the collective Movement has the greatest impact 
on international peace and security when it has direct involvement and ownership of a situation.  
 
1.3 Terminology 
This thesis uses many terms, both existing and novel, and as such this section will introduce 
those that are accepted and those that are submitted.   
 
1.3.1 Overview of the Olympic Movement  
This thesis focuses on and builds on several assumptions with regard to the Movement’s 
framework, hence a brief overview of the (web) framework is necessary here. The ‘Olympic 
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 Discussed in Chapter 5. 
8
 Discussed in Chapter 6.  
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Movement’ is a term frequently referred to in the Charter, which is itself a constitution, a 
statutory document of the IOC and an embodiment of the Movement’s basic rights and 
obligations.9 However, the Movement is not a legally recognised entity in its own right, despite 
having these aforementioned rights and obligations. Instead, it is simply an umbrella term used 
to group together, for ease of taxonomy, a variety of different legally recognised actors, whose 
collective primary function is the facilitation of staging the Olympic Games (Games).  
The term ‘Olympic Movement’ draws together three core actors under this umbrella, 
with the most ostensibly powerful actor as per the Charter, being the IOC.10 Thus to refer to the 
IOC and the Movement synonymously is incorrect. The IOC is only a Games facilitator, with 
no direct involvement in their staging. Instead the IOC oversees and demarcates the business 
of the other Movement actors.11 Rule 1.2 of the Charter extends the core of the Movement to 
the NOCs); the ISFs, reliant on its myriad of National Sporting Federations (NSFs).12 
Rule 1.3 of the Charter also includes under the Movement umbrella, certain smaller 
actors who are directly responsible for staging the Games, such as the OCOGs.13 Rule 1.3 also 
includes in the Movement, other external public and private actors, such as national 
governmental authorities, individuals and independent commercial vehicles under the ‘catch-
all’ category of “organisations and institutions” that “are recognised by the IOC”. They have 
also have a direct and temporary involvement in actually staging the Games. Therefore the 
Movement and the IOC avoid direct ownership of the risks of Games, which is born instead by 
other Movement actors.14 
The component actors of the Movement therefore cover a variety of different purposes 
and functions. As such, they have varying legal recognitions and treatments (nationally and 
internationally) depending on the jurisdiction in which they are incorporated. Some are INGOs, 
such as the IOC, which also has special status as a Swiss association. Many ISFs are also 
INGOs and Swiss associations, but they do not possess the same full range of legal privileges, 
nationally and internationally, as the IOC. Some Movement actors are companies, such as the 
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 Introduction, Charter, which also states it is a codification of Fundamental Principles. The Charter is the 
regulatory framework presiding over and guiding the Games and the Movement, contractually binding Movement 
actors (core and peripheral). 
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 Rule 1.1 and 1.2, Charter. The Movement can extend to the International Paralympic Committee, WADA, 
NSFs, teams, clubs, leagues, athletes, referees, coaches etc. Nafziger, James A. R, The Handbook of International 
Sports Law (EE Publishing Ltd 2013). 
11
 Rule 1.1, Charter.  
12
 Rule 1.2, Charter. 
13
 Rule 1.3, Charter also includes in the Movement: individuals who compete in the Games; coaches; and referees, 
technicians etc. The OCOGs are not permanent Movement fixtures, they have a lifespan of around 10 years. 
14
 The Host City (Host) contract is usually signed between the IOC, the Host and the host NOC, with the NOC 
contracting to undertake hosting and staging responsibilities. 
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British Olympic Association (BOA) - the UK’s NOC. Others are government authorities 
representing the Host City and enter the Host City contract, such as the City of London. 
Chapters 2 - 4 will show the framework as a web rather than a pyramid. 
 
1.3.2 Olympic Singularity 
 This thesis rests on the novel concept of Olympic Singularity that requires the 
Movement’s singular and special treatment under international law. Olympic Singularity 
enables the Movement to be an international law subject with limited personality and therefore 
a significant and legitimate actor in international peace and security. It replicates some of the 
reasons that justify the existence of other atypical subjects of international law but properly 
defines them. Hence, what is Olympic Singularity? What is so special about the Movement that 
requires it to be treated as a special INGO actor under international law, capable of governing 
and sanctioning the Truce in the form of a Treaty?  
Olympic Singularity unifies the Movement into one organisation and propels it into the 
field of international peace and security. It can be broken down into eight distinct factors, many 
of which affect each other and are cumulative to justify the Movement’s specificity before the 
law. Each in itself may not be sufficient to justify the Movement’s atypical status and 
personality, but together they necessitate it.  
Firstly, the Movement is an unusual organisation because it is a web rather than a 
pyramid. It is not a pyramid because the IOC is not the all-powerful actor as suggested in Rule 
1 of the Charter. Each individual actor, core or peripheral, within the Movement wields 
significant power and can act as a check on the power of the others, meaning that despite the 
IOC being at the centre, they are all important and significant. It is therefore the way that the 
Movement links various different actors together that is singular, and not simply that it is a 
web. There are many international organisations where a checks and balance occurs, including 
the UN and EU. However, with the Movement, the separation of powers is of independent 
powers, yet these powers are actually not entirely distinct of each other. It operates nationally 
and internationally, enabling it to be an international actor unlike any other.15 Therefore, the 
Movement can only be viewed as a web, where the webbing holding it together is the Charter 
– which all the Movement actors have agreed to be bound by. Indeed, the EU doctrine of the 
specificity of sport accepts as a reason for sport’s exemption from the law, its unique structure. 
This thesis argues that this specificity of framework is amplified in an Olympic setting. It draws 
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on and extends this EU doctrine. If sport’s unique structure can justify its independence and 
autonomy for the law, it is conceivable that its bodies have partial subject status and 
personality, limited to its purposes, which include peaceful Games staging. 
The second factor of Olympic Singularity follows on from this. This unusual Movement 
web is made even more unusual by its universality. The Movement’s universality encompasses 
the stretch and reach of its actors across the globe, the size and reception of the Games 
themselves, and the commercialism attached thereto.16 Taking the aforementioned factors in 
turn, the Movement has visibility in all states across the world, comprising 206 NOCs and 
scores of ISFs. The Games are bigger than any other event, with some of the most numerous 
audiences both at home and in attendance. They also have revenue streams to rival the world’s 
largest companies despite being not-for-profit. The Games together with the Movement have a 
truly international character, that when combined with its unusual framework, has meant that 
the sum (the Movement) is greater than its parts (the individual actors). This enables the 
Movement to engage in aiding all types of peace and security conflicts. Other fields and 
organisations may draw from a myriad of national and international actors, achieving a certain 
amount of webbed universality, such as the individual ISFs, but they lack the full reach of the 
Movement and its other Singular features. 
The third factor that makes the Movement special is that all of its actors share the same 
purpose: facilitation of staging the Games whilst guided by the humanitarian principles of 
Olympism.17 It is this purpose that draws all Olympic actors together. Despite the Movement’s 
actors having other purposes out-with the Olympiad cycle, and the IOC broadening its mandate 
into other fields, they come together under the Olympic umbrella to stage the Games every four 
years.18 
The fourth and fifth factors of Olympic Singularity build on these first three aspects 
and are themselves inter-linked. The fourth aspect asserts that the IOC has been incorrectly 
taxonomised as a regular INGO and not as an atypical subject of international law with limited 
personality.19 Olympic Singularity asserts that when its first three aspects are considered (its 
universal unusual web framework with a shared purpose) the Movement is an extraordinary 
INGO - an atypical subject of international law with limited personality, akin the Holy See, 
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 Akin the Red Cross Movement’s (RC Movement) universality that is a factor in it possessing atypical subject 
status and limited personality. 
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 Again likening it to the RC Movement which shares with the Movement, a humanitarian goal. 
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 Other purposes extend to gender equality, anti-doping and the 8th factor of Olympic Singularity - the promotion 
of peace through sport. 
19
 This thesis will examine international law subjects in Chapter 3 but not personality to a substantial degree as 
this is beyond this thesis’s scope. 
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Sovereign Order of Malta, or more likely, the ICRC. It is an INGO unlike almost all others, the 
ICRC aside. The reason(s) for the Movement being atypical leads into the fifth aspect of 
Olympic Singularity - the Movement (and in particular the IOC) receives almost unprecedented 
extraordinary treatments and recognitions by a variety of national and international actors. For 
example, the IOC has many legal and fiscal privileges under Swiss law, and it also has observer 
status at the UNGA granted in 2009 by way of Resolution 64/3.20 Whilst other organs have 
special Swiss status, they do not possess it to the extent that the IOC has, and of course, many 
others have observer status. Therefore, each special treatment is in and of itself not necessarily 
unique, but it is the combination of the many special treatments, that combine to form Olympic 
Singularity. As the ICRC is its closest corollary this thesis argues for similar recognition of the 
Movement as the ICRC under international law. 
The sixth and seventh factors of Olympic Singularity can again be grouped together. 
The sixth factor is that the Charter continually refers to the concept of the Movement, despite 
deliberately not attaching legal meaning to it – it was intended to only be a grouping of Olympic 
actors. Hence the Charter has unintentionally created a term which when combined with the 
other facets of Olympic Singularity, necessitate consideration of the Movement as a single 
entity with special powers regarding the Truce. 
The seventh factor of Olympic Singularity is that the Movement is unlike any other 
organisation (and a potential atypical international law subject) because the sporting and 
Olympic systems have created legal dualism: a system of rules that are synonymous with 
international sub-state law. This thesis accepts the argument that these rules are law at the 
national and international level with the doctrine of the specificity of sport being recognised 
under EU law.21 Whilst these laws are not only applied at the Games, and the specificity of 
sport may be jurisdictionally confined to the EU, the establishment of the Court of Arbitration 
for Sport (CAS) initially under the Movement’s auspices, has meant that these ‘laws’ are 
inextricably woven into the Movement’s fabric.22  
The specificity of sport itself details the reasons why sport requires special treatment. 
Some of these reasons are similar to the factors of Olympic Singularity. However, this thesis 
goes further than this European doctrine, by amplifying the specificity of sport in the Olympic 
arena, and breaks the reasons for its special treatment down accurately and in more detail. This 
thesis also focuses Olympic Singularity for a single purpose: that of allowing the Movement to 
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have governorship and sanctioning capacity of a Truce Treaty, rather than for general treatment 
under law, as is the case with the EU doctrine.  
The eighth feature of the Movement necessitating viewing it as one organ entitled to 
elevated privileges and responsibilities is the mandate that it has created for itself, out-with its 
primary function of staging the Games. It has claimed ownership in weighty fields aside Game 
staging. This is similar to the ICRC and the Red Cross Movement’s self-designated 
humanitarian mandate that was later recognised by the GCs. It has done this in its Charter 
where it codified the Fundamental Principles of Olympism which bind all Movement actors 
alike, core or peripheral, through their consent to the OC. The Fundamental Principles are 
philosophical themes that help guide the Movement in everything from Game staging to its 
other actions. The 2nd Fundamental Principle has laid down for the Movement a mandate in 
peace-building through sport, as it states that:- 
“the goal of Olympism is to place sport at the service of the harmonious 
development of humankind, with a view to promoting a peaceful 
society concerned with the preservation of human dignity”. 
Promotion of peace through sport is an unprecedented mandate for a sports INGO. This 
therefore shows the Movement’s commitment and ambitions in this field. Whilst staking a 
claim in this field is not enough to be considered a legitimate, serious actor therein, such an 
attitude ignores what is currently happening – that the Movement is involved already in this 
field. Self-given mandates were sufficient for the ICRC, although later recognised by the GCs, 
endowing it with a special mandate and consequential status and personality under 
international law. Thereby opening the door here for the Movement. 
One way the Movement achieves its ‘peace through sport’ mandate is by instigating 
and supporting the call for the UNGA Olympic Truce Resolution. As with all UNGA 
Resolutions, the Truce Resolutions are non-binding directions to UN Member States, and are 
therefore international. Furthermore, the Movement has established a precedent of involving 
itself in situations deemed by the UN Security Council (UNSC) to affect international peace 
and security. The Movement banned the South African NOC for replicating its government’s 
policies of apartheid at the Games. There are many ways in which the Movement could achieve 
peace through sport at a multitude of levels, and it is fulfilling this mandate through grass roots 
community projects and at the international state level. As the Movement is attempting to affect 
international peace and security, it and its mandate, when combined with the other features of 
Olympic singularity, demand attention and governance by international law. This thesis 
therefore submits that the answer is by way of the three-pronged aforementioned solution: a 
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singular Movement in control of a Truce Treaty with sanctioning capacity. This solution infers 
some limited personality and atypical subject status although not necessarily mandatorily so.  
 Existing attention has focused on a level one interpretation of the IOC as an INGO, and 
accepts existing assumptions about their form and capabilities. According to which, the IOC 
and the other Movement actors cannot directly make international peace and security laws. 
They can only instigate and carry out grass roots level projects to promote peaceful societies, 
and act as a complainer at the international level to those that do – states and IGOs. Hence the 
Movement can only legitimately fulfil its 2nd Fundamental Principle of ‘promoting’ peaceful 
societies via these two means. However, it is this thesis’s final contention of Olympic 
Singularity that the Movement must be viewed as one singular international law subject, 
specifically when framed against this 2nd Fundamental Principle mandate. This would enable 
it to re-take ownership of the Truce, by way of A Treaty and sanction any breaches.  
Therefore, this thesis submits that this new singular Movement is not like other INGOs 
(with the exception of the ICRC) or even other international law subjects - in terms of its 
recognition, personality, accountability and capability of making peace and security laws. 
Hence the Movement requires unique treatment by the international community due to 
Olympic Singularity, consideration of which, has until now, remained uncharted and shall be 
undertaken by this thesis. Not only is such a study long over-due, but it is wholly necessary to 
clarify the muddied waters left by the specificity of sport and lacklustre approach of the UN 
with regard to the Truce Resolutions. 
 
1.4 Structure 
This thesis will answer the two general research questions and demonstrate the 
aforementioned eight suppositions of Olympic Singularity, by way of six core Chapters and a 
conclusion. The six Chapters will be split into two parts. 
Part I addresses the first general research question of “why should the Movement be 
viewed as one entity?” and the first seven aforementioned factors of Olympic Singularity. It 
does this by way of three Chapters. 
Chapter 2 examines the first three linked factors of Olympic Singularity that the 
Movement has: a web framework; universality; and a shared purpose of staging the Games. 
Some of these factors are extensive and others are concise, obvious and brief. This Chapter will 
examine what the Movement’s framework to determine whether it is a pyramid or a web. It 
will comprise an institutional overview of the Movement. It will discover who the Movement’s 
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various actors are - their functions, purposes, powers, and status. It will also consider the 
interplay and power check that each of the Movement’s actors place on each other. Whether 
the IOC is supreme and all powerful over these other Movement actors as Rule 1.1 of the 
Charter suggests. This Rule states that the Movement is “[U]nder the supreme authority and 
leadership of the IOC.” 
Chapter 2 will examine the reach of this Movement framework, whether its web 
framework makes it universal, being the 2nd factor of Olympic singularity. It will then examine 
briefly whether all of these actors share a single purpose of staging the Games and Olympism, 
despite the myriad of other purposes and roles that they fulfil. 
Chapter 3 will then ask whether the IOC, the supreme authority of the Movement as 
per the Charter, is a regular INGO or international law subject. Has it been correctly 
taxonomised? It will do this by applying the UN INGO checklist to the Movement. Chapter 3 
will therefore determine whether the IOC is like other INGOs, i.e. a ‘regular INGO’. Thereafter 
it will examine other atypical subjects of international law to determine whether it can be 
considered one, with attaching rights, duties, mandates and recognitions, but with regard to a 
Truce Treaty. Thereby addressing the fourth aspect of Olympic Singularity.  
Chapter 4 will continue examining whether all the Movement’s actors are typical 
examples of their type. It will examine their other features to discover whether this makes them 
irregular INGOs or organisations and thereby justifying their collective sum’s special treatment 
under international law. It will do this by taking the IOC, the NOCs and the ISFs in turn. It will 
focus on the rights, recognitions, and treatments they receive under law from the international 
community, the fifth aspect to Olympic Singularity. These can vary depending on the legal 
system in which they are incorporated. This study has already been done in the Charter, case 
law, statute law and in academic writing. They therefore think that they have correctly 
understood these actors in terms of their legal rights and treatments. One of the special 
treatments that the Movement receives is that the rules it creates are potentially regarded as 
‘law’. The Movement’s potential to create laws and create a system of legal dualism will be 
accepted here (as this is a separate field of debate). It will be extended upon to discover whether 
this is a factor that can be offered as a precedent for a Truce Treaty. 
Chapter 4 will therefore consider whether this assessment is correct at both the 
Movement’s core actor and cumulative level.23 If something new has been created at the core 
actor level, such as a unique IOC, this bolsters the argument for the creation of a new, singular, 
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collective Movement that is an atypical international law subject. If the Movement’s actors are 
unusual then this reasoning can be extended to the macro level. Albeit if the core Movement 
actors are not unusual examples of their type, this does not preclude the overall Movement 
being singular and unusual. Olympic Singularity produces a unique, collective Movement 
separate to and resting on reasons other than the specificity of its component actors. 
Consequently, this examination will again reinforce the Movement’s singular web framework 
over that of a pyramid. 
Chapter 4 will also demonstrate the 6th component of Olympic Singularity. It will 
examine whether the frequent references to the Movement in the Charter and extraneously have 
given rise, unintentionally, to a real actor under law.  
Part II addresses the second general research question of “why should the Movement be 
viewed as a single collective organ in the field of international peace and security?” This is 
also the final aspect of Olympic Singularity that necessitates the Movement’s serious 
consideration as a singular entity under international law. That is, its ability to form laws and 
influence international peace and security. It will do this by way of three core Chapters. 
Chapter 5 shows that the Movement is already involved in peace and security by way 
of the Truce, which goes somewhat towards explaining the relevancy of the second general 
research question.24 It will explain what the Truce is in terms of the UNGA’s Resolutions, and 
how the Truce has been revived. This Chapter asks to what extent the Movement and the UN 
were involved in its revival and whether the IOC required the assistance of an IGO (the UN) 
for it to take effect. It charts the evolution of the IOC’s Appeal for the Olympic Truce on 21st 
July 1992, to the first Olympic Truce Resolution (48/11) on 25th October 1993 to its most recent 
incarnations.25 It will also demonstrate whether codification of the Truce into a Treaty is a 
viable solution. 
Chapter 5 also discovers whether there are any breaches of the Truce Resolutions and 
consequently, the Charter’s 2nd Fundamental Principle, and if so, why. For example, are the 
Truce Resolutions considered optional? This is a recurring problem that the UN faces in 
enforcing its GA Resolutions and even its harder SC Resolutions and international law 
generally, although is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
                                                          
24
 Akin the ICRC before the GCs. 
25
 Appeal for the Olympic Truce - A document in support of the appeal was signed by the IOC Executive Board 
(Executive), the Presidents and Secretaries General of the Association of Summer Olympic International 
Federations (ASOIF), the Association of International Olympic Winter Sports Federations (AIOWF), Association 
of National Olympic Committees of Africa (ANOCA) and representatives of the 169 NOCs participating in the 
Barcelona Games, dated 21st July 1992. See also, Resolution A/RES/48/11, 25th October 1993. 
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Chapter 6 uses a historical methodological approach to address both research questions. 
It compares the ancient Games and Truce of ekecheiria to the modern Games, Movement and 
Truce. It examines the reasons for observance of ekecheiria in order to determine whether any 
lessons can be learned and applied to the modern Truce. It ascertains whether ekecheiria was 
international law created by states (if these concepts even existed in the ancient world), and 
whether this was why it was observed. Hence this Chapter asks whether singular state control 
by Elis of a binding international Treaty with appropriate real sanctions was why ekecheiria 
succeeded.   
Chapter 7 uses a comparative and historical methodological approach on the case study 
of South Africa. It tackles the second general research question of ‘why peace’ by giving the 
example of a historic precedent of when the Movement involved itself successfully in peace 
and security. Thus this thesis operates from the assumption that sport, and Olympic sport, 
helped to end of apartheid. What this Chapter examines, is the extent of the Movement’s 
involvement and the reasons for the end of apartheid. The Movement’s involvement shall be 
compared to that of the UN, and other individuals, states and actors, as well as to the 
circumstances of the day. Hence why was sport successful in helping to end apartheid? A 
situation that the SC deemed to affect international peace and security. If this Chapter can 
discover the reasons for the end of apartheid, then these can be replicated for the modern 
Movement and Truce. For example, if the Movement helped to end apartheid because of its 
collective web working together with the power to sanction, this will help demonstrate the 
necessity of viewing it as a single organ capable of internationally sanctioning when it deals 
with peace and security. 
Chapter 8 provides a conclusion gathering the research findings and submits proposals 
for recognising and strengthening the Movement as a single collective organisation when it 
deals with peace and security – specifically the Truce. It will show what is required of the Truce 
by way of a Treaty and what sanctions will be needed to enable its effectiveness.   
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PART I 
 
 
INSTITUTIONAL OVERVIEW OF THE OLYMPIC MOVEMENT 
Why should the Olympic Movement be viewed as one entity? 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Is the Olympic Movement a web or a pyramid? 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter Two will discuss the first three aspects of Olympic Singularity that justify the 
Movement being an atypical subject of international law having a quasi-personality: that the 
Movement is: a web; that it is universal; and that it has a shared purpose of Games staging. The 
substantial part of this Chapter will focus on the first aspect of Olympic Singularity and ask 
whether the Movement has the framework of a web or a pyramid? The Movement’s framework 
is relevant and important because its regularity or irregularity can add to the notion of Olympic 
Singularity, and thus prove in the affirmative the first research question: ‘should the Movement 
be viewed as one entity?’ An Olympic web rather than a pyramid is significant because a 
pyramid would infer that the IOC is the supreme Olympic body, but on its own, it does not 
possess sufficient features that other atypical subjects of international law possess. Only when 
the whole Movement is viewed as one, are sufficient atypical features checked off, as Chapters 
3 and 4 will discover. From a legal perspective it is also necessary to treat the Movement as 
one entity. As Chapter 4 will discover the Movement uses its pyramid and murky current 
framework to avoid legal suit, side-stepping its obligations, but also potential rights it could 
have (such as governing a Truce Treaty). 
Thus it will start by swiftly detailing the different individual actors of the Olympic 
Movement: the IOC; the NOCs; and the ISFs. Each of these will be discussed in terms of their 
roles, powers and compositions to discover where they sit within the Movement, and thus 
whether it is a pyramid or web - the first aspect to Olympic Singularity. This part will ask 
whether the IOC is the dominant and most powerful branch, albeit the majority of its individual 
legal features will be discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. It will then ask what powers do the NOCs 
and ISFs possess and are any of them more dominant that the IOC’s? The ability of these two 
actors to keep the IOC in check will also be examined.  
Each of these will also be looked at in terms of how universal they are - the second 
aspect to Olympic Singularity. Can they each or collectively be considered international with 
presence around the world? The initial examination of their roles will also show whether they 
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share the same purpose of Games staging or whether they have any other important or 
competing roles - the third aspect to Olympic Singularity). 
 
2.2 The Composition of the Olympic Movement 
As Rule 1 of the Charter says, the Movement is comprised of an extensive array of 
actors. However, its core actors are: the IOC; the NOCs; the ISFs; and the OCOGs. In order to 
progress with this thesis, these actors require introduction. This Chapter, by introducing and 
explaining each Movement actor in turn, will weigh up their powers, rights and duties. It will 
also compare their interactions, with one another and external actors. This will answer the 
question of whether the Movement is a web or a pyramid. And consequently, whether the 
framework is unique or not contributing towards a justification of an atypical subject status 
with limited personality.  
 
2.3 International Olympic Committee  
2.3.1 History of the International Olympic Committee 
Pierre de Coubertin is credited with the foundation of the modern Movement and the 
IOC. As Secretary-General of the French Sports Association, Coubertin invited an elite circle 
of 14 of his friends from around the world, to what later became known as, the Congress for 
the Renewal of the Games at the Sorbonne University, Paris June 1894.1 The Congress 
unanimously adopted a Resolution that would revive the Games with the first Olympiad 
occurring two years later in Athens 1896. After the Congress, the IOC for the Games was 
consequently established by this elite group of 15.2  
 
2.3.2 Role of the IOC 
The IOC in Coubertin’s day was geared towards and more involved in, staging the 
Games.3 However, this is not the case for the IOC today – it is not as involved in Games staging 
as it was. This initially appears to hamper the IOC’s contribution to the third aspect to Olympic 
                                                          
1
 Chappelet, Jean-Loup, and Kubler-Mabbott, Brenda, The International Olympic Committee and the Olympic 
System: The Governance of World Sport (Routledge, 2008). See also, ‘IOC, The Olympic Congress 1894’ 
<www.olympic.org/paris-1894-olympic-congress> accessed 1 October 2015. Coubertin would later become IOC 
President. Coubertin invited representatives from France, Belgium, the UK, Ireland, Greece, Italy, Russia, Spain, 
Sweden and the USA.   
2
 Chappelet, n. 1. Many out of these 15 were aristocrats or future Nobel Prize winners. Many claim that the IOC 
is still elitist as it is the ‘most exclusive club in the world’, Ettinger, David J., ‘The Legal Status of the International 
Olympic Committee’ (1992) Volume 4 Pace International Law Review 97. 
3
 Chappelet even says this is its principal task, Chappelet, n. 1. 
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Singularity - the shared purpose of staging the Games. However, although the IOC is not 
directly responsible for staging the Games, it contracts with NOCs and a Host authority, for 
them, and the OCOGs, to do so on its behalf.4 Hence it delegates this role to them.5 So the IOC 
has the shared purpose of “ensur[ing] the regular celebration of the Games”.6 Yet it is the 
OCOG’s primary purpose to stage them. 
Nowadays, the IOC has a more dominant role, that of governance. It is the body that 
adopts the Charter, the IOC’s constituent document and the Movement’s statute.7 It is therefore 
the body that has the capability of such adoption. Hence the IOC has many extensive rights and 
obligations enshrined in its OC. Many of which suggest it is the dominant and most powerful 
Movement actor, suggesting it is at the top of a pyramid – which hinders the first aspect of 
Olympic Singularity – the web framework. 
This is reaffirmed when viewed in light of other Charter provisions. For example, the 
Charter states that the IOC “governs the organisation, action and operation of the [entire] 
Movement”.8 The 3rd Fundamental Principle reaffirms this, as it states; 
“The Movement is the concerted, organised, universal and permanent 
action, carried out under the supreme authority of the IOC, of all 
individuals and entities who are inspired by the values of Olympism”.9  
Rule 1.1 also calls the IOC the “supreme authority and leader[ship]”.10 And Rule 1.4 says the 
IOC is the supreme decision-maker: 
                                                          
4
 Rule 35, Charter entrusts organising the Games to the “NOC of the country of the Host as well as to the Host 
City itself.” The contracts (Host City and those on construction, transportation, security and customs) are formed 
with various public and private actors. The IOC also bears no financial responsibility for Games staging - neither 
the Host nor the relevant NOC can pursue the IOC for financial relief. Ettinger, n. 2, See also Chappelet, n. 1. 
5
 IOC delegation seems sensible as work is on-going for up to four Games at any one time, making it too big a 
task for the IOC alone. The IOC simply monitors and receives OCOG update reports, Chappelet, n. 1. 
6
 Rule 2.3, Charter. The IOC’s theoretical and practical role in Game staging is limited to Host election by absolute 
majority vote at the Session. See also Rule 18.2.4, “to elect the Host of the Games”. The NOC shall be responsible 
for the establishment, for that purpose, of an …OCOG which … reports directly to the IOC Executive.” 
7
 The Charter is “adopted by the IOC”, Introduction, Charter. 
8
 Introduction, Charter. 
9
 This is reiterated in Rule 1.2, Charter. The promotion of Olympism could also be considered one of the IOC’s 
foremost aims, for example, “The mission of the IOC is to promote Olympism throughout the world….” (Rule 2, 
Charter). Olympism is an obscure concept found in the Charter’s Fundamental Principles of Olympism and was 
a neology of Coubertin’s who wrote extensively on its philosophies. (Chappelet, n. 1). It is a philosophy linked to 
education that guides the IOC in its practices.  
10
 “Under the supreme authority and leadership of the IOC, the Movement encompasses organisations, athletes 
and other persons who agree to be guided by the Charter. The goal of the Movement is to contribute to building a 
peaceful and better world by educating youth through sport practised in accordance with Olympism and its 
values”, Rule 1.1, Charter. 
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“Any person or organisation belonging in any capacity whatsoever to 
the Movement is bound by the provisions of the Charter and shall abide 
by the decisions of the IOC.” 
The 7th Fundamental Principle designates the IOC as the body who recognises other bodies 
within the Movement, as it states: 
“belonging to the Movement requires…. recognition by the IOC.” 
This IOC role in recognising NOCs and ISFs is significant as it could suggest the IOC is at the 
top of a regulatory pyramid with these actors beneath it.11  
However, it is the opposite - it further exemplifies the Movement’s web framework. 
This is because these actors, particularly the ISFs often check the IOC’s power and often refuse 
to submit to the IOC’s or CAS’s authority.12 They consider themselves autonomous institutions 
with their own rules.13 Foster even says that it is they (and presumably not the IOC) that control 
and govern international sport.14 Even at the Olympics and CAS, they observe ISF rules and 
sports laws. This autonomy and potential to legislate could, in turn, trump the IOC and its 
recognition card.15 Furthermore, Chapter 7 shows that ISFs can influence the IOC by forcing 
it to expel South Africa’s apartheid practicing NOC. Hence ISFs check the IOC’s supreme 
autonomy, especially with regard to the creation of legal norms and their refusal to be entirely 
subservient to the IOC. This perhaps explains why Chappelet claims that these bodies are now 
afforded a degree of leverage by the IOC when it comes to decision making.16 
The IOC can also recognise NOCs, and currently recognises more NOCs (206 with the 
addition of Kosovo not yet a UN member) than the UN does states (193 plus the non-member 
permanent observer states of the Holy See and Palestine).17 Hence IOC-NOC recognition is 
more than just permitting athletes to attend the Games. It gives the IOC significant power on 
the international legal stage. Particularly when it comes to new or potentially emerging states, 
such as Kosovo or Palestine - they seek international law recognition via their NOC’s 
                                                          
11
 The IOC may “grant formal recognition to the constituent actors of the Movement” (Rule 3.1 and Rule 18.2.8, 
Charter), which may be full, provisional or withdrawn. IOC recognition is desirable as it often comes with 
subsides. It recognises only one ISF per sport (currently 35 official sport ISFs (28 summer and 7 winter) and 34 
unofficial ISFs (sports not on the programme but may be or have been)), Chappelet, n.1. 
12
 Chappelet, n.1.  
13
 Which this thesis has accepted constitutes global sports law and the debate on its existence as a separate body 
of law from existing principles, is beyond this thesis. 
14
 Foster, Ken, ‘Is There a Global Sports Law?’ (2005) Vol 2(1) Entertainment and Sports Law Journal 1-18. 
15
 Foster, n. 14. See also Beloff, Michael J, ‘Is there a Lex Sportiva?’ (2005) Volume 3 August I.S.L.R. 49-60.  
16
 Chappelet, n.1. 
17
 It grants NOC status to additional entities such as overseas dependent territories like the British Virgin Islands. 
IOC, NOCs, <www.olympic.org/ioc-governance-national-olympic-committees> accessed 15th July 2015.  
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recognition. NOC recognition can be considered a political and legal statement, lending 
credence to the NOC’s state to be so considered under international law.  
However, in practice, the IOC only recognises one NOC per “state” leading many to 
claim it is simply rubber stamping, diminishing the IOC’s international power. However, 
occasionally more than one NOC per state is recognised, for example China, the Netherlands, 
the USA, the UK and NZ all have more than one NOC making their recognition more than 
rote.18 Whilst generally the IOC recognises NOCs from the same state entities as the UN, there 
are exceptions.  
Furthermore, IOC recognition is not always certain or rote. It has occasionally been 
refused to NOCs, such as to the Gibraltar Olympic Committee (GOC).19 The GOC were refused 
IOC recognition because the UK already had an NOC and it was thought that one of its overseas 
territories did not need its own NOC. The IOC also determined that the GOC did not fulfil the 
recognition criteria. However, the GOC claimed that the recognition criteria had been 
retrospectively changed to deliberately exclude them, and thus went against the IOC’s general 
policy of inclusion.20  
 
Nevertheless, the IOC is the governor, supreme authority, leader, decision-maker and 
recogniser of the Movement.21 It is the main primary and superior Olympic organ from which 
the bestowing of responsibilities and duties arises.22 It undertakes and generates the majority 
of the Movement’s work.23 It delegates work and roles to other Movement entities, in line with 
the OC.  
This and the Charter suggest that the Movement is a pyramid, with the IOC at the apex. 
This thesis’s submission of it as a web seems tenuous, as there appears no way to check the 
IOC’s unlimited power.24 Yet the Charter has envisaged a limit on the IOC’s powers, in turn 
                                                          
18
 Each having:- China, Hong Kong and Chinese Taipei; Netherlands and Aruba; USA, Puerto Rico, Virgin 
Islands, Guam, American Samoa: UK, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands; NZ and the Cook 
Islands. Ibid. See also Chappelet, n.1. 
19
 Beloff, Michael J., ‘The Specificity of Sport – rhetoric or reality?’ (2012) 4 International Sports Law Review 
97-107.  
20
 The GOC lost its case for IOC recognition in the Swiss courts. Ibid. See also Beloff, n. 19. 
21
 It is also the ultimate decision maker in appeals: “The authority of last resort on any question concerning the 
Games rests with the IOC” (Rule 58, Charter). 
22
 Via the Charter. 
23
 Rule 2, Charter sets the IOC 16 further tasks to ‘support and encourage’ or ‘take action.’ Six relate to the IOC’s 
supreme regulatory function, such as:- encouraging and supporting good governance in sport; encouraging and 
supporting the organisation, development and co-ordination of sport and sports competitions; strengthening the 
unity and independence of the Movement and sporting autonomy; leading the fight against doping and corruption; 
and opposing political or commercial abuse of sport.  
24
 All it would need do is withdraw a dissenting body’s recognition. 
19 
 
this promoting the concept of an Olympic web. For example, the Movement is meant to have 
three core actors:   
“The Charter defines the main reciprocal rights and obligations of the 
three main constituents of the Movement, namely the IOC, the ISFs 
and the NOCs, as well as the OCOGs, all of which are required to 
comply with the OC.”25 
These two other actors (the ISFs and the NOCs) are significant players within the Movement. 
Yet, some would say their power and authority is limited, to their own areas. Furthermore, their 
piecemeal composition inevitably makes them weaker than the IOC. However, this thesis 
asserts that it is their piecemeal nature that is their strength. Their numbers are legion and they 
are independent of the IOC. They are incorporated under their own statutes (albeit they must 
observe the Charter) and are geographically spread. This Chapter’s sections on ISFs and NOCs 
will show that this pyramid is incorrect. Yes, the IOC is a powerful actor, but it is a hub within 
a web, around which appear the other Movement actors – all linked together.  They must all 
co-operate. Each can able wield significant power should they so choose. 
 
 
2.3.3 IOC Structure 
The IOC is split into two ‘houses’: the Executive Board (Executive) and the Session. 
The Executive is the IOC’s executive and primary decision-maker and it can make quick 
decisions due to its regular meetings (four annually).26 It appears from the Charter that the 
Executive is the IOC’s powerhouse and primary institution, as it decides the Session’s agenda 
with ultimate authority over it.27 The Executive comprises 15 members: the IOC President acts 
as Chair; 4 Vice-Presidents; and 10 elected from the Session’s membership,28 and are usually 
the Chairs of the Athletes’ Commission, and the heads of associations of ISFs (ASOIF) or 
NOCs (ANOCA).29 The latter category has been accused of promoting their agendas and 
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 Introduction, c), Charter. Rule 1.3, Charter states that “The three main constituents of the Movement are the 
IOC, the ISFs and the NOCs.” Bearing in mind the Charter was adopted by the IOC. 
26
 Chappelet, n.1. The Executive “assumes the general overall responsibility for the administration of the IOC and 
the management of its affairs” (Rule 19.3, Charter). It also takes all IOC decisions that are legally binding with 
all powers that are not attributed to the Session (Rule 19.3.10, Charter). 
27
 Rule 19.3.7, Charter. 
28
 Unless provision has been made for an Extraordinary Session, Rule 18, Charter. 
29
 Chappelet, n.1. The IOC now also has 28 Commissions under its auspices: Ethics; Women in Sport; Olympic 
Solidarity; Legal Affairs; Marketing; and Co-ordination Commissions for upcoming Games. See also IOC 
Commissions, Revised in 2015,  
www.olympic.org/Documents/Commissions_PDFfiles/All_Commissions/2015_IOC_Commissions.pdf> 
accessed 2nd September 2015. 
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protecting their organisation’s influence which shows the web framework as the requisite 
impartiality and independence of an Executive member is blurred.30 
 The Executive is better placed to make decisions than the more pedestrian, annual 
Session – the IOC’s plenary body akin a general assembly.31 Despite the aforementioned 
Executive powers, the Session is still a powerful body keeping the Executive in check.32 It is 
the Session that can adopt or amend Charter rules, meaning it ultimately forms Olympic 
‘law’,33 it also elects Hosts and IOC members. Yet these electoral roles are done in tandem 
with the Executive.34 Both branches work together albeit the Executive appears the more 
dominant. 
 
2.3.4 A Voluntary Association of Individuals 
The IOC is a voluntary association of 115 individual members who hold office for eight 
years. Members represent and promote the IOC’s interests and Olympism in their respective 
states and worldwide.35 They are IOC spokespersons who promote the Charter’s Fundamental 
Principles. 36 They do not represent their states at the IOC and are not their state’s delegates.37 
They are to be independent of their governments.38 IOC members swear an oath reaffirming 
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 Chappelet, n.1. 
31
 An ordinary Session must occur annually to deal with IOC business, such as a Host election (Rule 33.4 and 
18.2.4, Charter). See also Chappelet, n.1. 
32
 Chappelet, n.1. 
33
 Rule 18.2.1, Charter. However, the Executive can comment on the viability of any proposed amendment (Rule 
19.3.4, Charter). 
34
 The Executive can recommend IOC members to the Session (Rule 19.3.5, Charter) and the procedure for Host 
election (Rule 19.3.6, Charter) but the Session elects both. (Rules 18.2.4, 18.2.2, 18.2.9 and 18.2.3 respectively).  
35
 Rule 16.1.4, Charter, “Members of the IOC represent and promote the interests of the IOC and of the Movement 
in their countries”. This is obvious from ‘of’ and not ‘at’ the IOC, Mestre, Alexandre Miguel, The Law of the 
Olympic Games (Asser Press, 2009). 
36
 Mestre, n. 35. See also Chappelet, n 1. 
37
 IOC members are not paid but receive expenses, such as rooms at the Lausanne Palace Hotel for the President 
($400,000 in 2004), to $3,000 worth of expenses for Executive members and $1,400 for general members per 
meeting, Ibid.  
38
 They are not to “accept from governments, organisations or other parties, any mandate or instructions liable to 
interfere with the freedom of their action and vote” (Rule 16.1.5, Charter). Mestre claims non-politicisation stems 
to Coubertin: if IOC members were direct (or indirect) representatives of their states then this would lead to 
governments promoting (national) agendas at the Games, and politicise the IOC. Although Coubertin supported 
a necessary functioning level of politicism within the Movement. It was actually Brundage (IOC President 27 
years after Coubertin) who was opposed to their politicisation.  These Rules would require redrafting to accept 
the necessary politicisation of the Movement and Games and culpability of NOCs for their state’s actions in peace 
and security. Ibid.  
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this.39 However, they do not have to be wholly independent of governments as they may be 
influenced as long as it does not interfere with their Olympic duties.40  
Membership may be categorised as: independent; and those whose memberships exists 
and lasts for the duration of another office they hold.41 It is this second category that generates 
claims that they may not be fulfilling their required function of representing the IOC at their 
own organisation. Instead, they may be promoting personal agendas, rather than the IOC’s. For 
example, if a person is appointed to the IOC as International Association of Athletics 
Federations’(IAAF) President, they may attend Lausanne meetings with their IAAF hat and 
not their IOC hat. This may impede the IOC’s impartiality and independence.42 Nevertheless 
as both NOCs and ISFs have ‘seats at the IOC table’, this promotes the idea of an Olympic 
web. 
Many still claim that the IOC is elite or under-representative, as it was in Coubertin’s 
day, which hampers its universality – the second aspect to Olympic Singularity. Ettinger claims 
that nepotism was rife and members nominated successors based on personal connections.43 
Nevertheless, accusations of under representation of women,44 non-Europeans45 and young 
persons,46 have somewhat been remedied and thus the IOC can be considered ‘more universal’ 
now. This is because the IOC instigated compositional reforms in 1999 following the Host 
election scandal.47 Now in addition to more women and an age limit of 70 years old, many new 
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 The oath requires them to “promote in all circumstances the interests of the IOC and … the Movement” and to 
keep themselves “free from any political or commercial influence and from any racial or religious consideration”. 
Rule 16.1.3, Charter. 
40
 This was an issue in the SLC Host election scandal - it suggests gift giving is not per se unethical, but only the 
resultant election sway. The SLC OCOG bribed an IOC official to elect it as Host by paying his daughter’s tuition, 
rent and expenses totalling nearly $110,000. Evidence of gift-giving, flying 70 of the 100 IOC members to SLC, 
and outright bribes was also found. Boyes, Simon, ‘The International Olympic Committee and Bribery Scandal’ 
(1999) Volume 2(2) S.L.B. 14. See also Shephard, Alicia C., Any Olympian Scandal, April 1999 AJR. 
41
 Although there is always potential for re-election (Rule 16.1.1, Charter). The IOC members who hold other 
offices are ISF Presidents, NOC Presidents or those from the Athletes commission. Each of these has a maximum 
of 15 (Rule 16.1.1, Charter) and overall, the ‘linked’ category must not exceed 40, or 70 for independent members, 
Chappelet, n. 1. See also, Mestre, n. 35. 
42
 The IOC is “to oppose any political or commercial abuse of sport and athletes”, which likely includes intra-
organisational disputes (Rule 2.10, Charter). See also Chappelet, n.1. 
43
 Ettinger, n.2. 
44
 Chappelet identified 12 female members at his writing in 2004, although now there are 26, Chappelet, n.1. See 
also, IOC Members <www.olympic.org/ioc-members-list> accessed 1st October 2015. 
45
 Nafziger discusses the unfairness of the IOC’s European dominance, as 46 were European and only 1 out of the 
10 Presidents was not European (Avery Brundage was American, but still shows the Anglo-European dominance 
at the IOC). Europeans also dominate CAS and ISF lead roles (ranging from 40-80%), and as Hosts (summer or 
winter Games) (over 60%, and now is just under this figure following Rio 2016 Games, 2018 Pyeongchang and 
2022 Beijing). Nafziger, James A. R., The Handbook of International Sports Law (EE Publishing Ltd 2013). 
46
 There were claims of age bias, as the average age was 61, many are now 30 – 40 years old, Chappelet, n. 1. See 
also, IOC Members <www.olympic.org/ioc-members-list> accessed 1st October 2015. 
47
 It was discovered that IOC members had behaved inappropriately by rigging Host elections for: SLC 2002, 
Nagano 1998, Sydney 2000 and Atlanta 1996. Five IOC members were expelled/resigned with more sanctioned. 
The IOC (upon media and sponsor pressure), established the Ethics Commission and a Code of Ethics in 1999. 
22 
 
members are ex-athletes. The IOC has also created the linked category of membership to ISFs 
and NOCs and no more life members have been added, preventing constant re-election and 
twenty year Presidencies.48 The IOC would therefore assert that its membership is no longer as 
elite. Yet IOC membership is largely European drawing from: royalty;49 law and academic 
professionals;50 public officials or ex-politicians;51 journalists;52 influential business-people;53 
and with the vast majority being (ex-)athletes or sports administrators.54  
 
2.3.5 IOC Universalism 
The second aspect of Olympic Singularity is that the Movement is universal. This 
universality is (one reason) why the Movement should be a single webbed organ. Hence, is the 
IOC a universal actor within the Movement? 
There are 115 IOC members and yet 206 NOCs and 193 states.55 Mestre calls this a 
large gulf of non-inclusion hindering IOC universalism.56 Even if all 115 IOC members had 
115 different nationalities, many states would still lack an IOC representative. The political 
neutrality of IOC members does not circumvent this – there is still not an IOC ambassador in 
many states.  
This is compounded by there actually being only 72 different nationalities of IOC 
members.57 Certain states, such as the UK and Switzerland, have four each.58 Consequently the 
IOC is not fully represented in many states and non-state territories with NOCs. Large countries 
that perform well at the Games have the most IOC members. If lack of IOC representation 
                                                          
Some claim the Commission lacks independence as it is an IOC subsidiary - up to 4 out of the 9 Commission 
members are IOC members, selected by the IOC President (and the Executive) on their reputation. The 
Commission reports to the IOC’s Executive who ultimately decide on any recommendations. Chappelet, n. 1. 
48
 For example, Brundage’s term spanned 1952-1972. Chappelet, n.1. Life members were co-opted before 1966 
and an 80 years’ age limit was imposed for those elected before 1999, Byelaw 2.6.1, Rule 16, Charter.  
49
 There are 10 royals (9% of the IOC):- HRH the Princess Royal, HSH the Sovereign Prince Albert II, HSH the 
Princess Nora of Liechtenstein, Sheikh Ahmad Al-Fahad Al-Sabah, HRH the Grand Duke of Luxembourg, HH 
Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al-Thani, HRH Prince Tunku Imran, HRH Prince Feisal Al Hussein, Baron Pierre-
Olivier Beckers-Vieujant and , IOC Members, n. 45.  
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means poor Game performance, this can only exacerbate it.59 The Games and IOC would 
feature political powers, western and east-Asian states. It would be their social-legal and 
political norms that would steer the Movement. This inhibits the ability of the IOC, as a stand-
alone actor to be universal. However, as it links up within the wider Movement, this is refuted.  
Nevertheless, the Games themselves are unrivalled which contributes to their 
universality. No other event can match it. FIFA’s (Federation Internationale de Football 
Association) world cup (WC) might draw similar viewing figures but it pales beside the Games 
in terms of universalism. The WC separates male and female competition and coverage of the 
latter is on a drastically smaller scale. FIFA has undergone recent corruption scandals meaning 
it is 15 years behind the IOC in terms of transparency, and the rule of law. The WC only has 
one event whereas the Games include many different sports with a multitude of winners. Teams 
must qualify for the WC final, which is capped in their number. 
Therefore, the Games and the Movement are universal, potentially only rivalled by the 
UN and ICRC and GCs. This universality requires its special consideration as an atypical 
subject with personality. 
2.4 National Olympic Committees 
2.4.1 History  
Historically NOCs were non-permanent foreign correspondents of the IOC that were 
established in advance of every Games.60 However, in 1921 Coubertin called for their 
permanence to further advance the Movement’s goals.61  
 
2.4.2 Role and Rights of NOCs  
2.4.2.1 Promotion of Olympism and the Movement 
NOCs have several roles that vary in importance, sphere and their resultant 
obligations.62 The most obvious one – sending teams to the Games is discussed below. Whereas 
their overall mission is to:-  
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“to develop, promote and protect the Movement in their respective countries in 
accordance with the Charter”63, and to “promote the Fundamental Principles and values 
of Olympism in their countries”.64 
They are to promote and represent the Movement and Olympism within their home nations and 
be independent of governmental influence. NOCs do not represent their home states at the IOC, 
as it is often erroneously assumed.65 This home representation makes them effective grassroots 
players.66 It also supports the idea of the Movement as a universal web as it means that the 
Movement has representation in 206 jurisdictions. 
NOC independence could exist in order for them to absorb the risks and responsibilities 
of co-hosting the Games, instead of the IOC. This is a major reason that the Movement should 
be viewed as a singular web, so that this cannot occur, to prevent the IOC from escaping 
commitments. 
Rule 27.2 contains six further roles for NOCs, many of which show the Olympic web 
in which the NOC operates.67 They must adopt and implement the World Anti-Doping Code 
(WADC) which links the Olympic web.68 Furthermore, this Olympic web stretches into the 
state system here as WADC is legitimised by the UNESCO International Convention Against 
Doping in Sport in 2005, which requires state parties to comply with WADC’s principles.69 
Furthermore, NOCs have the onerous task of ensuring Charter observance within their 
countries, giving them a judicial role over the other Movement branches, again demonstrating 
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the web.70 If NOCs are to enforce Charter observance, then their national courts or CAS must 
enforce the OC. Which again shows the Olympic framework with CAS and a linking to the 
state system. 
Alongside these functions NOCs have many corresponding rights which demonstrate 
the Olympics’ web framework. They have the sole authority for suggesting Hosts but they must 
work with national authorities and lobby at the IOC for election.71 Furthermore, as mentioned 
in section 2.3.2 above, the IOC is strict about NOC recognition which controls who can use 
Olympic intellectual property.72 IOC recognition can always be revoked, for example, the 
Executive will revoke if something within the NOC or its associated territory threatens the 
Movement.73 This is a definitive linking of the NOC to governmental responsibility/liability, 
which shall now be discussed further, and illustrates vast international Olympic web.74 
 
2.4.2.2 Sending Teams to the Olympic Games    
 NOCs may have another, more central function: that of sending teams to the. This role 
is contained in Rule 27.3 and states that: 
 “NOCs have the exclusive authority for the representation of their 
respective countries at the Games …. in addition, each NOC is obliged 
to participate in the Games … by sending athletes.”75 
The second part of this Rule is clear – NOCs must send teams to the Games.  
 
2.4.2.3 Compromising political independence 
NOCs represent their ‘countries’ at the Games as specified by the Charter.76 NOCs 
bring the state political system to the Games – a definite hitching of the Olympic web to the 
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international state system.77 They are the sporting manifestations of their states, backed and 
condoned by government institutions. NOCs are often government subsidised, enabling many 
developing world NOCs to exist as the funds they receive from Olympic Solidarity would not 
be enough.78 This independence from governments does not always exist in practice. 
Consequently, Charter references to ‘countries’ compromises NOC (and the 
Movement’s) political independence. NOCs, and the whole Movement, are meant to be 
impartial and independent of governments.79  
Olympic Solidarity gives NOCs funds to prevent them relying on governmental aid.80 
And again this shows the web that links the Movement together. 
 
2.4.2.4 Potential Waiver of Political Independence 
However, the Charter recognises that at times there may be a compromise of NOC’s 
political independence:-  
“NOCs may cooperate with governmental bodies, with which they 
shall achieve harmonious relations. However, they shall not associate 
themselves with any activity which would be in contradiction with the 
OC. The NOCs may also cooperate with non-governmental bodies.”81 
A literal interpretation of this is that NOCs may be politically compromised and lack 
independence, as long as Charter principles are not compromised. Hence, NOC autonomy is 
balanced against such necessary cooperation. 
 
2.4.2.5 Why permit Political dependency? 
The only feasible justifications for the Charter’s use of ‘countries’ and the Charter’s 
recognition that NOC’s may have to work with governments, is that the Charter refers to a 
geographical or ‘sporting’ country, rather than a political one. The former could offer a new 
definition of country drawing on the specificity of sport. Beloff notes that ‘sporting nationality’ 
differs to legal or political nationality, and has long existed.82 Sporting bodies and competitions 
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“do not align with conventional political or geographical boundaries”.83 This was the British 
court’s view in Reel v Holder (1981), where a sporting “country”, was not necessarily linked 
to a national or sovereign state.84 Instead, a sporting country refers to the area over which an 
NSF relates.85 This meant that Taiwan’s 1956 affiliation to the IAAF was valid alongside 
mainland China’s 1954 admission.86 To Beloff, a ‘country’, may have different legal-political 
and sporting meanings.87 Political recognition via NOCs may be sought which shows that 
NOCs are politicised and lack independence.  
If sporting countries differ to legal-political ones, then they are defined by NOCs, ISFs 
and NSFs, differing from sport to sport, with a lack of unity and cohesion. This can leave NOCs 
unclear as to who and what they actually represent. Their jurisdictions could differ depending 
on the sport.  However, Byelaw 2.1 to Rules 27 and 28 somewhat clarifies matters here. This 
states that NOCs “constitute, organise and lead their respective delegations at the Games”. 
NOCs can therefore organise and choose their delegation (rather than state). 
 
2.4.3 Composition and Universalism of NOCs 
The composition of NOCs is relevant. If they share commonalities across different 
jurisdictions, this can show that the Movement is a singular webbed organ and reinforce NOC 
universalism, the second aspect of Olympic Singularity. 
NOCs vary greatly from country to country in their form, permanence and status. The 
Charter does not prescribe their form – leaving this up to the individual NOC.88 This room for 
manoeuvre is necessary as NOCs are constituted under their own domestic legal systems which 
vary and recognise different entities.89 This makes harmonisation difficult and could potentially 
weaken the Movement’s web framework.  
However, the Charter does attempt to harmonise their order – if not their composition.90 
They do share commonalties which strengthens their universalism and the idea of an Olympic 
web. For example, NOCs must include certain key players that exist within their territory: IOC 
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members; heads of NSFs; and any athlete IOC representatives.91 Hence the same individuals 
appear in NOCs, ISFs/NSFs and the IOC, yet presumably remembering to be independent and 
apolitical. 
Mestre details the different types of NOCs that exist. Some are created by statute backed 
and endorsed by governments and legislatures, giving them specific statuses and roles.92 This 
links the ‘Olympic web’ to the international state system. Legislative recognition of NOCs 
means they cannot be considered independent of their states. For example, the US’s NOC 
(USOC) was created by the Amateur Sports Act and it must report to the US government.93 
This Act states that sport has an international structure with the Charter at the peak of the 
pyramid, and that it ranks above ISF rules and regulations and regional bodies.94 Whilst this 
suggests an Olympic pyramid (rather than a web), it says that it is the Charter that is at the 
peak, and not the IOC (although the IOC drafts this). This therefore could actually promote the 
idea of an Olympic web, as the Charter could be the webbing linking the Movement together.95 
The French National Olympic and Sports Committee (FOC) has a public service 
mission, although it is an association governed by private law.96 French law requires its statutes 
be approved by the French Council of State.97 This is in line with the French juridification of 
sport where the Loi du Sport creates a sporting regulatory framework.98 Hence the Olympic 
web has linked up to the state system in France. 
The Italian NOC (CONI) is a confederation of NSFs which give it a unique personality. 
It is recognised under public law, although it is a non-governmental/ public economic body.99 
CONI is kept under review by the Italian government but it does not need their approval to act. 
Its hybrid nature means CONI has a dual function: it has a “fiduciary relationship with the 
IOC”, but it “is also the public body that over-sees the entire organisation and regulation of 
Italian sport.”100 Hence CONI shows a clear linking of the Olympic web to the state here.  
NOCs like CONI cannot be viewed as independent of the bodies that found or review them.  
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Mestre notes these types of NOCs contrast to the majority of countries whose laws are 
silent on NOCs. This does not necessarily make them more independent or divided from their 
states - as most NOCs still depend on state given operating funds.101 Although some are 
completely independent of their public authorities.102 For example, the BOA is a private 
company limited by guarantee with the same obligations as every other private UK company 
limited by guarantee.103 UK legislation is silent on the BOA in line with how our legislature, 
government and judiciary treat sport.104 Thus the BOA is independent of all UK government 
bodies and offices.105 
Some NOCs are more subsumed into their state than others, despite their supposed 
independence. Yet in reality the two are often not separate, and no more so than when NOCs 
enter Host agreements with governmental authorities and when OCOGs are considered.106 
Therefore they should have a measure of this atypical status recognised by having limited 
personality. The introduction of CAS means that the whole Olympic system (IOCs, NOCs, 
N/ISFs, CAS, and OCOGs) are collectively linked up to states.  
 
2.5 International Sporting Federations 
ISFs are the third core actor of the Movement and are groupings of NSFs. Their 
examination could help prove that the Movement is one large universal web that exists to stage 
the Games. Within this web, ISFs are particularly powerful and multi-faceted. 
 
2.5.1 Role 
Within the Movement, ISF’s primary roles are to be responsible for their sport at the 
Games: its rules, their enforcement and their sport’s development.107 Out-with the Movement, 
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they govern, administer, manage, develop and promote their sport internationally.108 ISF entry 
to the Movement, like NOC entry, is dependent on IOC recognition as:-  
“the IOC may recognise as ISFs INGOs administering one or several 
sports at world level and encompassing organisations administering 
such sports at national level. The statutes, practice and activities of the 
ISFs … must be in conformity with the Charter … and … WADC. 
Subject to the foregoing, each ISF maintains its independence and 
autonomy in the administration of its sport.”109 
This is remarkable for three reasons. Firstly, the IOC is the body that bestows recognition on 
ISFs should they wish to have their sport at the Games. Whilst the IOC is again the gate-keeper 
suggesting it is all-powerful in a pyramid framework, this perception diminishes as ISFs ‘own’ 
their sport at the Games. IOC authority wanes when viewed against that of ISFs. With the 
shared purpose of the Games, ISFs link to the IOC. Secondly, the ISFs are yet another 
Movement body that must promote Olympism and act in accordance with the Olympic spirit.110 
As all Movement bodies must promote this – this role unifies them, suggesting the Movement 
is a singular actor.  
Thirdly, they are conglomerations of NSFs, and specifically labelled as INGOs.111 ISFs 
recognise NSFs and impose rules on them, ensuring their universal and uniform application.112 
Therefore they inherently have an informal degree of international recognition that should be 
formalised within the Movement. ISFs as part of the Movement, strengthen the Olympic 
Singularity notion of Olympic universalism - they contain an NSF in most states - which in 
turn reinforces the web framework.113  
As ISF’s rules/laws seep into ‘foreign’ legal systems, despite an ISF being incorporated 
within one state, this gives them an international law-making role.114 Leading some to assert 
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that they should have personality especially for the UN relations as a gap exists between their 
function and their legal personality.115 ISF universalism and their law-making role (and the 
Movement’s), demonstrates their special nature and necessity to have atypical subject status 
and personality under international law. 
 
2.5.1.1 ISFs and Law-Making 
Any assertions that ISFs make law, opens up a debate which is beyond this thesis.116 
Much academic attention has already been given to whether ISFs make a new substantive area 
of law based on the unique characteristics of sport (its specificity), or simply transnationally 
apply and enforce their rules, using existing national, European and international laws, to 
sport.117  
If ISFs do create new law from their legislation, cases and tribunals (especially CAS) 
then it would have five features. Firstly, such ‘law’ is transnational. ISFs apply it to their 
various NSFs, crossing many state boundaries. Secondly, it is autonomous. It is created by ISFs 
only for those within its governance. ISFs thereby attempt to circumvent national courts and 
legislation for sporting disputes. Instead they force use of their internal institutions or CAS. 
This implies ISFs (and their rules) are out-with or immune to national laws.118 This is the third 
feature of ‘ISF sport law’: that it is global law without a state.119 Fourthly, it justifies this as the 
parties contractually consented to such rules, making it a private contractual legal order.120 
Finally, it has developed from transnational legal norms into unique universal legal principles. 
This potential legal pluralism shows the extent to which ISFs desire to maintain autonomy in 
their field. ISFs as private international bodies (INGOs) may be able to create law, and not just 
the state.121 A worthy precedent for a singular Movement claim ownership and enforcement 
for a Truce Treaty. 
ISFs are almost unique amongst INGOs in asserting that they create laws.122 The IAAF 
even stated that their rules were supreme in the 1992 US case of Reynolds v Athletics Congress 
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of the USA Inc. (1991).123 Here, a rule banned alleged dopers from US Olympic Team try-outs, 
excluding Reynolds was excluded and sought to challenge this.124 The court ruled he was 
allowed to try-out as potential irreparable harm outweighed the other considerations. If 
Reynolds qualified, his eligibility would be reviewed then. Here the courts applied US law. 
However, this does not mean that ISFs do not create law. The court avoided such a 
determination here. They would make such a decision if Reynolds qualified – a neat side step. 
Therefore, there is still the potential that ISFs (like the IAAF), can create laws that rank higher 
than domestic laws, as asserted here.  
The British courts take a firmer stance regarding ISFs and potential law-making.125 
They do not recognise NSFs/ISFs as having governmental or quasi-governmental status, nor 
any law-making functions implying legal sovereignty or immunity from the law.126 In Cooke v 
Football Association (1972) a football player wished to leave an Irish club for an English 
club.127 However the rules of FIFA, the Irish Football Association (IFA) and the Football 
Association (FA), prevented this.128 The courts held that FIFA would need to change its rules 
as otherwise it meant enforcing a contract in restraint of trade. Cooke shows that English courts 
will enforce national law on NSFs and ISFs instead of their internal rules. However, this case 
was from 1972 before the EU doctrine of specificity of sport. Nevertheless, following Bosman, 
it would likely still be decided in the same way.129 
However, in another British case, Reel v Holder, the Court upheld ISF rules regarding 
the definition of a sporting country.130 At first this seems to contravene Cooke, by saying that 
ISFs rules are supreme to domestic laws. However, Lord Denning stated that the court’s task 
was to interpret IAAF rules and to ignore issues of sovereignty and international law.  
These cases show that there is no definitive position by the courts on supremacy of ISF 
generated rules. They seek to avoid such determinations with a variety of excuses and 
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loopholes. This thesis approaches this debate with an equally un-definitive but balanced view 
recognising it is beyond its scope. It accepts that precedent has established that agreements 
have created rules that parties observe transnationally.131 It also accepts that there may be a lex 
sportiva (sports law) in certain circumstances regarding certain rules.132 This thesis focuses on 
the effect - which is the same whether or not the rules are law. In effect, ISFs have created rules 
that are observed, giving the Movement a precedent for ensuring observance of laws that it can 
apply to a Truce/Treaty and of being a significant international player within the Movement. 
This in turn categorically refutes the idea of a pyramid framework, and shows conclusively the 
inter-linking web. 
 
 
2.5.2 – Jurisdiction 
ISFs incorporate in different jurisdictions around the world. However most incorporate 
in only a few jurisdictions with the majority of Olympic recognised sports choosing 
Switzerland.133 Incorporation in the UK is the closest second, with only four ISFs on the 
Olympic programme choosing it.134  
As mentioned with regard to the IOC, Switzerland gives many geographical, political 
and legal advantages of incorporation to ISFs to attract them. However, it does not afford ISFs 
as many rights or recognitions as the IOC, despite the clamouring of certain ISFs for equal 
treatment.135 Swiss authorities must rank ISFs below the IOC supporting this thesis’s 
submission that the IOC is at the centre of the web.136  
As well as its political neutrality and stability, Switzerland hosts the IOC’s and CAS. 
Many ISFs will seek to curry their favour and recognition by close incorporation.137 Existing 
sporting bodies attract yet more ISFs.138 Within Switzerland the majority of ISFs register in 
Lausanne or its surrounding canton. Dudognon notes a deliberate policy of hospitality by the 
Swiss authorities towards ISFs with Lausanne attempting to consolidate its status as ‘Olympic 
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capital’.139 A look at the benefits offered to ISFs by Switzerland will show the linking of the 
whole Olympic web as one, and its hitching to the state system. 
 
2.5.2.1 Taxation Benefits 
Dudognon asserts that due to the sheer volume of ISFs incorporating in Switzerland, 
the overwhelmingly predominant reasons for its selection, must be economic and legal. 
The Swiss Federal Council passed a Decree in 2008 that unified the different tax 
exemption provisions amongst the different Cantons.140 Swiss national law now exempts legal 
entities such as ISFs from direct Federal taxation if they have a public service goal. An 
advantageous tax provision. Later in the same month, the Decree was expanded by a circular 
to the Canton Tax authorities specifying who would qualify for exemption, and this specifically 
included IOC recognised ISFs (as international confederations) but not Swiss NSFs or regional 
federations.141 This leads Dudognon to surmise that IOC recognition of ISFs has legal 
consequences beyond the sporting, and reaffirms the web where all the actors link up together 
and then to the Swiss authorities. 
 
2.5.2.2 Legal Benefits 
Switzerland also draws ISFs by offering them a desirable business vehicle: the 
association. These are similar to the voluntary associations recognised in the UK.142 Article 60 
of the Swiss Civil Code makes their formation easy – they do not have to give much specificity 
for their internal structure and have a flexible framework. Article 60 states that:- 
“1) Associations with a political, religious, scientific, cultural, 
charitable, social or other non-commercial purpose acquire legal 
personality as soon as their intention to exist as a corporate body is 
apparent from their articles of association (AoA). 2) The AoA must be 
done in writing and indicate the objects…, its resources and its 
organisation.” 
This requires associations to have written AoA that clearly indicate their objects 
(purpose) and once this exists, the association legally exists. They only require a minimum of 
two people to establish AoA between them and appoint directors and auditors.143 There is no 
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need for registration (and payment of a fee) in the commercial register unless it conducts 
“commercial operation(s)”.144 Consequently associations can include Not For Profit 
Organisations and (I)NGOs, political parties, Trade Unions and ISFs such as FIFA.145  
As ISFs must use the vehicles available to them in the state they choose for 
incorporation, the existence of the association in Switzerland is attractive to ISFs. Again Swiss 
law seems to be particularly welcoming.146 Despite the international nature of ISFs, they and 
their founding documents are governed by Swiss law with potential recourse to the Swiss 
courts. This may dispel their ‘internationality’ but does link the Olympic web to the state web 
in Switzerland. 
 
2.5.2.3 Problems of Swiss Incorporation 
 As the majority of ISFs are headquartered in Switzerland this could be seen to hinder 
their universalism, their international status, and the web-framework, three aspects upon which 
Olympic Singularity rests. That they are not truly international. However, when it is 
remembered that ISFs are considered conglomerations of NSFs, this is put to rest. 
What is not so easily dismissed is that a glut of Swiss incorporated ISFs means that 
Swiss influence increases. It is their laws that are uplifted by ISFs across the world and over 
the Movement, which compromises ISF autonomy and independence. The Swiss Federal 
Supreme Court can even annul CAS rulings on limited grounds.147 This is striking for two 
reasons. Firstly, it means that the Swiss Federal Court can overrule CAS, the supreme judicial 
authority of the Movement and consequently, Olympic decision making. And secondly, the 
choice of national jurisdiction for ISFs is important as it promulgates that state’s national laws 
potentially over CAS and the Movement, which in this case is Switzerland. Nevertheless, 
whether CAS is used or Swiss-courts-using-CAS-principles, this still shows that the Olympic 
web reaches widely and is definitively linked to at least one state’s legal system: Switzerland. 
Furthermore, Dudognon notes that whilst the applicable law to ISF disputes is Swiss, 
the Swiss courts are eschewed in favour of CAS. Yet in reality CAS applies either the 
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appropriate ISF rules, or national laws if the parties have not agreed to the application of 
different laws, meaning that Swiss influence wanes here as rules are applied first.148 
 
2.5.2.4 International Incorporation 
Switzerland’s offering of the significantly unregulated association is attractive to ISFs. 
Although many other state’s national laws may be more onerous for ISF incorporation, they 
may carry other advantages in lieu of this.149 Hence a brief look at other state’s attitudes 
towards ISFs can show that they, and consequently the Movement, are welcomed into the 
international world. 
France has beneficial laws regarding articles of association for sporting bodies (ISFs), 
they also offer ‘associations’.150 Compared to Swiss associations, French ones only require one 
person but that it must be not-for-profit. They may only have separate legal personality if they 
publish certain personal information.151 Some founders may object to this and hence the 
association remains without legal personality.152 Nevertheless, both France and Switzerland 
legally welcome ISFs, thus there is a definite linking of the sporting Olympic system to nation 
states here.153  
After Switzerland, the UK is the most popular choice for Olympic ISFs to incorporate 
in. Only two ISFs incorporated on the UK’s mainland, being sailing in Southampton,154 and 
curling in Perth.155 The remainder ‘British’ ISFs favour the Bahamas,156 the British Virgin 
Islands157 and the Isle of Man - each will have its own taxation requirements and law.158 Thus 
this shows a definite linking of the Olympic to the state system here, especially as many of 
these overseas territories have their own NOC. 
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The majority of British incorporated ISFs favour ‘private companies limited by 
guarantee’, rather than voluntary or unincorporated association.159 British associations are not 
as liberally construed as Swiss or French ones as they offer members no protection against 
personal liability of debts. Instead, a company limited by guarantee protects ISFs with the 
corporate veil and limited liability. Guarantors need only ‘invest’ a small amount of capital and 
have corresponding liability.160 Hence the main legal benefits of ISFs incorporating in the UK 
are limited liability (although this is not exclusive to the UK) and maintaining cultural links to 
the country with which the sport has a form of historical affiliation. 
Historical links help explain why the ISF for taekwondo remains in the Republic of 
Korea and why badminton is incorporated in Malaysia due to its far eastern popularity.161 
However, this does not explain why the ISFs for athletics and the modern pentathlon are 
incorporated under Monegasque law.162 Monaco, similar to Switzerland, offers beneficial tax 
and association provisions that ISFs take advantage of with the IAAF officially moving its 
headquarters there in 1993. This leads Dudognon to surmise that the primary motivating reason 
for ISFs in selecting Switzerland is economic rather than legal; nevertheless, the result of Swiss 
generosity is the promulgation of its laws within the Olympic system. Hence at the least, the 
Olympic system links to Switzerland, if not globally. And whilst the Swiss predominance 
diminishes the idea of ISF universalism, it does show that the ISFs are linked as one to the IOC 
and hence must be thought of as a singular entity. 
 
2.6 - Conclusion 
 The Movement comprises a variety of different core actors: the IOC; the NOCs; and 
the ISFs. It is their shared purpose of staging the Games that brings them together under the 
Movement, therefore this is inherently part of Olympic Singularity. Only ISFs have a role out-
with the Movement, existing for their own means. Although the Games are likely the highlight 
of their sporting calendar, with only a few sports having exceptions to this.163 Therefore the 
                                                          
159
 Such as cricket. Dudognon, n. 108. An unincorporated association is established by agreement amongst those 
with a view other than making a profit and often includes sports clubs. Individual members are personally 
responsible for its debts and contractual obligations. They require no registration and have no set-up fees. 
Conservative and Unionist Central Office v Burrell [1981] EWCA Civ 2. 
160
 S3(3) and s5 of the Companies Act 2006. 
161
 World Taekwondo Federation <www.worldtaekwondofederation.net/> and Badminton World Federation 
<http://bwfbadminton.org/> both accessed 18th November 2015. 
162
 Under Monegasque Law No. 1.355. See also Dudognon, n.108. 
163
 FIFA has the World Cup; the ITF has Wimbledon. 
38 
 
third aspect of Olympic Singularity is conclusively proven: these actors share the same purpose 
of staging the Games. This is despite the fact that not all of them are directly involved in this. 
The fact that these actors come together for this shared purpose inherently makes the 
Movement a web: staging the Games and guided by the humanitarian principles of Olympism. 
The Games could not occur if one of the actors were missing, hence they are all important and 
necessary. However, within this the IOC has many reasons to think itself supreme, such as the 
frequent Charter references to it and the fact that it can delegate to and recognise NOCs and 
ISFs. However, the number of ISFs and NOCs and their reach across the world into 206 
different territories and the tens of sports it covers is a necessary counter-balance to this claim 
which proves the third aspect of Olympic Singularity - universalism. Furthermore, ISFs and 
NOCs can also be considered to be part of the IOC reaffirming the web construct: heads of 
their associations are automatically members of the IOC. Therefore, to divide them is incorrect, 
albeit when they wear their IOC hat, they are meant to be independent of their NOC or ISF 
agendas.  
Also in terms of their powers ISFs can weaken the IOC’s authority as they govern their 
sport, setting the rules the sports observe at the Games. They (as well as the IOC) can be 
considered a significant law-maker. NOCs can also counteract this IOC authority as they are 
the ones, working with NSFs and ISFs that select teams that attend the Games. Hence they 
choose the highly visible actors and can wield influence this way. 
It can be said that the Movement is a murky far-reaching web, whose shared purpose 
brings them together. Thus it must be considered a singular entity, which helps answer in the 
affirmative the first research question: Should the Movement be viewed as one entity. This will 
help to clarify the framework and to add credence to it being a powerful and unique actor able 
to step into the mantle of regulating the Truce and potential Treaty. 
The next Chapter will demonstrate why viewing the movement as one web is necessary. 
It is only together that the Movement is strong enough or sufficiently akin other atypical actors, 
to justify its international propulsion. Each Olympic organ contains only part of the puzzle, or 
some of the features justifying an atypical status and quasi-personality: their shared purpose of 
Games staging backed by humanitarian Olympism; their universalism; and the web’s 
attachment to the state system. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Is the IOC a regular INGO or an atypical subject of international law? 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter Three focuses on the fourth aspect of Olympic Singularity – whether the IOC 
has been incorrectly taxonomised as a regular INGO by existing academic attention rather than 
an atypical international law subject, and by its own OC. This Chapter will examine whether 
the IOC’s special nature has created a new type of INGO akin the ICRC or other atypical 
subjects. It shall do this by examining the UN’s INGO checklist to see whether it fits neatly 
into the INGO box. It will determine whether the IOC is afforded extensive liberties, rights, 
recognitions and treatments by law, states and the international community. It will then 
examine current subjects of international law to determine whether the Movement can fit into 
any of the existing non-state categories. 
If the IOC is something unexpected and unique, when this ‘singularity’ is added to 
Chapter Two’s findings of a singular universal Olympic web, credence is added to the two 
research questions of this thesis: that the Movement should be viewed as one singular and 
special entity; capable of governing the Truce and potential treaty. If the IOC is something 
‘new and unique’ at the core level, then this reasoning can be extended to the macro level.  
 
3.2 The IOC as an INGO 
The Charter is the best place to start any examination of the IOC. Its Rule 15 appears 
initially, to determine the issue, as it states that:-1  
“The IOC is an international non-governmental not-for-profit 
organisation, of unlimited duration, in the form of an association with 
the status of a legal person, recognised by the Swiss Federal Council in 
accordance with an agreement entered into on 1 November 2000.” 
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This Rule refers to two important legal attributes of the IOC. That it is an INGO and that it has 
‘the status of a legal person’. It does not mention the status of the Movement generally nor that 
of the other core actors nor whether this personality is international or not.2  
Consequently, this raises the issue of whether the IOC is a typical INGO or whether it 
is something beyond its existing confines encroaching on the categories of atypical subjects? 
It is submitted here that existing writers are erroneous in their swiftness to accept such easy 
taxonomy of the IOC’s as a regular INGO. By applying the UN’s INGO checklist tests it will 
be shown that the IOC greatly surpasses these so that a new entity has been created and thus 
proves the fourth aspect of Olympic Singularity. Thereafter, subjects of international law will 
be examined to discover whether sufficient similarities exist between them and the Movement 
to justify its inclusion there.  
 
3.3 Application of INGO Criteria to the International Olympic Committee 
The UN has laid down criteria for the establishment and recognition of (I)NGOs.3 UN 
recognised INGOs may become UN observers, UN consultants or official UN partners. 
Furthermore, INGOs are increasingly being recognised as relevant international actors.4  
The laying down of UN criteria means that the UN as an inter-governmental 
organisation (IGO) has control demarcating (I)NGOs. This reinforces the doctrine of state 
sovereignty and a state’s ability to create institutions and rules recognised under law or by 
international agreement.5  
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3.3.1 Support and Respect for UN Charter Principles 
The first UN criterion for INGO conferment is that the organisation must support and 
respect UN Charter principles.6 A literal interpretation of this could mean that actual UN 
Charter observance is not required, but simply that the (I)NGOs must only ‘support and respect’ 
UN Charter principles – which is a lower and less onerous obligation as INGOs must only 
commit to broad principles, rather than a Charter.7 The IOC supports UN Charter principles as 
many of them are replicated or have a corollary in the Charter, specifically those on peace, 
security and the prevention of war and respect for human rights and equality. Albeit, the IOC 
uses a sports specific lens on these UN principles. For example, the UN Charter’s Preamble 
states that it has the aims of “liv[ing] together in peace… maint[aining] international peace and 
security”. The Charter views this through the sport lens in the 2nd Fundamental Principle by 
stating that:- 
“the goal of Olympism is to place sport at the service of the harmonious 
development of humankind, with a view to promoting a peaceful 
society concerned with the preservation of human dignity.”8 
Consequently, it can be said that the Olympic and UN Charters aspire to fulfil similar aims and 
protect similar rights, meaning that the IOC has more than cleared the first (I)NGO hurdle, 
albeit it is not unusual in expressing such aims as many other INGOs support the UN’s Charter 
principles. 
 
3.3.2 Recognised National or International Standing 
The second requirement placed on organisations wishing to be considered (I)NGO’s by 
the UN is that they be ‘of recognised national or international standing.’9 The IOC has extensive 
international standing due to the number of different NOCs that send teams to the Games and 
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the travelling nature of the Games themselves.10 However these NOCs or the OCOGs that host 
the Games are separate to the IOC. But nevertheless the history and the membership 
composition of the IOC [as seen in section] fulfil this criterion. IOC members draw from 70 
different states. Consequently, the IOC is internationally recognised and fulfils the second 
(I)NGO hurdle.  
 
3.3.3  Not-for-profit and Tax Exempt 
Thirdly, the UN requires that the organisation must only operate not-for-profit and have 
tax exemptions, being a two staged test.11 The IOC appears to fulfil the first leg of this test as 
the Charter’s Preamble states it is a “not-for-profit organisation”. However, many critics would 
dispute this. The commercialism of the Games has blossomed since broadcasting rights were 
sold in the 1960s, and sponsorship deals were negotiated in the 1970s and 1980s, alongside 
IOC control over its intellectual property.12 The IOC enters multi-million dollar broadcasting 
contracts enabling it to bring home revenue in the region of $5 billion.13 It also enters lucrative 
sponsorship contracts with The Olympic Partners (TOP) or.14 This revenue enables it to be a 
serious player amongst the world’s top revenue-generating companies, although prohibited 
from being so considered as it is not-for-profit.15 Furthermore many would say that the reason 
for possessing intellectual property, is to make money and not simply to ensure the smooth 
running of the Games.16 Furthermore, the IOC also has considerable investments.17 This has 
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led Chappelet to state that the IOC has a flourishing business, incongruous with the UN criteria 
of ‘not-for-profit’.18  
However the IOC would respond that this revenue enables it to maintain one of its 
fundamental aims: being independent of governments and not relying on government 
subsidies.19 Whilst it generates income, it is not profit. Income is re-invested. Meaning that it 
does fulfil this third UN (I)NGO criteria. Yet individuals do profit from the Olympics, such as 
IOC members and their families receiving money and gifts to sway Host selection, to suites at 
the Dorchester during the London 2012 Games.20 This contrasts to Coubertin’s financial ruin 
and dying in ‘poverty’ due to his commitment to the Games. He sank all of his personal equity 
into the IOC and it was entirely financed by him in the early years.21 The meeting of the first 
part of the UN’s third criteria is debateable.  
The second part of this test is that the organisation be tax exempt.22 This would be 
limited to the domestic jurisdiction of wherever the IOC operates in. As the IOC is incorporated 
under Swiss law with its headquarters in Lausanne, it is exempt by the Swiss authorities from 
direct taxation, albeit it must pay VAT.23 The highest Swiss executive body, the Swiss Federal 
Council, decreed in 1981 that the IOC was to have special juridical benefits, rights and liberties 
under Swiss law reflecting its resultant desire to have the IOC operate from its territory due to 
the ‘benefit’ that Switzerland would thus receive.24  Consequently the tax exemption and 
special status afforded to the IOC in Switzerland is deliberate and demonstrates this criterion’s 
fulfilment.25  
 
3.3.4 Robust Decision-Making 
The fourth requirement for (I)NGO status by the UN is that the organisation have 
statutes or byelaws governing their internal decision making and elections.26 Rule 18 of the 
Charter, has transparent and detailed Session voting procedures, with a clear demarcation of 
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what business is to occur at the Session or at an Executive. For example, the Session passes 
motions on important IOC business such as Host27 or membership selection,28 on a majority 
basis, unless it otherwise requires a higher standard.29 The Charter requires the Session to lay 
down the higher standard of a two thirds majority if it wishes to adopt or amend Charter Rules 
or Fundamental Principles.30 However with low quorums and simple majorities some have 
attacked the IOC for being able to pass motions based on the support of small fractions, in an 
already elitist institution.31 Although the IOC has voting procedures in place that appear 
transparent and accessible, they may not be fair or representative, meaning the IOC’s fulfilment 
of this (I)NGO criteria is lessened. 
 
3.2.5 UN Collaboration 
The UN also requires potential (I)NGOs to have a ‘satisfactory record’ of collaboration 
with the UN and its departments, such as UN Information Centre (UNICS).32 The IOC has had 
a long history of association and co-operation with UN agencies on several programmes where 
sport is used as a tool for development and peace.33 For example, the IOC has been an ILO 
partner since 1922 and following its assumption into the UN system since its creation in 1945. 
The UN GA has also passed the Truce Resolution in advance of every Games since 1993. The 
relationship reached new heights in 2009 when the UN GA granted the IOC permanent 
observer status based on its philanthropic activities, its involvement in the promotion of peace, 
and its global health and education programmes.34 
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This paved the way for the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the 
IOC and the UN in April 2014, which broke new ground on several fronts. Ban Ki Moon noted 
that it is the first such agreement between them regarding sport for development and peace.35 
Both parties pointed out that this Memorandum ushered in a new level of collaboration on a 
variety of initiatives around the world, stemming from commitment at their highest levels to 
‘contributing to a better and peaceful world through sport’.36 Resolution 69/6 ‘welcomes’ this 
Memorandum and this time refers collectively to the whole Movement in achieving the 
Memorandums goals using sport as a tool for development and peace, rather than the IOC.37 
References to the IOC are limited to its factual undertakings that it has made on behalf of the 
Movement.38 This contributes to the persuasive argument that the Movement is recognised as 
a singular legal entity under international law, albeit, it is facilitated by the IOC making 
commitments on its behalf.  
The IOC extends its involvement in these collective programmes to NOCs, ISFs, 
OCOGs and individual athletes, i.e., the whole Movement. All Olympic entities are committed 
via the IOC, to working with UN Member States and UN departments and agencies.39  
However, despite this collaboration, the IOC is still not one of ECOSOC’s 4000 odd 
active NGO consultants permissible under Article 71 of the UN Charter enabling them to 
participate in ECOSOC’s work.40 This aside, the IOC and the UN have a close working 
relationship and history of collaboration. 
 
3.2.6  Portfolio of Work and Sustained Future Activity 
A further UN criterion for recognising (I)NGOs is that the organisation must have an 
established portfolio of work for at least 3 years, with the ability to show sustained future 
activity. The IOC easily meets this criterion in that it was created by the 1894 Congress and 
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has been in existence, albeit with a changing status, nature and importance, for well over 100 
years. 
 
3.2.7 That it is not an IGO 
The final and potentially greatest attribute that the UN lays down for potential (I)NGOs 
is that it not be established by an inter-governmental agreement.41 Hence this negative criterion 
(i.e. what it is not) bestows (I)NGO designation based on who an organisations founders were, 
and the nature of that foundation, and not from the scope of its activities (as NGOs cover all 
fields but tend to have a united single focus for public benefit). As already stated, the IOC was 
founded by Coubertin and various international sporting federations in 1894. Despite the 
evolution of the IOC from 1894 to 2015, it was then as it is now, a body established by actors 
(principally) independent of governments.42 Mestre states that this separation from 
governments and status as an INGO was deliberate from the outset, and is why the IOC has not 
sought consultative status alongside many other (I)NGOs with ECOSOC despite serious 
consideration having been given to this and the IOC fulfilling ECOSOC’s criteria for such 
status.43 It is arguable that such UN status would bolster, not compromise, the IOC’s 
independence as the UN is not meant to be at the whim of single national agendas.  
 
3.4 Subjects of International Law 
The current approach of international law is that only some international actors are its 
subjects (“subject(s)”), under its jurisdictional control. Subjects possess international rights and 
duties, and have full international legal personality.44 This thesis advocates that the Movement 
should possess this full suite of rights, duties, personality and subject status, in order to govern 
and sanction a Truce Treaty operating from the assumption that new subject breeds can 
emerge.45 Current thinking does not extend these in full to the Movement, preventing it from 
this new role. This section will therefore assess whether this approach is accurate in its 
determination that the Movement does not fall within any of the existing categories of 
international law subjects, and if it does not, whether it can still be propelled to the international 
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plane and govern a Truce Treaty by possessing the requirements for subject status (international 
rights, duties and personality). Thereby gaining this role another way. 
There are many candidates for subject status.46 These include states, IGOs, atypical 
subjects of international law, non-self-governing peoples,47 mandated territories,48 indigenous 
peoples, IGO created independent agencies, individuals and multinational enterprises.49 
 
3.4.1 States, Mandated Territories, IGOs and Created Agencies 
The primary, most important and universally accepted subjects of international law are 
states. They possess:- objective; 50original;51 full;52 and equal personality due to recognised 
international law norms - sovereignty or sovereign equality.53 Despite this thesis arguing that 
the Movement is linked to the state system, particularly by way of its NOCs and Host Nations, 
the Movement is not a state. Nor is the Movement a mandated territory, usually ex-colonial 
territories for which some form of trusteeship existed, and have all gained independence or 
been subsumed into other states. The Movement is therefore excluded from governorship and 
sanctioning of a Truce Treaty if only states were subjects. 
However, some precedent for the Movement’s involvement in a Treaty could arise from 
the fact that although states were the first subjects with full personality, extensions occurred.54 
By the early 19th Century, IGOs began to appear, and were recognised as subjects with some 
form of personality, by virtue of state agreement.55 These included the Central Commission for 
Navigation on the Rhine established in 1815 by the Congress of Vienna56 and the Commission 
for the Danube.57 However, these were IGOs with territorial jurisdiction - a necessary pre-
condition for personality and subject status.58 Furthermore, as IGOs, they distilled their 
personality directly from their state.59 Despite this extension, states are still, via their 
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agreement, the original source of personality and subject status.60 They and their IGOs are the 
custodians of all rights and responsibilities under international law, and its supreme law-
maker.61 The Movement and its branches are INGOs, not IGOs, as the Charter is not signed by 
states. Yet there is potential here for a liberal interpretation of IGO status extending to the 
Movement, when it is considered that Host Nations sign agreements with various Movement 
entities and by the NOCs link to their governments. However, this is an unstable argument to 
support this thesis’s presuppositions on, and examination of the other potential subjects will 
continue.  
If the Movement being a subject is tenuous under IGO classification, even shakier is 
attaching it such status as an IGO-created agency, as per this thesis’s proposal of making the 
Movement a UN agency. IGO-created agencies derive their personality, from their IGO, 
provided this has been expressly provided for in their founding documents.62 Thereby meaning 
that potentially, should the UN-Movement relationship be so formalised, and the latter’s status 
be so confirmed, the Movement could be a subject of international law and govern a Truce 
Treaty. However, this is a lot of presuppositions. But even if no such authorisation were to be 
given, the Movement’s international subject status and personality may be implied, if the     
agency were essential, due to ‘implied powers’ recognised by the ICJ regarding the UN’s 
personality.63 It is unclear whether the Movement would be so considered, but it seems highly 
unlikely relying on too many ‘ifs’.64 Furthermore, the Movement’s inability to gain subject 
status here is confirmed when it is discovered that this category is limited to EU agencies,65 
and not UN agencies.66 Yet Walker does say that extensions in this category could occur, but 
this would rely on the Movement being a UN agency, the UN being allowed to create agencies 
that can have separate full international subject and personality status to it, and for this to be 
confirmed for the Movement. Again too many variables.67 
 
3.4.2 Multinational enterprises 
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Although multinational or transnational enterprises or corporations are not new and can 
be dated to the Hanseatic League,68 their candidacy for a limited form of personality, and their 
exact status under international law remains unsettled.69 They generally exhibit characteristics 
of universal or multi-national spread, akin the Movement, but their purposes in theory differ. 
The Movement being for the hosting of the Games and not to make profit.70 Furthermore, the 
reason such enterprises may possess some status is because Article 25 of the Convention on 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes between Nationals and Other States necessarily implies 
it. This ensures that states and these companies are equal parties before the International Centre 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes.71 Therefore, multinational enterprises and the reasons 
for their partial and potential personality seem too tenuous to cover the Movement.  
 
3.4.3 Atypical subjects of international law  
Another category that might prove more fruitful for consideration of the Movement as 
a subject of international law, is placing it in the ‘atypical’ category. The Italian Courts have 
recognised these on the basis that the “modern theory of the subjects …recognises a number of 
collective units whose composition is independent of the nationality of their constituent 
members and whose scope transcends by virtue of their universal character, the territorial 
confines of any single state.”72 Within this category, three entities are usually mentioned: the 
Sovereign Order of Malta; the Holy See; and the ICRC. Each shall be examined to ascertain 
whether the Movement is akin it or if the Italian courts are correct in saying that this could be 
a new extension. 
 
3.4.3.1 The Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order of Saint John of Jerusalem of Rhodes and 
of Malta (the “Order”) 
The Order was established by the Knights Hopsitaller as a religious, medical and 
military order after the 1099 Christian conquest of Jerusalem to prevent Christian persecution.73 
It was sovereign over various Mediterranean islands (Cyprus and Rhodes) and then Malta until 
                                                          
68
 An internationalised corporate body of the 14th Century and lasting until the 19th, Walter, n.3. 
69
 Shaw, n.53. 
70
 Despite allegations to the contrary.  
71
 1965, Walter, n.3. 
72
 Nanni v. Pace and the Sovereign Order of Malta (1935) 8 ILR 2, in Shaw, n.53. Supported by Wallace, n.3. 
73
 The First Crusade. 
50 
 
French occupation in 1798.74 From 1834, its modern incarceration, a humanitarian 
organisation, has operated from headquarters in Rome.75 
The Order has had its status as a sovereign (secondary) subject of international law 
confirmed over the years, at least in the eyes of those recognising it, for example, this was 
specifically recognised by the Pope in 1113.76 This was re-confirmed and recognised by the 
Italian Court of Cassation in 1935.77 The Order has extraterritoriality over its Roman 
headquarters, akin embassies, with embassies in other states. It therefore maintains diplomatic 
and formal relations with over 100 states, the EU, other IGOs and the ICRC. It is therefore 
recognised (and self-identifies) as a subject by over 80 states with its principal officers being 
‘citizens’. It enters treaties, issues passports, coins, licence plates and stamps.  
However, some dispute the fact that the Order is a recognised subject,78 a primary 
subject,79 or a full subject.80 They say that it cannot be a sovereign subject as it is not 
independent because of its religious affiliations and growing dependency on the Holy See.81 
They cite the fact that it is only a permanent UNGA observer as an ‘other entity’ alongside the 
Movement, and not as a UN member state, non-member UN state (Holy See) or an IGO. 
Furthermore, it is not a state.  
Nevertheless, although its status as a subject is disputed, the Order does exhibit aspects 
of sovereignty thereby attributing it a quasi-subject status.82 It has a slight international 
presence due to its limited evanescent and unique personality.83 It has a “limited legal capacity 
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to act in international relations for the purpose of achieving [its] goals”.84 Therefore there is 
potential for entities to be atypical subjects which bodes well for the Movement also to be one. 
Each facet of the Order that indicates its atypical subject status shall be examined in turn.  
Cox calls the Order’s humanitarian goals one of the most significant factors in its 
maintenance of personality and atypical status.85 Furthermore, the Order needs unique 
personality and subject status to pursue these humanitarian goals. The Movement too has 
developed a humanitarian Mandate as per its 2nd Fundamental Principle and atypical status 
would also be useful in pursuit of this. Hence the Movement would fulfil this humanitarian and 
necessity requirement to be considered an atypical status. 
The next most significant factor in the Order’s maintenance of subject status and 
personality is its unique history.86 The Movement too has had a unique history, as documented 
more in Chapters 2, 4 and 6, both in terms of the ancient Games and the modern re-incarnation. 
If the Order links to its historical entity, potentially the Movement could too - to Elis in classical 
Greece. This would mean that they will both have had, at some point in history, territorial 
sovereignty, and Cox calls this the overarching reason, although lost, that the Order initially 
gained its status.87 Hence the entity does not have to currently hold territory, but it must have 
done so in its history.88 This could support the Movement being an atypical subject, if historical 
territorial sovereignty ensured subject status. Chapter 6 demonstrated that the ancient Games 
were absorbed into Elis and the Olympic site was inviolable. Furthermore, if a permanent 
Movement site were ever successfully established, this could be akin the Order’s Roman 
headquarters, or possession of Rhodes or Malta, over which it has extraterritoriality.  
The Movement does not enter formal diplomatic relations or have embassies, unlike 
the Order, potentially its NOCs and IOC members could be considered to exercise this role in 
their various states. Rule 27 of the Charter states NOCs are to promote Olympism in their 
countries and Rule 16 requires IOC members to do likewise. Thereby supporting the Movement 
being considered an atypical subject like the Order. 
Furthermore, the Movement enters treaties, such as the Host contracts with states, like 
the Order. It could also be likened to this atypical subject in the issuing of passports. Although 
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the Movement does not issue passports, it does allow athletes to compete under the Olympic 
flag in certain circumstances, and Olympic recognition is useful in the establishment of 
statehood. Competition under this flag and Movement support in establishing state recognition, 
tentatively could amount to self-recognition.89 The Movement and the Order share many 
commonalities that are given as examples of the latter’s personality and status.  
However, and most significantly, the Movement is not recognised as a subject by itself 
or other primary or secondary subjects, distinguishing it from the Order. The IOC recognises 
itself as an INGO and a legal person, but not as having personality,90 nor is this inferred by its 
external recognition, despite Switzerland’s favourable treatments of it. This recognition and 
status is discussed further in Chapter 4. Nevertheless, the Order’s justification of status and 
personality under international law derives from and places more weight on its:- humanitarian 
goals and the necessity of personality and status in pursuit of these; its unique history; and its 
former territorial sovereignty. All features that it shares with the Movement. This justifies the 
Movement being considered an atypical subject, akin the Order with quasi-subject status and a 
limited personality. 
 
3.4.3.2 Holy See 
The Holy See (“See”) is the ‘parent’ or ‘ecclesiastical’ jurisdiction of the Catholic Church, 
governing all its members and officers.91 The Holy See, or the Papal States, have been 
recognised as a sovereign state since the medieval era.92 However, with Italian unification in 
the late 19th Century, the See’s territorial sovereignty was lost and debate surrounded whether 
it could remain a sovereign state, after this territorial loss.93  
After this loss, but before the 1929 Lateran Treaty, the See continued its diplomatic 
relations and entering of international agreements and concordats, indicating its personality 
continued in these ‘territory-less’ years.94 The issue seems nevertheless settled in the 
affirmative by the Lateran Treaty which recognised the sovereignty of the See.95 It also restored 
to the See, the ‘newly’ recognised and created VCS for which the See holds territorial 
sovereignty over, negating its ‘territory-less’ years where this lack could mean a loss of its 
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sovereignty.96 This creation and recognition ensured the Pope’s diplomatic and spiritual 
independence,97 and gave the See its required territorial sovereignty for international affairs.98  
Although interrelated, and part of the same construct, the See is different to the VCS, but 
it too has an equally unstable status.99 The See is an independent sovereign entity, analogous 
to a state, with recognised full personality by the international community.100 This is 
demonstrated by its diplomatic relations with states,101 it entering of treaties and concordats 
with states, and its membership of various international organisations.102 It has an:- 
“exceptional nature within the community of nations; as a 
sovereign subject of international law, it has a mission of an 
essentially religious and moral order, universal in scope, which is 
based on minimal territorial dimensions guaranteeing a basis of 
autonomy for the pastoral ministry of the sovereign Pontiff.”103 
Whereas the VCS is a small support state existing solely for its support role, with no diplomatic 
relations, no permanent population (aside Church functionaries), and with Italian assistance for 
its administrative duties.104 Yet it does enter international treaties and is recognised as a 
state.’105 They both therefore possess their own separate international identities. The See, 
together with the VCS, show that atypical subjects of international law do exist. Cox calls the 
See the transition from an independent subject of international law with an essential territorial 
origin, to something different.106 This bodes well for Movement being so considered. It too has 
an exceptional nature within the international community of an essentially sporting and 
humanitarian purpose, universal in scope and necessary for its independence. The Movement 
currently lacks territory, as does the See, but unlike the See, it did not hold lands, unless as 
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mooted above it links to Olympia or a permanent Olympic site is founded. Moreover it enters 
treaties and has the potential for informal diplomacy.107 Nonetheless, the leap from the See 
being a subject of international law to the Movement being so considered, based on these 
factors, is not so great.  
 
3.4.3.3 ICRC 
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is part of the International Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Movement (“RC Movement”). The RC Movement includes various 
entities, each with their own distinct legal personality spanning the globe.108 These include the 
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) which co-ordinates 
the network of 190 National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (NRCS).109 Although each 
entity is separate, all RC Movement entities share fundamental principles and purposes.110 The 
RC Movement can therefore be likened in terms of organisational structure to the Olympic 
Movement in that they have:- an organisational committee (the ICRC and IOC);111 an 
international federation (IFRC and ISFs); which draw from worldwide national entities (NRCS 
and the NOCs). Furthermore, each Movement and their entities, are united by their shared 
purposes and goals. The Movement has Olympism, its philosophical basis which values human 
rights, humanitarian goals, sport and health. Olympism unites the Movement, in the way the 
RC Movement is drawn together by its humanitarian goals. Furthermore the Movement and 
the RC Movement have an overlap in their missions, as many INGOs do, with the Fundamental 
Principles of Olympism having a humanitarian and human rights slant.112  
However, it is not the RC Movement that is mooted as the atypical subject with a special 
status under international law – it is the ICRC – which would be akin to this thesis arguing for 
the IOC and not the Movement to have special status under international law (to govern an 
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Olympic Truce Treaty). This thesis does not take this route as on its own, it does not possess 
sufficient of the features to justify atypical international law treatment nor does it consider it 
separable to the remainder of the Movement. The ICRC is the body within the RC Movement 
that potentially has a special status under international law as an atypical subject and a unique 
INGO. It could act as a precedent for the Movement/IOC having similar rights, obligations, 
mandates, recognition and status as the ICRC under international law.113 Therefore it is 
necessary to understand what rights the ICRC possesses and why, to determine whether these 
could be serve as a foundation for the Movement’s.  
The ICRC was established in 1863 as a private association in Switzerland under the 
Swiss Civil Code, to undertake humanitarian activities during armed conflicts.114 The 1949 
Geneva Conventions then bestowed upon the ICRC a role in international humanitarian law, 
specifically in the implementation and enforcement of the GCs. For example, the ICRC is to 
provide relief to protected civilians, prisoners of war and to occupied territories.115 As 
mentioned with the movements above, both the IOC and the ICRC share human rights goals. 
Furthermore they are both meant to be independent, neutral NGOs. 
Again like the IOC, the ICRC’s statute demarcates its role,116 but offers little in terms 
of understanding whether it possesses personality. Both of their statutes define them as 
‘associations’ governed by the Swiss Civil Code and endowing them with ‘legal personality’.117 
But neither of their statutes mention whether this personality is international, thereby assuming 
it is national. Furthermore, despite demarcating the ICRC’s role, potentially justifying its 
personality and atypical subject status, the GCs are silent on this.118 This suggests that their 
constituent documents give the ICRC and IOC an equal footing with regard to status and 
personality. However, unlike the IOC, the ICRC asserts it is a subject of international law with 
a special status and personality,119 although this may be limited or sui generis, a view 
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 The ICRC under the GCs (and their Additional Protocols - all GC references here include their APs also) and 
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 GCIII, Articles 73 and 125, and GCIV, Articles 59 and 61. 
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 As per the Geneva Conventions, and to faithfully apply international humanitarian law and to protect and assist 
victims of armed conflicts, Article 4 ICRC Statute. 
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confirmed by many states and the ICTY.120 For example, the Swiss Federal Council entered a 
Headquarters Agreement with the ICRC in 1993 (and not the IOC despite its attempts), which 
comes with privileges of extraterritoriality and juridical immunity.121 Such privileges can, but 
do not necessarily demonstrate special subject status, but nevertheless here they do show Swiss 
recognition of “the international juridical personality and the legal capacity in Switzerland of 
the ICRIC.”122 
This granting of (limited) subject status and personality to the ICRC appears to be due 
to seven factors, many of which could equally apply to the IOC/Movement.123 The first factor 
cited is that the ICRC deserves special status because it has entered many treaties with states, 
international organisations such as the UN, and additional Headquarters Agreements with over 
60 states.124 The GCs are cited as the primary examples of these and are examined further in 
the mandate section - the 6th factor below.125 The IOC’s only equivalents are the Host Nation 
contracts, being the beneficiary of rights under the Nairobi Treaty on the Protection of the 
Olympic Symbol 1981,126 or benefiting as an international organisation headquartered in 
Switzerland under a 2007 Swiss federal law. This 2007 law regulated the relationships between 
Swiss authorities and certain international organisations headquartered there, and specifically 
identified the IOC as ‘special’. 127 Yet in terms of entering relationships, the IOC does not 
appear to be afforded the same opportunities as the ICRC, internationally or domestically, 
thereby suggesting a lesser status. However, it is important to note that the majority of the 
ICRC’s opportunities here came about after it was given its mandate in the GCs. The IOC could 
hope for such treaty opportunities and recognitions that the ICRC has, post a Truce Treaty.  
Secondly, as a result of such agreements with states, the ICRC enjoys privileges and 
immunities from the jurisdiction of several states, such as those under the Swiss HQA 
mentioned above. This is an advantage that the ICRC has over the IOC in claiming special 
status and personality under international law. The third reason given as evidence for the 
                                                          
120
 The German government has stated that the ICRC has personality “in a number of respects…. [its] work in … 
armed conflicts is based on the four GCs… which give it the right to carry out specific activities… the basic pre-
requisite for its works is strict impartiality and neutrality”,  Gazzini, n.118. 
121
 Chappelet, n. 12. See also Agreement between the ICRC and the Swiss Federal Council to Determine the Legal 
Status of the Committee in Switzerland, 19th March 1993 (Headquarters Agreement). Although a 2008 Agreement 
between the IOC and the Swiss Federal Council gives it access to Swiss diplomats and consuls. Mestre, n.43. 
122
 Article 1, 1993 Headquarters Agreement. Although Gazzini asserts that nothing prevents states granting such 
privileges to an organisation without personality, n.118. 
123
 Gazzini, n.118. 
124
 Ibid. 
125
 Walter, n. 3.  
126
 See Chapter 4. 
127
 And any ISFs headquartered there. 
57 
 
ICRC’s special status is that it maintains diplomatic relations with states and international 
organisations, although Gazzini disputes this as convincing evidence. This leads to the fourth 
cited piece of evidence which is that the ICRC has UN observer status.128 However, the IOC 
and the IFRC also have this, all appearing under the category of ‘other entities’, supporting the 
argument that the IOC could be an atypical subject with personality, akin the ICRC. However, 
elsewhere within the UN system, the ICRC and not the IOC, is one of 4000 plus bodies granted 
ECOSOC consultative status, thereby suggesting that it is the former that is the more unique 
subject. The fifth reason is that the ICRC has claimed against subjects of international law, 
although again Gazzini disputes this as concretely evidencing subject status.129 Furthermore, it 
is a factor to which the IOC has no equivalency, having made no such claims.  
The sixth and most indicative factor in the ICRC having special subject status and 
personality under international law are its mandate and functions, as conferred on it by its 
statutes and more importantly, the GCs. This factor can be unpacked into two reasons. The first 
is that the ICRC’s GC mandate requires it to have subject status and personality to fulfil this 
given role. The foundational basis and justification for this is the ICJ’s Reparation Advisory 
Opinion which advised that the UN was exercising functions and rights which required the 
possession of personality, and was thereby an international law subject.130 The IOC has a self-
created mandate in peace and security as per its second Fundamental Principle, like the ICRC, 
and could have a treaty given one to under an Olympic Truce Treaty. If the latter were to happen 
it would justify the IOC at least having some necessary for of subject status and personality 
under international law. This would mean that the IOC would not have to have this now, only 
after such a Truce Treaty. However, Reparations centred on the UN, an IGO capable of having 
derivative personality and status, and the IOC is an INGO. However, as Chapters 2 and 4 show, 
this thesis has shown that the Movement, and therefore the IOC links to the state system. The 
mandate factor can also be further unpacked to understand why it justifies the ICRC receiving 
a special and personality. Under the GCs the ICRC in times of armed conflicts performs 
Convention duties traditionally performed by state parties. The ICRC steps into the role of the 
contracting state at war and assumes its duties or into the role of the ‘protecting power’.131 
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Whilst writers such as Gazzini and Barlie say that this role assumption does not infer or 
necessitate personality or atypical subject status, such commentary is unnecessary in 
determining the weight of the ICRC’s precedent to the IOC/Movement. This is because 
irrespective of the ICRC’s status, it is given a role similar to which this thesis advocates for a 
Truce Treaty. And moreover, many within the international community, as indicated above, do 
afford the ICRC such status and recognitions irrespective of this scholarly dispute. Therefore 
on both fronts, i.e. the ICRC’s status and personality, and mandate, are suitable precedents for 
the IOC/Movement.  
The final factor in attributing the ICRC an atypical subject with personality is because 
of its universality. Both organisations are universal, which they do not necessarily strictly 
achieve themselves, but are heavily aided through their national branches:- NRCSs and NOCs. 
While universality is not sufficient itself to justify an atypical subject status necessitating 
personality, it contributes to it and shows why this thesis advocates extension of norms to the 
Movement, and not to the IOC. As mentioned under Olympic Singularity, this universality is 
achieved by the whole Movement.  
 
Even if the Movement and IOC do not fit into an atypical subject of international law 
or one of the other non-state actor categories, or be in possession of some form of limited 
personality, it may still have capacity for international action and influence, or to be granted 
rights and obligations under a Truce Treaty.132 Personality and subject status are of course not 
synonymous with capacity, although they are frequent corollaries.133 This section has shown 
that as international law’s subjects are not exhaustive, and that new breeds such as the Holy 
See, the Order and the ICRC do emerge, then the Movement/IOC could have emerged that 
have an emphasis on capacity for action. 
 
                                                          
violates the other warring party’s rights. A protecting power were states appointed by warring parties to safeguard 
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territories, non-self-governing territories, international state organisations, NGOs, multinational companies, 
public companies, private companies, individuals, belligerent groups, terrorists, liberation movements, and any 
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3.5 Other Atypical International Webbed Networks  
It could be argued that many atypical international actors have their own form of 
webbed universality akin the Movement’s or some form of atypical status. Thereby, if the 
Movement should have special status and personality, then so should they, or conversely if 
they do not, then neither should the Movement.  
The United Nation’s International Labour Organisation (ILO) uses a “unique tripartite 
structure” drawing together governments, employers, and trade unions and workers 
representatives in order to promote and set the standards of decent working conditions around 
the world.134 It has a close working relationship with the International Trade Union 
Confederation (ITUC), that seeks to promote and defend worker’s rights and that the ILO’s 
standards are upheld.135 They (and their collegiate work) could be said to be a web of 
international actors that hitches to the state system with responsibility for enforcement of 
international law. Thereby occupying a position, not dissimilar to what this thesis advocates 
for the Movement. They are both based on contracts (employment contracts versus consent to 
the Olympic Charter or other sporting constitutions) and have a range of Tribunals through 
which to enforce rights. Yet the ITUC does not have atypical subject status or personality. This 
would suggest that the Movement follow this precedent, rather than the ICRC’s or the atypical 
subjects mentioned above. 
Indeed, when the reasons for Olympic Singularity (mentioned in section 1.3.2) and the 
specificity of sport (mentioned at section 4.5.1) are examined, many of the justificatory reasons 
for the specificity of sport and the Movement are shared by the ITUC:- work and sport are both 
significant; they have unusual webbed or pyramid structures that stretches across the world; 
they work closely with governments; they have forms of universality; unique histories; have a 
unifying purpose (sport and worker’s rights) with wider goals of societal and peaceful 
development; and they are significant international non-governmental organisations. This 
seems compelling for the Movement to follow the ITUC’s precedent.  
However, the ITUC lacks some of the key features of Olympic Singularity and those 
justifying sport’s specificity before the law. The features it lacks, centre on the autonomy of 
sporting institutions and their ability to develop their rules that are then enforced as law – or 
are indeed law to begin with due to sport’s specificity. With regard to labour, what is enforced 
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are existing employment or contract laws as developed by the appropriate body, with perhaps 
some leverage exerted to update or enforce those, not those developed by a non-state entity and 
observed as if they were already law. This is what allows sporting bodies to discriminate (on 
sex, age etc.) or to use terms differently. It has led to the Movement’s special treatment in 
domestic jurisdictions and internationally before the UN by way of its UNGA observer status. 
Something which has only been extended to five non-IGO entities:- ICRC, IFRC, the Order 
(discussed above), and the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU).136 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
The IOC fulfils the UN’s (I)NGOs criteria. However, the IOC is more than a ‘regular’ 
INGO. It is something unique. The IOC’s plane is both national and international. However, 
on the international stage, the most powerful and fullest of actors are states, followed by IGOs. 
Clearly, the IOC is neither of these. This is where it was necessary to examine other types of 
actors who have international capacity and that may possess limited international subject status 
and personality, and whether the Movement or its entities could be thus. The most convincing 
argument here likens the Movement to an atypical subject of international law. There are 
similarities between it and the See and the Order. But this Chapter demonstrated that the 
Movement has more similarities with the RC Movement and ICRC. Whilst the Movement 
currently does not share the full range of international rights and duties, status and personality 
as the ICRC, it does have enough commonalities to justify inclusion here. Indeed it was the 
GCs and the ICRC’s mandate that led to its recognition and personality under international 
law, and a Truce Treaty could do the same for the Movement.  
Olympic Singularity means that the IOC cannot be removed from this international state 
system but nor is it purely an INGO. The full extent of the IOC’s international rights, 
obligations and treatments will be examined in the next Chapter but some examination here 
was necessary, alongside other Olympic actors, as they compared to atypical subjects. This 
thesis is not submitting that the IOC is an IGO or state, but that it possesses similar personality 
features to them, placing it between an INGO and an IGO: an atypical subject. Indeed, Henkin 
notes that (I)NGOs can have recognised legal status under Treaties or international 
agreements.137 And Walter claims that the personality of (I)NGOs is still unsettled albeit not 
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entirely excluded.138 Hence a new role can be potentially carved out for the IOC, and the 
singular Movement by this rhetoric.  
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
Legal Treatment of the IOC  
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 has shown that the IOC fulfils the UN’s INGO checklist, and that at times it 
is one of the most unique and powerful INGOs, as demonstrated by the universal web proven 
in Chapter 2. It also demonstrated that the IOC, NOCs and ISFs share commonalities with other 
atypical subjects justifying the extension of their privileges under international law, to them. It 
is not a typical INGO, but more akin an atypical subject.  
This Chapter will examine in more detail than previous Chapters, the fifth aspect of 
Olympic Singularity - whether the IOC (rather than other Olympic branches) receives special 
treatment under national and international laws. Any special legal treatments of the IOC can 
be uplifted to the whole Movement due to its web. In so doing, it will also determine whether 
there is a reason for the current informal pyramid of separate actors, rather than treating the 
Movement as one entity. It will also examine whether such treatments indicate a special status 
and personality under international law, enabling Movement governance of a Truce Treaty. 
And whether such treatment indicates a recognition or an affirmation of special status. It will 
do this by asking four questions:-1 
1. What status does the Charter have and how do states treat it? 
2. How do states/IGOs interact with the IOC?  
3. What powers does the IOC possess?  
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special status as more than that of a regular INGO’s. 
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4. Does the specificity of sport indicate state affirmation/recognition rather than 
creation of the IOC’s special status? If the latter then the IOC’s special status would 
stem from state sovereignty, and if the former, the IOC has law-making power - the 
seventh aspect of Olympic Singularity - and shall be examined here. 
 Chapter 4 will also examine whether the Charter’s frequent references to the 
‘Movement’ have unintentionally given birth to it in a legal sense, and is the sixth aspect of 
Olympic Singularity.  
4.2 The Olympic Charter – Status as law 
The Charter is the primary place to start any examination of whether the IOC receives 
special legal treatment. It could itself contain a designation or identification of its special nature 
as law, or be externally recognised by states as law. Even if it is not declared from within or 
out-with as law, the Charter may still receive some form of lesser recognitions or dispensations.  
The Charter could be considered: hard law; customary law; or law via CAS judgements. 
Firstly however, the Charter cannot be considered hard law in the international or formal sense, 
as it is not created by an IGO or a state. Yet the argument that ISFs and the IOC can create a 
global sports law with autonomous rules via the Charter is also applicable here. If the IOC and 
ISFs can make ‘law’, they would be unique INGOs and an atypical subject. Although tenuous 
and unproven, this could show that the Charter as transnational law. This debate is strictly 
beyond this thesis, but its existence shows that the Charter occupies a unique position on the 
international stage. This shall be discussed briefly in this Chapter and this thesis takes the view 
that in certain circumstances, the Charter may be considered law, especially when states host 
the Games. The existence of the debate as to whether the Charter does or does not constitute 
hard law is enough to show its and consequently the IOC’s special position here. Special 
enough for the Movement to have governorship of a Truce Treaty. 
Secondly, the Charter could be considered customary law. The Charter itself could have 
passed into custom. And thirdly, the decisions of its ‘court’, CAS could have binding weight 
and be considered law. This third consideration opens the debate up from the Charter strictly 
and ties it back into the overall Movement and international sporting scene.  
The majority of these arguments are inter-twinned, meaning that this Chapter will focus 
on whether the Charter constitutes customary law. The Charter would then be law making the 
IOC a unique entity as the creating body. If the Charter is customary law, then this would add 
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significant weight to the argument that the Movement be responsible for administering and 
enforcing a Truce Treaty.2 
The main problem with such a consideration is that the Charter is ‘voluntary’, and 
cannot be law, which lessens the potential for the IOC to have a special status here.3 This would 
mean any Charter observance by states, individuals, Teams, NOCs or other entities, rests on a 
contractual obligation. But the level of volition here is disputed due to the desire of athlete’s to 
‘work’ i.e. participate at the Games, indicating that the Charter could still be customary law 
and shall be examined here.  
 
4.2.1 Is the Olympic Charter Customary International law? 
If the Charter constitutes international law, customary or otherwise, then the IOC’s 
potential status, personality and sovereignty is unlimited. Hence its voluntariness is an essential 
component to be examined here. 
 
4.2.1.1 Treaty Recognition of the Olympic Charter 
One of the necessary elements for the Charter to be custom is that it be recognised as 
law. O’Neill and Ettinger both say that states (governments and courts) and international law 
do recognise the Charter’s authoritative force and accord it due respect.4 Ettinger claims that 
the Helsinki Accords of the 1970s established that the Charter constituted customary 
international law.5 The Accords state that “to expand existing links and cooperation in sport, 
participating states will encourage contacts… on the basis of establishing international rules, 
regulations and practice.”6 However Ettinger concedes that the Accords are themselves not 
legally binding, but guiding norms to its signatory states.7 Therefore status of the Charter as 
law based on the Helsinki Agreements is tentative and the Charter’s authoritative force must 
come from elsewhere.  
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 Ettinger, David J., ‘The Legal Status of the International Olympic Committee’ (1992) Volume 4 Pace 
International Law Review 97. See also O’Neill, Barbara, ‘International Sports: Have States Succeeded Athletes 
as the Players?’ (1988) Volume 6 Number 3 Penn State International Law Review. 
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4.2.1.2 Recognition of the Olympic Charter as law in Domestic Courts 
Domestic courts around the world have had several cases where the status of the Charter 
as law has arisen – whether it constitutes binding law, strong enough to supersede their own 
laws.  It must be remembered that any domestic cases are only that state’s interpretation of the 
Charter and the IOC - other courts elsewhere may differ. Plus there would have to be sufficient 
repetition and universalism for that approach to be considered law. 
Nevertheless, in Belgium, the courts confirmed that in certain circumstances 
international sport rules and the Charter can supersede conflicting national law and are thus 
binding.8 This leads Ettinger to confirm that Belgium recognises the customary international 
law natures of IOC rules.9 Thus paving the way for other states to do so too. 
The US appears to follow Belgium in a number of cases where their courts upheld the 
Charter over competing domestic law rights. The first two cases Martin and SFAA suggest that 
the Charter may be a form of customary law. However, in those two cases the courts were clear 
to avoid specifically stating this or that the Charter is supreme over US law. In fact the ruling 
may contradict this as it suggests they upheld a contract. Hence side-stepping and court 
ambiguity is what these cases show. 
The case of Martin v International Olympic Committee (1984) is the first US case that 
demonstrates the US’s approach.10 Here, the courts applied the Charter instead of US domestic 
law and found in favour of the IOC, and the ISFs.11 In Martin female runners sought to compel 
the IOC, LAOCOG, the USOC and the IAAF to include a woman’s 5 and 10k race at the 1984 
Los Angeles Games.12 These races existed on the men’s programme and in women’s 
international competition, but not at the Games. The women sought to use the equal rights 
protection of the California Civil Code (which contains and codifies the Unruh Civil Rights 
Act 1959), as Rule 32 of the 1970 Charter amounted to gender discrimination. Rule 32 
governed the admission of new events to the Olympic programme.13 It stated that this was a 
decision to be taken by the IOC and the ISFs, depending on popularity of participation in the 
four years preceding the relevant Games. 
                                                          
8
 Ettinger, n. 4. See also Nafziger, n. 7. See also Bondoux, Batonnier Rene, ‘Law and Sport’ (1978) Aug-Sept 
Olympic Review, 494, 500-02. 
9
 Ettinger, n. 4. 
10
 Martin v International Olympic Committee (1984) 1 740 F.2d 670, 705 (9th Cir. 1984). 
11
 And again involved the IAAF. 
12
 There were a variety of pursuers and defendants in this case: the IOC, the USOC, the LAOCOG and the IAAF. 
13
 This stated that “the IOC in consultation with the ISFs … shall decide the events … in bearing with the global 
aspect of the Olympic programme and statistical data referring to the number of participating countries in each 
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However the women were denied their motion on the reasoning that to force the 
Movement’s hand would be apartheid as they were seeking individual races for themselves and 
not to run in the men’s events.14 This ignores that the genders are split in sport and the concept 
of equality of opportunity, which Judge Pregerson noted in his dissenting opinion.  
Moreover, the court upheld Rule 32 and rejected the women’s claim on the basis that:  
“a court should be wary of applying a state statute to alter the content 
of the Games. The Games are organized under the terms of an 
international agreement - the Charter. We are extremely hesitant to 
undertake the application of one state's statute to alter an event that is 
staged with competitors from the entire world under the terms of that 
agreement.”15 
This therefore suggests that the US courts apply the Charter over and above its own domestic 
laws and potentially if there is conflicts with domestic laws.16 That the Charter (and the IOC) 
is authoritative with regard to the Games.  
However, Martin avoided definitively determining that the Charter was superior to US 
law by ruling that the Charter did not breach US law. It held that Rule 32 of the Charter was 
not discriminatory as it applied to both men and women equally and thus it was gender neutral. 
Their reasoning for such a find is neither logical nor detailed and misunderstands that the effect 
of a rule may be discriminatory. Thus they found that Rule 32 did not breach US anti-
discrimination laws and were thus not applicable. Thus they said they were applying 
contractual rules and created the loophole this way.17 Potentially because the Games were being 
held on its territory.18 It in effect found the Charter superior, and found a reason to justify it, 
basing it on contract. 
 In San Francisco Arts and Athletics (SFAA) v USOC and IOC the US courts again 
found in favour of the IOC and refused to overturn their decisions and authority, reinforcing 
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its status as law.19 The dispute here centred around SFAA using ‘Olympic’ as the US’s Amateur 
Sports Act 1978 strictly reserves its use to the USOC. US legislation had conferred on the 
USOC, and the IOC, permanent rights only variable by Congress under the Constitution and 
are found in the Charter.20 The courts reaffirmed this legislative provision in SFAA, where they 
found that due to the IOC’s visibility and influence, ‘Olympic’ did require protection. The 
special status of the USOC can be seen due to the IOC being a highly visible and influential 
international body which is akin to factors 1 - 5 of Olympic Singularity.21 Ettinger has 
speculated that SFAA paves the way for US courts/legislatures to protect other breaches of the 
Charter, upholding Charter rights and showing the IOC and its Charter’s weighted status under 
law.22  
However, the most persuasive US case for demonstrating legal supremacy of the 
Charter over US law and the uniqueness of the IOC is Liang Ren-Guey.23 Here the case 
intertwined the authority of the IOC and the binding nature of the Charter into one. In Liang 
Ren-Guey, the IOC once more faced the issue of the two Chinese NOCs (mainland China and 
Taiwan) who both wished to compete as ‘China’ at the 1980 Lake Placid Games. The IOC 
Session had historically recognised both NOCs, with the Executive removing the Taiwanese 
NOC’s right to compete as ‘China’. This was reserved solely to mainland China.24 The issue 
had resurfaced because the US had rescinded diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. Hence the 
Taiwanese plaintiff was essentially asking for use of the Chinese national flag, anthem, emblem 
etc.…. at the Games. He was attempting to assert his individual rights before the US courts on 
a matter that affected ‘states’. Thus in this case, Olympic participation was tied to politics and 
recognition, as national emblems were found to be intertwined with identity and sovereignty. 
Although, sensibly, the courts viewed this issue as ultra vires and political. It said this was 
solely within the President’s prerogative, who defers (via the State Department) to the IOC 
regarding national representation at the Games.  
Thus, the US courts denied his motion, and for several further reasons. The court added 
that NOCs cannot define themselves - this is the IOC’s prerogative (albeit the US courts are 
doing that for Games on its territory).25 It also reaffirmed that every Games participant must 
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accept the Charter and the IOC’s supreme authority. Hence the US could be seen to relinquish 
its sovereign law making ability for foreign policy reasons and due to the uniqueness of the 
Games. Which is a promising precedent for the Charter to be considered as binding and thus 
the IOC and the Movement’s special treatment under law.  
This is compounded when another decisive feature of Liang Ren-Guey is considered 
that potentially makes its decision go further than Martin and SFAA (with its relinquishment 
of sovereignty). In Lian Ren-Guey, the case centred on Games on US soil.26 The US Executive 
and Justice Department said they would not intervene in the Charter’s application and would 
adhere to the IOC when the US was hosting a Games.27 Ettinger noted that it was stated in this 
case that; 
“[the] US has a substantial foreign policy interest in maintaining its 
ability to host international sporting events [Games] consistent with 
decisions reached by international bodies managing those events… US 
has committed to the IOC that it is bound by the IOC’s invitee list and 
conditions of participation… based on our recognition of the private 
character of IOC and the Charter.”28 
However, the court only noted the ‘private’ character of the Charter and did not designate it as 
superior law. Hence the US only agrees to be bound by the Charter out of goodwill and politics 
for home Games. 
This seems to contradict the previous two cases (Martin and San Francisco Arts) 
because those suggested that the Charter had passed into customary international law.29 Liang 
Ren-Guey, with its Executive authority, appears to dispel this. Nevertheless, at the least it 
narrows Charter observance to when it hosts the Games but suggests that there should be more 
concrete abidance then. This is contrary to the universality required to form customary law.30  
 Academic opinion also does not address this succinctly, avoiding a determination like 
the courts. Ettinger and Nafziger simply state that although Charter observance as law is not 
universal, there are elements which evidence the existence of customary international law, for 
example, repetition, duration, opinio juris and adherence under legal impulsion.31  
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The case of Defrantz v USOC (1980) may help clarify the status of the Charter and 
consequently whether the IOC has special INGO atypical status capable of governing a Truce 
Treaty.32 Indeed, Siekman claims that Defrantz could infer that the IOC is a quasi-state because 
it possesses many state-like benefits, such as diplomatic immunity that have their basis in 
customary law.33 If such an assessment of Defrantz is correct, it would definitively show the 
special status of the USOC and consequently, the IOC as the recognising body. 
In Defrantz, the USOC resolved not to send a team to the 1980 Moscow Games, 
allegedly in protest over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Twenty-five athletes sought an 
injunction against this USOC resolution, to enable them to attend the Games. They claimed 
that under the Amateur Sports Act 1978 (which founded the USOC)34 they had a statutory right 
to compete at the Games. The athletes claimed that Games participation was a state action and 
that the USOC’s refusal to send a team violated their constitutional rights. 
However, the US Courts denied the athlete’s motion, dismissing each of their claims. 
The court said that they had not established sufficient grounds to control USOC decision-
making. Instead it found in favour of the USOC. It held that the USOC had the right and 
authority to decide whether or not to send a team to the Games, under s374(3) of the 1978 Act. 
Therefore, the court upheld the USOC’s rights over those of the athletes.  
Hence the case turned on what type of entity was the USOC and could it be directed by 
a court? Foster says this Act recognises the USOC’s authority as deriving from the IOC and 
that the Act does not grant the USOC rights, responsibilities and functions.35 For example, 
Section 22050(c)(2) deals with the USOC’s main powers. It states that the USOC is to 
“represent the United States as its NOC in relations with the IOC”.36 This view is extended by 
the court later, where it adds that;  
“congress was …aware that a NOC is a creation and a creature of the 
IOC, to whose rules it must conform. The NOC gets its power and 
authority from the IOC, the sole proprietor and owner of Games.” 
Hence Foster says this implies that the IOC is equal to states.37 However, this seems to be in 
line with the general understanding of what an NOC is under the Charter and does not 
ostensibly add anything new. 
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 Nevertheless, what Defrantz does show, is that once more, US courts avoided explicitly 
determining that Olympic ‘law’ had supremacy over its constitutional rights, but carrying out 
that determination in practice. Instead, the courts said that the US constitutional rights were not 
applicable in the aforementioned cases. Even, if constitutional rights had been affected by the 
Charter, they the courts could still have avoided such a determination of their supremacy by 
applying a different piece of US legislation (the 1978 Act).  
 A more recent Canadian case goes further than these US cases by specifically attaching 
the Movement to the state system, when it is a Host Nation and demonstrating the necessity to 
view the Movement as one organisation.38 This is a weighty precedent for permitting a singular 
Movement to be able to operate on the state system and guard a Truce Treaty. In Sagen v 
Vancouver Organising Committee for the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games 
(2009)39 fifteen female ski jumpers pursued VANOC in the Canadian courts for not including 
women’s ski jump at the Vancouver Winter Games. They claimed this breach was 
discriminatory and contravened the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.40 The Canadian 
court did find the exclusion discriminatory, meaning that the Movement must abide by national 
laws of Host Nations. The court’s finding was based on its determination that VANOC’s 
activities were tantamount to governmental activity, to which the Charter applied.41 An 
important distinction arose however, as VANOC itself did not have sufficient governmental 
control to invoke the Charter. The Charter was only invoked because the actual staging of the 
Games, VANOC’S activities and not it itself, were a government activity.42 Therefore this case 
definitively hitches the state and Olympic systems, when it comes to Host Nations. 
In addition to the demonstration that VANOC’s activities are governmental, Sagen also 
demonstrates that the Movement’s loose pyramidical framework of separate entities permitted 
VANOC to escape culpability. It shielded VANOC from accountability here. The court found 
that VANOC had no ability to control what events were included due to the contractual 
relationship existing between it and the IOC. It was the IOC that was the ‘critical decision 
maker’, who was not a party to the action, and therefore not subjected to the Canadian 
Charter.43 This meant that the action failed due to the Movement’s framework - a deliberate 
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ploy to evade liabilities. The IOC should not be able to escape suit or its legal duties due to a 
lack of clarity of its framework. Nor should it have immunity from suit by way contracting 
these out to OCOGs. Clarity and formality must be brought here to the Movement which 
necessitates it being viewed as one entity under the rule of law. Only this way will legal rights 
be enforceable against the IOC. With these legal duties comes the opening up of new legal 
rights that an entire Movement could possess under international law. 
 
4.3 Charter and CAS decisions – are they law? 
As the Charter must be implemented by judicial bodies, their decisions can help show 
whether the Charter is compulsory law or a voluntary contractual obligation. National court 
responses were examined above. But, another judicial vehicle that makes decisions on the 
Charter and IOC autonomy is CAS. CAS decisions and attitudes to the binding nature of the 
Charter can be examined here.  
This also raises the larger question of whether overall, CAS decisions are voluntary or 
whether they create law and whether initially CAS itself is voluntary or binding.44  
 
4.3.1 Does CAS view the Charter as binding law? 
The CAS Code determines what rules will apply depending on the type of hearing: 
general, appeal or Ad Hoc.45 The only hearings in which CAS considers the Charter as binding 
are in its Ad Hoc Panels at the Games. At these Game Panels, CAS must apply the Charter and 
any applicable general principles of law. Hence at the Games, but not necessarily elsewhere, 
the Charter is binding and on a par with the general principles of law.46 And as shall be shown 
in the section below, this is binding most likely, by way of agreement. 
In General hearings, CAS shall apply: the relevant regulations; the rules of law chosen 
by the parties; or in the absence of this choice, the domestic law covering the ISF’s domicile.47 
Hence it is mostly likely to apply Swiss national law, unless both parties agree otherwise. In 
any event CAS’s legal seat is always considered as Switzerland, irrespective of where the actual 
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hearing occurs.48 Furthermore, Swiss Courts can review CAS decisions in certain 
circumstances.49 However, this is only in exceptional circumstances.50 Even when CAS appeals 
make it to the Swiss Federal Tribunal, they usually fail, as this normally defers to CAS.51 Swiss 
law therefore seems to frequently apply to sporting disputes and the Games, even though Hosts 
move across the globe. This additionally shows that the Swiss law ranks higher than CAS rules 
and decisions. 
If CAS sits as an appeal’s panel, the parties may choose: the governing law; failing 
which, CAS applies the national law where the challenger is headquartered; or the rules of law 
CAS deems appropriate.  
 
4.3.2 What is CAS? Is it voluntary? 
Hence if the Charter is only binding at the Ad Hoc Panels, is submission to it binding 
itself? Thus it is necessary to understand what CAS’s purpose and composition is. 
CAS was established in 1983 to adjudicate and resolve sport and Olympic disputes 
without interference or resort to national courts.52 It was founded under IOC auspices although 
it was intended to be independent of it.53 Hence it is called the IOC’s ‘little brother’ as some 
consider it an extension of the IOC.54 This lack of impartiality from the IOC means that it 
cannot be considered, a court, despite good intentions to the contrary.55 It is an arbitration 
Tribunal. These claims of dependence, led to a CAS review in 1990. Its independence of the 
IOC was strengthened enabling it to be a proper judicial check on the IOC’s supreme 
authority.56 It is now governed by its own Code. 
Nevertheless, CAS still requires both parties to consent in writing to its 
authority/jurisdiction via an arbitration agreement. Its jurisdiction is ‘optional’. Yet in practice 
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parties, including the IOC do not refuse such consent. They accept the binding nature of CAS’s 
judgements and consequently the agreement gives CAS’s decisions the same force as that of 
the civil courts. This leads Nafziger to assert that CAS has all the powers of an international 
court of arbitration enabling it to be a proper check on, for example, the IOC’s supremacy.57  
However, Foster disputes the true voluntariness of CAS as parties have to consent due 
to their unequal bargaining positions. Both when they initially subscribe to a N/ISFs 
constitution, or when a dispute is referred to CAS. Athletes are made to waive the right to 
resolution of disputes in the national courts, before they can compete in the Games.58  
 
The next question to be addressed is whether CAS can create such general principles 
of law that it must apply? In IAAF v USA & Young, it was determined that CAS judgements do 
not create precedent.59 This problem is doubled because they avoid the national courts and their 
precedent creating ability.60 Thus there is the problem of legal certainty, something which is 
prevalent in the sporting system and which has been so far demonstrated. Nevertheless, CAS 
decisions are a firm guide directing CAS in the future ‘as part of an emerging lex sportiva’.61 
This means that they are only persuasive. However as Young was a CAS decision, it itself 
cannot be considered binding and thus could change. The decision that said CAS’s decisions 
were not binding cannot be binding itself.  
Although CAS as an arbitration Tribunal does not create binding precedent, its eventual 
decisions are enforced by the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards (once parties have agreed to initially be bound by it).62 This international 
convention binds its 150 odd state parties to enforce CAS decisions. This shows the special 
status of CAS, the Charter and the IOC – capable of having the powers to establish a binding 
judicial institution. A precedent which can be applied to governance of a Truce/Treaty. 
Although here, effect has had to be given via state parties. Yet the fact that state parties agreed 
to this in a Convention demonstrates CAS’s importance. Albeit it is not yet universal or 
therefore of customary status. 
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CAS has nevertheless been viewed as a court around the world. For example, the Swiss 
courts have affirmed that CAS is the ‘Supreme Court’ for world sport.63 However, this in turn 
means that recognition is stemming from a state, which diminishes CAS’s ability to be 
considered a maker of precedent. At the least, it is one of the world’s most unusual 
organisations, operating between the law and volition, as the Movement does. And again shows 
the uniqueness of the Movement’s organs.64 Hence clarity is required here, and one way to 
achieve this would be for CAS to be involved in upholding the Truce/Treaty.  
 
4.4 Treatment of the IOC by states and IGOs 
The next attribute that should be examined to discover whether the IOC has a special 
nature capable of governing a Truce/Treaty, is the treatments that it receives from external 
actors, at the international level. There are three levels that this can be split into: the domestic; 
the national (Hosts); and the international and each shall be addressed now in turn. 
 
4.4.1 Domestic Treatments - Switzerland 
At the domestic level, the relevant jurisdiction is Switzerland as this is where the IOC 
has its headquarters and is incorporated.65 Hence the way that Switzerland treats the IOC shall 
be examined here in order to discover whether it is a regular INGO or whether it is more than 
this – something quasi-judicial as Samaranch wished.66 
Within Switzerland the IOC can obviously enter standard legal relations such as owning 
or leasing property (heritable, moveable and intellectual),67 entering employment or 
procurement contracts,68 and the ability to enforce rights or be sued in the courts.69 These are 
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the standard rights that any legally incorporated entity possesses, however the IOC is far more 
than this. It was incorporated in Switzerland under the Swiss Federal Constitution and Swiss 
Civil Code.70 Furthermore, the Swiss Federal Council legislatively granted the IOC special 
legal status and recognises the IOC as an international institution.71  This was confirmed in its 
1981 Decree where the Council; 
“expressly recognises the importance and universal vocation of the 
IOC in sport… it is in interests of our country to have you here…. the 
IOC benefits in Switzerland from a juridical nature and from rights and 
liberties guaranteed by Swiss law. We … accord to the IOC a special 
statute which takes into account its universal activities and its specific 
character as an international institution. …. the IOC … even more well 
able to promote the ideals which have inspired it.”72 
Therefore, Swiss law regulates the IOC, giving it rights and obligations domestically, and thus 
the IOC occupies a special position within Switzerland. Thus its rights arise of Swiss law. This 
seems to strengthen the case for the IOC (and consequently a wider Movement) have a special 
status capable of governing a Truce/Treaty.  
The IOC in Rule 15 of the Charter acknowledges Swiss recognition and states that: 
“The IOC is an international non-governmental not-for-profit 
organisation, of unlimited duration, in the form of an association with 
the status of a legal person, recognised by the Swiss Federal Council in 
accordance with an agreement entered into on 1 November 2000.” 
Mestre examines this November 2001 Agreement and notes that it explicitly reaffirms the 
Swiss authorities recognition of the IOC’s legal capacity in Switzerland.73 It also provides the 
IOC with attaching rights and powers, such as tax exemptions and access to Swiss “diplomatic 
and consular representations abroad.”74 The Agreement goes on to guarantee the IOC’s 
independence and freedom of action that enables it to be separate to and not influenced by, 
states.75 Therefore the IOC seems a privileged entity adding credence to it and the Movement’s 
special nature, and capability to govern a Truce/Treaty. 
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Laying aside the fact that Rule 15 refers to an external Agreement between a 
government department and an INGO, that ascribes the founding organ rights, but not annexing 
it being poor, there are two issues with this. Firstly, Swiss recognition leads Mestre to conclude 
that the IOC cannot be a public international law subject, because it is a subject of Swiss law. 
This lessens its potential consideration as a special INGO.76 However, this ignores that certain 
(I)NGOs are subjects of international law and ignores the myriad of other factors discussed in 
this thesis which show the singular nature of the Movement as an INGO. Secondly, the IOC 
has not entered a Headquarters Agreement with the Swiss authorities, which it has done with 
the ICRC. Therefore Switzerland has not bestowed on the IOC the fullest latitude possible.77 
The IOC is not on a par with the ICRC. However, when the IOC is considered as the whole 
Movement, alongside the many other Swiss ISFs and Swiss special financial treatments, its 
special INGO status is galvanised. 
 
4.4.2 International Treatment of the IOC 
International treatment to the IOC can include, but is not limited to, the conclusion of 
Host contracts and treaties with states or non-state actors and its recognition by the UN. Foster 
states definitively that the IOC can interact on the international level – an obvious assertion.78 
Hence full engagement on the international plane would perhaps be the most significant 
indicator of the IOC being greater than a regular INGO, and thus deserving of custodianship 
of a Truce Treaty. Thus the possibility for a collective Movement being the guardian of a 
proposed Truce Treaty is particularly promising. Hosts and international dealings will now be 
addressed in turn. 
 
4.4.2.1 Host City Contracts 
Firstly, with regard to contracts, the IOC contracts with the various Hosts (their 
municipal authorities) and the relevant NOC, on the day the Games are awarded.79 The IOC 
enters this contract as an equal if not dominant contractor. The IOC also enters a multitude of 
contracts with the relevant OCOGs. All of these contracts are further evidence of its contracting 
capacity.80 Hence as it is the body that is delegating obligations to state actors here (local 
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authorities), the IOC’s power is and capabilities are strong, thus strengthening the case for it to 
have governorship over a Truce/Treaty. 
Furthermore, in order to host the Games, after signature of the Host contract, states 
often give the Games and Movement special treatments and dispensations in their laws. For 
example, the UK passed the London Olympic and Paralympic Games Act 2006 which 
recognised the specificity of sport and the Movement/Games and specifically dealt with the 
hosting of the Games. The Act included a clause at the IOC’s request (a private and not a state 
organisation), rather than on legal necessity, and consequently circumventing full 
parliamentary scrutiny and debate.81 For example, it gave unparalleled protections to Olympic 
property and ticket sales and that have never been extended to other events.82 This leads James 
to the correct assumption that it is the Games specifically within all human activity that merits 
special treatment before the law. The existence of this Act (and its corollaries around the world 
in advance of other Games) therefore show legislator recognition of the specificity of the 
Games. Their occurrence every two years, across the world compounds the international aspect 
of them. 
 
4.4.2.2 IOC as a beneficiary of rights  
Whether or not the IOC can contract on a par with states, it does receive special 
recognitions on the international stage as it is the beneficiary of rights recognised by 
intergovernmental Treaties. It benefits from intellectual property rights under the Nairobi 
Treaty on the Protection of the Olympic Symbol 1981, which was signed by 46 states and 30 
state ratifications. Signatories agreed to prohibit unauthorised use of the Olympic symbol and 
confirmed IOC ownership of the Olympic symbols.83 However, support for this international 
Treaty is far from universal and the major commercial powers did not sign it.84 It is worth 
noting here that the IOC is simply the beneficiary of these rights. It is not a party to the Treaty, 
and in this instance, the IOC must have a lesser capacity for entering relationships than states.   
 
4.4.2.3 IOC Treatment by the UN 
Chapter 3 discussed specific UN-IOC collaborations that demonstrated the INGO 
nature of the IOC as per the UN checklist. This will be developed here, with specific focus on 
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the recognitions, rights and treatments that the UN affords the IOC, and will demonstrate the 
IOC’s unique nature. And thus the ability of the IOC, via a singular Movement, to have a 
special international law role. This would mean that the IOC’s special status would be 
dependent and derived from states, as the primary subjects of international law. Entities such 
as the IOC may only possess status and personality to the extent that states permit it.85  
The IOC pursued ultimate international recognition of its special nature from the UN 
in 1982 which could have conclusively settled the matter of its special status. The IOC 
proposed a Draft UN Declaration where the UN would “protect and maintain the Games”, and 
“avoid action that would harm the Movement” and that Charter Rules were international law.86 
Confirmation of the Charter Rules being international law would have conclusively determined 
the IOC as a unique body. However, the IOC withdrew the Draft due to fear that they would 
lose content and drafting control in the GA due to international politics in the early 1980s.87 
Hence, no such definitive determination was made. 
Nevertheless, twenty-seven years later the UN gave a definite indication of the IOC’s 
special INGO status, by designating it as a permanent UNGA observer in 2009. This has only 
been granted to four entities that are neither states nor IGOs, the ICRC being one of these.88 
Consequently the IOC must be considered special and on a par with the ICRC in terms of its 
capabilities.  
There are also many other ways in which the IOC-UN relationship has affirmed the 
former’s special status. The IOC’s call on the UNGA to revive the Truce is a notable example. 
The UNGA now passes Truce Resolutions in advance of every Games, conferring on the IOC 
a certain unique international complainer role.89 Furthermore, the IOC would also cite the 
appointment of the Special Advisor on Sport for Development and Peace and the resulting 
International Conferences and Forums as evidence of its special UN recognition.90 This is 
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bolstered by the fact that the IOC has signed ‘co-operation’ agreements with the majority of 
UN agencies and affiliations.91 
A further significant way that the UN has afforded the IOC special recognitions, 
developing the latter’s classification as a special INGO is by way of its endorsement of sporting 
autonomy.92 In 2013, IOC President Bach gave a speech at the UNGA where he emphasised 
the need for sporting autonomy.93 The following year the UN and the IOC entered a 
Memorandum of Understanding, which recognised and called for respect of sport’s 
autonomous organisation.94   
These sentiments were solidified by the UNGA in Resolution 69/6, which was 
associated to the Memorandum. This too supports the independence and autonomy of sport and 
its institutions. For example, it ‘invites’ Members States, all bodies of the UN, sport 
organisations, the media, civil society, academia and the private sector to:- 
“Support[s] the independence and autonomy of sport as well as the 
mission of the IOC in leading the Movement”.  
This is explicit UN endorsement for autonomous law-making by sporting organisations (the 
IOC/Movement) and thus suggests that the IOC/Movement are special INGOs.  
Bach made comments about what this sporting autonomy and the Resolution would 
entail. He said that it requires NOCs to lobby political leaders nationally for sport to be given 
due consideration. Thus NOCs will have to work with governments to integrate sport into 
policy making, including their peace-building activities.95 Bach adds that:- 
“We must form partnerships with political organisations based on this 
recognition of the autonomy of sport”.96 
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Bach, nevertheless recognises the importance of NOCs and the IOC, in remaining politically 
neutral.97 However, it is unclear how this will operate in practice and remains to be seen, but 
nevertheless does show the special status of the IOC in its governmental and IGO collaboration. 
Resolution 69/6 also makes further advancements to the position of the IOC as a special 
INGO as it makes specific mention of the Charter, and calls for the upholding of its 6th 
Fundamental Principle.98 This lends weight to the Charter being considered customary law, at 
least with regard to its 6th Fundamental Principle. For example, the Resolution states that events 
such as the Games should be;- 
“organised in the spirit of peace, mutual understanding, friendship, 
tolerance and inadmissibility of discrimination of any kind and that the 
unifying and conciliative nature of such events should be respected, as 
recognised by Fundamental Principle 6 of the Charter”. 
This demonstrates that parts of ‘Olympism’ may be universally recognised: the 6th 
Fundamental Principle OC; and the importance of conciliation and dialogue.99 The latter two 
aspects being potential IOC/Movement forays into peace building and thus could be considered 
to be UN recognised.100  
Hence, this Resolution could be considered the international community’s inadvertent 
recognition of the IOC and the OC. The ‘hardness’ of the Charter could be inferred from the 
UN’s call to member states to recognise the IOC’s/Movement’s authority and supports the 
European doctrine of the specificity of sport and legal dualism. This autonomy is therefore 
ultimately bestowed by states, but nevertheless supports the position of the IOC/Movement 
being a unique INGO.  
 
4.5 Specificity of Sport and the IOC/Olympic Movement 
The doctrine of the specificity of sport has been recognised under EU law as it relates 
to areas of its competence. This means that in certain circumstances the CJEU, due to the 
specific nature of sport, recognises sport’s exemption from its sphere of influence and 
application of the law. This means that the IOC/Movement as the centre of the international 
sporting web must also have this specificity apply to it. Olympic sport may therefore upon 
occasions be exempt from EU law. Although with the IOC’s headquarters in the non-EU 
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Switzerland, this specificity would have to be by way of the other actors in the Movement’s 
webs - the EU based NOCs and ISFs. 
Firstly, in order for Olympic sport to be ‘exempt’ from EU law, sport had initially to be 
recognised as being included in the EU’s sphere of competence. The Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union 2007 (TFEU) under Article 6 states that:- 
“The Union shall have competence to carry out actions to support, 
coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member States. The areas 
of such action shall, at European level, be: …. (e) … sport and 
vocational training;” 
This consequently gives the EU the authority to act and intervene in sporting matters. This is 
consolidated by Article 165 which specifically places sport within the EU’s jurisdictional 
competence of education by stating that;- 
“1. The Union shall contribute to the development of quality education 
by…. contributing to the promotion of European sporting issues, while 
taking account of the specific nature of sport, its structures based on 
voluntary activity and its social and educational function. 
2. Union action shall be aimed at:….– developing the European 
dimension in sport, by promoting fairness and openness in sporting 
competitions and cooperation between bodies responsible for sports, 
and by protecting the physical and moral integrity of sportsmen and 
sportswomen, especially young sportsmen and sportswomen.” 
Hence from a mandate perspective, the TFEU clearly gives the EU competence to act in 
sporting matters. However, Siekman is keen to point out that it does not consider itself a 
European sports regulator. Although for many it is still unclear what is specifically included in 
this mandate to act. Nafziger, for example, raises the issue of it being inapplicable to field of 
play decisions but it may apply to the organisational structure of sports.101 
This legislative inclusion of sport within EU competency consolidates the case law 
position of the CJEU which had been dealing with sporting matters for a number of years 
preceding the TFEU. The CJEU had based its competency to act on sports matters because it 
can affect free movement of workers and individuals. Hence CJEU judgements are considered 
to be the most important source of international sports law. Beloff cites the case of David Meca-
Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission of the European Communities (2006) where the CJEU 
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took the view that sporting rules can be included within the concept of free movement of 
workers and thus is not automatically removed from EU competencies simply because it is a 
sporting rule.102 
Consequently this case seems to confuse the situation because on one hand the 
specificity of sport is explicitly recognised in Article 165 suggesting its total exclusion from 
EU law and the autonomy of sporting institutions as ISFs such as FIFA and UEFA and ex-IOC 
President Jacques Rogge have been intensively alleging and campaigning for years - sporting 
institutions and ISFs do not have complete autonomy.103 Yet it categorically does not mean this 
when you read the TFEU in its entirety. The TFEU and case law has specifically reserved sport 
as an area of EU competency. However, what it does appear to mean is that because sport has 
a specific nature, a fine jurisdictional balance is struck between sports bodies and EU 
institutions, where certain sporting areas are reserved for each but without this ‘devolution’ or 
‘reservation’ being absolute. The CJEU has specifically ruled that it itself will determine 
whether or not to intervene due to the ‘specificity of sport’.104 Hence it seems that the specific 
nature of sport means an ad hoc ability to decide whether to intervene or not.105  
Although the doctrine of specificity seems to be a magic wand conjuring up different 
solutions as it sees fit, there are themes of EU involvement in certain areas. For example, the 
EU’s competency, intervention and legislative application tends to be restricted to areas 
connected to its existing mandate such as where sport and its disputes intersect free movement, 
the internal market, competition law, employment and economic activity. 106 With regard to 
free movement, the CJEU considers sport to be a social advantage with the potential to affect 
a workers ability to take up employment in another Member State.107 Hence EU intervention 
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is not strictly limited to employment issues, so it can apply to both professional and amateur 
athletes, albeit the vast majority of case law centres on the professional athlete. 
 
4.5.1 Why does sport receive special treatment under EU law? 
This leads to the question that many writers, such as James, pose: why does sport 
receive specific and exceptional treatment of the law? What is the legal basis for its special 
treatment? The answer to this can be said to overlap with the reasons for Olympic Singularity. 
These special features can be added to Olympic Singularity to emphasise it and overlap in some 
fields. These therefore are a commonality in justifying the specific treatment of the Movement 
with regard to a Truce Treaty. However, with specific regard to sporting specificity under EU 
law, the reasons can be broken down into three areas: sport’s social significance; sport’s unique 
structure; and a variety of other reasons.108 
 
4.5.1.1 Social Significance of Sport 
The first reason for special treatment before the law, centres on the philosophical, 
cultural and educational values of sport as reaffirmed in the TFEU above and further EU 
Declarations, such as Declaration 29 to the Treaty of Amsterdam.109 Although not legally 
binding, this Declaration emphasises the:- 
“social significance of sport, in particular its role in forging identity 
and bringing people together. The Conference therefore calls on the 
bodies of the EU to listen to sports associations when important 
questions affecting sport are at issue. … special consideration should 
be given to the particular characteristics of amateur sport.” 
Thus the EU recognises that one of the reasons sport is unique is because of the multitude of 
societal benefits that it has. The Charter also recognises such philosophical benefits of sport in 
its concept of Olympism, and thus would appear to fulfil the first requirement to have the 
Movement and its rules recognised in law. However, these wide ranging societal benefits are 
of course not unique to sport, with culture, art and many other areas also having a similar 
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societal impact and may also be organised along a similar framework as sport. Therefore, the 
specificity of sport and of the Movement to special treatment cannot solely stem from this area. 
It is the accumulation of the features, as with all eight features of Olympic Singularity, that 
justify sport’s and the Movement’s special treatment before the law. 
 
4.5.1.2 Uniqueness of Sport’s Structure 
The second reason that accords sport specific treatment before the law according to the 
2007 White Paper is the uniqueness of its structure. This draws together all of the aspects of 
Olympic Singularity into one overall term, which Olympic Singularity broke down. The EU 
doctrine also breaks this down into meaning a variety of different things. For example, Beloff 
notes sporting structure’s autonomy, diversity and pyramid nature are cited as reasons for sport 
and its organisations to be treated differently before the law, and shall be tackled in that order 
here.110 However, Olympic Singularity showed that this pyramid was incorrect. 
 
4.5.1.2.a) Autonomy and Diversity 
Turning first to the autonomy of sporting structures, it is generally accepted by courts, 
legislators and governments, that sport administration and regulation is best left to the 
autonomous ISFs. The former’s general acceptance of this, indicates sports special status. This 
delegation to ISFs of autonomy is deliberate on the part of the judicial authorities who neither 
have the capacity or inclination to be further involved, for example, and as already stated, the 
EU did not want to be a European sports regulator. In Yang Tae Young v International 
Gymnastics Federation (FIG) & Hamm a post Athens CAS Panel it was stated that sport would 
be “fatally undermined if every decision taken could be judicially reviewed”.111 Indeed the 
existence of CAS helps promote the specificity of sport and the Olympics before the law, as it 
monopolises sport dispute resolution keeping it away from national and international courts.112 
In turn this reaffirms its own autonomy, alongside that of ISFs and the Movement.113 Alongside 
borrowing ekecheiria from the ancient Greeks, the Movement also appears to be borrowing 
ouroboros, the snake that regenerates by eating its own tail. 
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But nevertheless the state does interfere (whether directly or indirectly) as Beloff notes, 
all sporting decisions are theoretically justiciable. According to Segura v IAAF114 and KOC v 
ISU,115 there is no complete immunity.116 However, in practice, it appears that it is only field 
of play decisions and rules of the game that are largely excluded and left to the autonomy of 
ISFs and the Movement. But the extent of sporting immunity from the law in each of these 
areas is not ‘wholly clear’.117 With regard to field of play decisions, what is clear is that judicial 
exclusion covers mistakes made by officials, whether admitted or otherwise.118 The Official’s 
honest intent is sufficient to justify exclusion of field of play decisions from judicial scrutiny. 
They only invoke court/CAS recourse if there has been some form of fraud, corruption or bad 
faith on the part of the official.119 For as Lord Denning stated, fraud unravels everything.120 
Thus if field of play decisions were a ‘domain into which the King’s writ does not seek to run’ 
then Lord Atkin notes that this would mean it were (and there could be) a sphere beyond the 
law and was instead governed by agreement.121 Furthermore, rules of the game are also 
theoretically judicially reviewable as they are not considered autonomous ‘micro law’ but 
circumspection must be exercised in determining whether to review or not.122 This means that 
in practice they are almost never reviewed by CAS unless there are exceptional 
circumstances.123 Hence Beloff notes that for both field of play decisions and rules of the game, 
there can be no absolutes, meaning that the determination as to whether review or not must be 
based on self-restraint.124 
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4.5.1.2.b) Pyramid Structure 
Returning to the uniqueness of the structure of sporting organisations, ISFs control their 
sport worldwide meaning they can be said to sit atop their pyramid. This includes professional 
and non-professional alike in a single tiered hierarchy.125 At the same time, the Olympic web 
must be overlaid over all the ISFs. It is likely that it is this structural duality that warrants 
special treatment before the law. Beloff notes that ISFs have a wide all-encompassing nature, 
but that the IOC has a narrower but deeper field due to its temporal activities. And when their 
framework is overlaid together it means that both bodies would fulfil this specificity test. 
However, in reality as James points out, attributing specificity to a hierarchical structure 
permits ‘monopolistic private bodies to control huge areas without significant legal 
interference.’126  
 
4.5.1.3 Assorted reasons 
The next reason for sport’s special treatment under law can be found in the European 
Commission’s White Paper on Sport 2007,127 which covers a whole variety of reasons.  
The first of many reasons, is that there is widespread acceptance that sport is unique 
and reserved from law because of the acceptance of discrimination in sporting competition. For 
example, men and women, on the whole, compete separately in elite sport with claims that it 
is ingrained even for competitions such as table tennis, where there is no apparent physical 
need.128 Modern UK legislation recognises the equality of the sexes but it also give specific 
exemptions for sport. The Sex Discrimination Act 1975 lays down a specific exception for 
competitive sport under section 44.129 Beloff says this Act and the Equality Act 2010 
institutionalises sporting sex discrimination.130 So keen are sporting bodies to maintain separate 
competitions for male and female athletes that when faced with intersex athletes they have to 
adopt new and detailed rules to determine who can compete in what competitions.131 
Furthermore in the US Martin case, the ruling Judge’s verdict that to suggest separate 
competitions was akin apartheid is preposterous. The dissenting Judge Pregerson noted that 
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this overlooked physical differences and distorted equality of opportunity and would require 
the banning of all separate sporting events on grounds of apartheid. That it could extend to the 
necessity not to provide separate toilets. Judge Wallace in this case also hinted that the women’s 
case might have had more merit if it had argued for inclusion in the male events. Consequently, 
with regard to sport, the notion of equality of the sexes is somewhat suspended in favour of 
equality of opportunity. 
There is also acceptance of age discrimination in sporting competition by way of 
separate competitions depending on age. And this is again condoned in the UK by way of the 
Equality Act 2010 where separation is allowed if it is proportionate to achieving a legitimate 
aim.132 As with the other reasons for separating competitors whether based on sex, disability133 
or age, the purpose is to achieve safe and fair competition that is in line with generally accepted 
international practice.134 Therefore separate competitions are excluded from anti-
discrimination laws.135 This permission of discrimination within sport contributes to its specific 
nature. This concept can also extend to include things such as stakeholders requiring a certain 
outcome, competition against an external party, and that there should be a set number of 
participants.136  
Another, of many reasons, that gives sport and the Olympics their specificity, is that it 
uses, either day-to-day terms or legal terms, differently. For example, Beloff mentions that 
sport has its own definition of nationality, separate to political nationality. Entities that are not 
states before the UN, possess ‘sporting’ nationality, such as Taiwan and Scotland. Furthermore, 
Chappelet notes that Games participation may be a stronger example of sovereign statehood 
than UN admission.137 
Nafziger adds that following the fall of the Eastern bloc, IOC recognition was one way 
for new states to obtain recognition and legitimacy of their statehood on the international 
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scene.138 Indeed, it contributed somewhat to the legitimacy of statehood of some of the former 
Yugoslavian states contrary to the UN and other sporting competition’s position at the time.  
For example, at Barcelona 1992, Slovenia and Croatia sent teams for the first time and it 
allowed the inclusion of individual athletes from Serbia after UNSC sanctions.139 These 
individual athletes used the Olympic flag as transitionary symbols of statehood.140 However, 
former Serbian sports teams could not attend.141 Nafziger concludes that thus the IOC was more 
expansive at the time, that organisations such as UEFA (Union of the European Football 
Associations) which did not allow participation by former Yugoslavian teams. However, he 
fails to note that in fact, the IOC was not more inclusive than them, as it only allowed 
individuals and not team participation at the Games. Moreover the IOC, via the Truce, failed, 
to bring an end to the conflict in Bosnia at the time.142 
A further reason for sport’s specificity is the relationship it and its institutions have with 
governments. This is especially true with regard to OCOGs, who are considered by Chappelet, 
as para-public. He adds that NOCs are inextricably linked to governments as they are the 
organisation that selects the Games team that will parade in front of the world at the opening 
ceremony – an unparalleled opportunity for a state to display statehood in a peaceful manner.143 
 
It appears that the courts understand when the doctrine operates and when to interfere, 
and then work back to justify this. Therefore, according to the EU doctrine of specificity, there 
are many ways in which sport may differ from other pursuits which do not obtain specificity 
before the law. It is a combination of competitiveness, uncertainty of outcome and physical 
differences of the individual that give sport its unique nature, alongside the political sporting 
field it appears on. All of which apply to competition at the Movements thus fulfilling the first 
hurdle for its special treatment before the law using the EU doctrine. However, this 
arbitrariness of outcome diminishes the doctrines credibility and potential application to the 
Movement, compounded by the fact that many CAS/European decisions relate to professional 
football. Furthermore, whilst EU sports law is international, it is only limited to Europe.144 
Hence the application of the doctrine to the Movement is not on solid ground. 
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However, the rest of the world could assume its doctrines either into domestic or 
international law, using the same reasoning. Jurisdiction is relevant to the Olympic system 
because of the interplay with host nation’s laws and the potential for Swiss law to apply. There 
is always the potential that different rights/laws could exist at different Games depending on 
where they are being held. 
Furthermore, this thesis contends that the specificity of sport stops too soon as the 
existing doctrine has not understood Olympic Singularity. Existing academics have viewed the 
exemption from the law of the Movement’s constituent parts - focusing on whether the ISF or 
the IOC can make law. However, as this thesis contends that whilst these core Movement actors 
are extraordinary, so is the collective Movement. It is unusual due to its visibility and 
charisma.145 Hence Olympic Singularity compounds the specificity of sport enabling the 
Movement to be able to sanction a Truce Treaty 
  
 
4.6 The birth of the Olympic Movement in the Olympic Charter  
The sixth feature of Olympic Singularity which necessitates the Movement’s grouping 
as a singular organisation capable of enforcing a Truce Treaty, is that it has been created by the 
Charter, albeit unintentionally.  
As it stands the Charter does not consider the Movement as able to hold power or act 
on its own. The Charter simply considers it an ease of use term grouping various actors 
together. It does this in part c) of its Introduction where it says that the IOC, the NOCs, and the 
ISFs are the “three main constituents of the Movement” alongside the OCOGs.146 Therefore 
this suggests that the Movement is simply the collective grouping of these actors for ease of 
reference. Furthermore, to refer to the IOC as the Movement is erroneous. 
However, there are flaws with the Charter’s approach to the ‘Movement’. It does not 
consider that its frequent usage and definition (albeit muddied) have unintentionally given rise 
to a new actor where the sum (the Movement) is greater than its actor parts.  
The Charter refers to the Movement 61 times. On its pages, the Movement is real. 
Furthermore, the Charter does attempt to define the Movement. Drafting wise it is a defined 
term which includes the aforementioned actors. It is also further defined, albeit woollily, in the 
3rd Fundamental Principle as  
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 Ettinger, n. 4. 
146
 In order to participate in the Games, these Movement actors must observe the Charter in addition to their own 
constitutions and articles.  
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“the concerted, organised, universal and permanent action, carried out 
under the supreme authority of the IOC, of all individuals and entities 
who are inspired by the values of Olympism. It covers the 5 continents. 
It reaches its peak with the bringing together of the world’s athletes at 
the great sports festival, the Games. Its symbol is five interlaced rings”. 
The Movement is significantly more than an ease of use term to group together various actors. 
The Charter even gives this collective Movement rights and obligations such as that of 
autonomy.147 
 The reason for the Charter’s repeated usage of ‘Movement’ as a defined term, but not 
giving it legal status is likely so that its actors can potentially cloak themselves from legal risk, 
particularly the IOC. Although the Charter gives the Movement rights and responsibilities, the 
Movement has no legal capacity.148 It cannot enter contracts, sue or be sued. Therefore in terms 
of the Charter and the potential for avoiding responsibilities, lawyers have a duty to bring order 
to this sports field, as Beloff suggests.149 This thesis manages this by way of its clear definition 
of the Movement as a singular collective organisation that is capable of having rights and 
responsibilities, notably in the field of a Truce Treaty. The Movement is meant to be viewed 
as one, with the ‘whole’ Movement being greater than the sum of its parts. The solution offered 
therefore has its legal basis in the aforementioned specificity of sport.  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
This Chapter has shown that the IOC, as it can be subsumed into the Movement, is no 
ordinary INGO. It takes the universal features of an INGO mentioned in Chapter 3 and adds 
more flavour to the IOC/Movement as a unique INGO. It has the capacity to create law, both 
via its Charter and its ISFs. It receives special treatments and recognitions from the UN by way 
of its observer status, involvement in the Truce and various departments, and in terms of the 
rights bestowed on it. Furthermore, various domestic jurisdictions afford the IOC and the wider 
Movement web specific rights and recognitions. Whilst the IOC may not be quite on a par as 
the ICRC in terms of these rights, its unusual status is solidified. 
The EU has recognised the doctrine of the specificity of sport, which necessarily 
includes the Movement/IOC. However, it has failed to reason it and has not sufficiently dealt 
with the fact that the Olympic sporting competition stretches beyond its borders. Thus this 
                                                          
147
 5th Fundamental Principle of Olympism, Charter. 
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 As evidenced by the fact that the IOC has no financial or legal liability for hosting the Games. 
149
 Beloff, n. 69. 
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thesis in Part I has accurately deconstructed and then reconstructed sporting specificity in an 
Olympic light. It has termed this Olympic Singularity and draws from some of the same fields, 
such as the importance of the structure and the recognitions afforded to it. Olympic singularity 
recognises sporting specificity, but comments that the unique and special features of sport, are 
at their most unique in the Olympic sphere. Part II will go on to demonstrate that this singularity 
extends into certain spheres, out-with the sphere of envisaged by specificity – beyond sport and 
into the legal-political.  
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PART II 
 
 
THE OLYMPIC MOVEMENT AND PEACE AND SECURITY 
Why should the Olympic Movement be viewed as one entity with regard to the 
Olympic Truce? 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
The Olympic Truce – a new mandate for the Olympic Movement in 
international law and peace and security? 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Part I demonstrated that the Movement is a unique singular organisation. Part II will 
examine whether there is a new role for this Movement in peace and security and what that 
role can be. Specifically, it will examine whether that single collective Movement can have a 
role in a Truce Treaty.  
The Truce’s existence shows that the Movement has given itself a widened mandate 
encroaching on international peace and security. Despite the Truce Resolutions being passed 
by the UNGA, the IOC was the organisation that called on the UN to revive the concept of 
ekecheiria in 1992, via the Appeal for the Olympic Truce.1 This was because the IOC was 
concerned that the Games would be disrupted by poor attendance from a number of political 
upheavals in the early 1990s.2 
 Chapter Five will examine the current Truce and assess its effectiveness in order to 
determine whether it is the right vehicle through which the Movement can fulfil its new peace-
building mandate. It will examine the Truce’s nature and content. Its status as a source of law 
will be tentatively considered, although as a UNGA Resolution, this seems unlikely. It will do 
this by examining the language and nature of UN and Olympic agreements, publications, 
Solemn Appeals and Resolutions, including the Charter and Truce Resolutions. It will also 
consider whether these sufficiently define the Truce or not.  
Chapter Five will then assess whether the Truce is effective, and if not, why? Specific 
consideration will be given to whether any failures of the Truce’s observance are attributable 
to the Movement’s lack of international status and disparate web framework. Therefore, it will 
examine whether a singular Movement, receiving special treatments and recognitions (as 
shown by Olympic Singularity in Part I) would be better placed to do this. This desire for 
involvement in peace-keeping is part of the last aspect of Olympic Singularity yet does not 
                                                          
1
 ‘Appeal for the Olympic Truce’ passed by the IOC at its 99th Barcelona Session 21st July 1992 and presented to 
the UNSG in 1993. 
2
 E.g., the fall of communism in Eastern Europe ending the Cold War, African civil wars, and war in the Balkans. 
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justify this role. However, when Part I’s discussion of Olympic Singularity combines with the 
desired mandate in this field, and the current failings of the Truce, new possibilities and 
solutions must be examined here. 
This Chapter and the next will therefore consider possible solutions to remedy the 
ineffectiveness of the current Truce. The Truce’s ancient predecessor - ekecheiria - will also 
be examined to discover whether it had any advantages over the current Truce incarnation.3 
 
5.2 What is the Olympic Truce? 
The language used by the Movement, the UN and invested third parties4 regarding the 
Truce shall be examined to understand its terms and status. This includes the Olympic Charter, 
the IOC’s initial ‘Appeal’, and UN Truce Resolutions and their associated SG Solemn Appeals. 
This will help to understand whether and why it is being observed. It will use the usual intrinsic 
and extrinsic interpretative tools, alongside consideration of context and purpose.  
 
5.2.1 Charter Language 
The IOC was the institution that first mooted the idea of renewing the Olympic Truce 
and hence its language and institutions are a good place to start an examination of its content 
and status. However, before Olympic sources can be examined, historical contextualisation 
will help to understand why the IOC thought its revival necessary. 
 
5.2.1.1 History 
In 1981 the IOC explored the possibility of organising UN adoption of a Resolution 
requiring non-interference of the Games by states following two unsuccessful Games. This 
coincided with an IOC search for a deeper meaning to the Games in the hope of securing its 
longevity.5 The first approach was well supported by the international community,6 but the IOC 
dropped its submission to the 1982 UNGA Session. The “highly charged political era” and a 
fear of losing control over it at the GA due to it weak position dictated the IOC’s turnaround.7 
                                                          
3
 See Chapter 6, with minor references in Chapter 5. 
4
 Such as the IOC founded IOTF and IOTC (International Olympic Truce Foundation, and Centre, respectively), 
5
 Montreal 1976 was a financial disaster with South Africa-related boycotts and there were many boycotts of 
Moscow 1980. Wassong, Stephan, ‘The United Nations’ Attitude to Olympic Peace’ 
<http://library.la84.org/SportsLibrary/ISOR/isor2010zu.pdf> accessed 16th December 2015. See also Pound, 
Richard, Five Rings over Korea (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1994), 52. See also Kidd, Bruce, 
“Montreal 1976,” Encyclopaedia of the Modern Olympic Movement, eds. John E. Findling and Kimberly D. Pelle 
(Westport, CT and London: Greenwood Press, 2004). 
6
 Wassong, n.5. Pound added that the time was ripe, n.5. 
7
 Pound, n.5 and Wassong, n.5. 
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Although not strictly a Truce, this first exploration paved the way, ten years later, for the 
successfully uplifted IOC-UN organised Truce Resolution. The UN heeded the IOC in the early 
90s because once again, there was a charged political climate, but this time, super-powers were 
not directly involved. Specifically, this was the breakout of war in the Balkans in 1991. 
However, the UN’s uplift of the Truce Resolution was not as simple as war in an ex Olympic 
Host Nation. 
In 1991 the UNSC established a Sanctions Committee against Yugoslavia and in 1992 
sanctioned Serbia and Montenegro with sporting sanctions via Resolution 757.8 This called on 
all states to take “the necessary steps to prevent the participation in sporting events on their 
territory of persons or groups representing FRY [(Former Republic of Yugoslavia)]”.9 This 
meant that the UN endorsed sporting sanctions and prohibitions of FRY athletes, preventing 
Olympic participation, potentially establishing this as a future precedent for international law 
breaches.  
However, this precedent was not set as the IOC raised concerns. The IOC thought this 
sanctioning was at odds with Olympism.10 The IOC also raised concern over these sanctions 
because it wanted to protect its independence from the UN and ensure Games success.11 The 
IOC pitted its ‘international muscle’ against the UN in inviting FRY athletes. The IOC and UN 
agreed that FRY athletes would be allowed to participate in Barcelona 1992, individually, 
under the UN flag and not representing a state’s NOC.12 Croatia, Bosnia Herzegovina and 
Slovenia also sent their first teams to Barcelona. Some claim that this was a compromise with 
the UN yielding more ground.13 However, this is lessened, as the IOC’s suggestion regarding 
FRY, required UN ‘approval’, reaffirming UN superiority. It also makes Resolution 757’s 
sporting sanction entirely redundant. 
This is interesting for three reasons. Firstly, it shows that the UN valued sporting 
sanctions for breaches of international law as mooted by this thesis and that there was a desire 
for the UN to be able to affect the IOC, strictly out-with the state system. Secondly, this 
demonstrates that the IOC and the UN’s objectives were conflicting. This conflict between 
‘IOC inclusion’ and ‘UN sanctioning of international law’ is potentially what prevents the 
                                                          
8
 UNSC Resolution 757, 30th May 1992, sanctioned the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). 
9
 Paragraph 8(6).  
10
 ‘Inclusion and Movement unity’ and ‘protection of athlete’s interests and the Games’, Jarvie, Grant, with 
Thornton, James, Sport Culture and Society: An Introduction, Routledge, 2nd ed, Mar 2012. 
11
 Wassong, n.5. See also Kidane, Fekrou, “The Olympic Truce”, Olympic Review XXVI, no. 19 (1998), 5. 
12
 They also paraded into the opening ceremony wearing a uniform of the Olympic Rings. Wassong, n.5. See also 
Kidane, Fekrou, “Sport and politics, diplomacy of a Truce” Olympic Review XXVI, no. 28 (1995), 50.  
13
 Wassong, n.5.  
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Truce from working effectively. Each walks the line balancing their conflicting missions 
resulting in the Truce’s impotency. Thirdly, Resolution 757 also shows that when the IOC had 
to decide between ‘inclusion’ and its 2nd Fundamental Principle (peace), it chose inclusion, 
even when parties were warring. This suggests ‘inclusion’ outranks peace-building and 
demonstrates the IOC’s lack of serious commitment to promoting peace and ending hostilities. 
Nevertheless, in order to be seen as maintaining commitment to its 2nd Fundamental 
Principle of peace-building, and to balance out the inclusion of athletes from states at war and 
to ensure the success of the Games, the IOC’s Appealed to the UNGA for an Olympic Truce.14  
 
5.2.1.2 The IOC’s Appeal for the Olympic Truce 
NOCs and the IOC, after governmental collaboration, proposed the Appeal at the 
UNGA in 1993.15 It uses semi-formal language akin a UN Resolution and is another indicator 
of the linking of the Olympic and state systems – they are not as divided as the Charter claims. 
The Appeal, as the first written espousement of the Truce, provides some definition but 
confuses this clarity by later using woolly terms. Its wording resurfaces in later Olympic 
language and Resolutions, but as shall be shown, its initial certainties are lost over the years. 
The Appeal’s first indicator of a definition comes from its pairing of the Truce to 
ekecheiria, for example, its introduction states that the Movement is “[a]nxious …to restore 
the ancient Greek tradition of ekecheiria or “Truce Pledge”. This Truce pairing frequently 
resurfaces within the Appeal and in later sources.16 However, little attempt to define ekecheiria 
is made in the Appeal. 
Secondly, the Appeal infers that the Truce is an armistice.17 Although armistice is not 
specifically used, nor defined, it is implied from “laying down of weapons”. The Truce, whilst 
in IOC control, is not a permanent or lasting peace, similar to ekecheiria. This armistice 
implication is one that again frequently resurfaces.  
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 In 1992 and to the UN in 1993.  
15
 Although passed by the IOC in 1992. 
16
 Introduction, Appeal. E.g., Paragraph 2 calls on states to decide that:-“during the Olympic Truce dictated as in 
ancient Greece, to the spirit of brotherhood and understanding between peoples, all initiatives shall be taken and 
all group or individual efforts made to being and continue to achieve by peaceful means the settlement of conflicts, 
whether or not of an international nature, with a view to establishing peace.”  
17
 “During the period, all armed conflicts, and any acts related to, inspired by or akin to such 
conflicts, shall cease, whatever the reason, cause or means of perpetration thereof.”  
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Thirdly and linked to the Truce being an armistice is its limited duration, again similar 
to ekecheiria.18 The Appeal stated that the Truce is to last 30 days (16 days of the Games and 
7 days either side). This defined duration is the Truce’s clearest feature. 
Fourthly, the Appeal places a positive obligation on itself, states and international and 
national organisations to observe the Truce and again this resurfaces in later sources.19 It 
requires all parties to take ‘initiatives’ to ensure this, whatever these may be.20 Not only must 
they have no involvement in conflicts but various initiatives must be taken. Many states may 
not actively be involved in conflicts by default, but they do not establish peace through sport 
initiatives. The notable exception to this are the Host Nation’s Olympic Programme initiatives 
and therefore, only they observe this requirement.21 
The final aspect to be drawn from the Appeal indicating the Truce’s content and status, 
is that it has no binding weight under international law and this is amplified when adopted by 
the UNGA via its Resolutions. This is recognised by the Appeal being a ‘call’. At best, it 
evidences signatory consensus.22  
This Appeal does cursorily give definition to the Truce as an armistice of a set duration, 
but many other terms within it, such as ‘conflict’ and ‘initiatives’ are not defined. This is not 
necessarily problematic in itself. The Appeal is simply a good faith plea, not intended to have 
legal meaning or intent. This mediocre lack of certainty does however become an amplified 
issue when UNGA Truce Resolutions use this IOC Appeal as a basis for their definitions and 
references. This Appeal contains reasonable certainties and definitions, the Resolutions do not. 
The Resolutions refer to this non-binding Appeal for content and definition as they lack it 
themselves. This amplifies the mediocre certainties of a non-binding plea into woolly 
uncertainties, making adherence difficult.  
 
5.2.1.3 The Charter and IOC Truce Institutions 
This section will continue to look at Olympic language, before the next section 
examines UN language for a definition of the Truce and understanding of its nature. The 
                                                          
18
 E.g., paragraph 1 of the Appeal states that:- “During the period from the seventh day before the opening of the 
Game until the seventh day after the end of these Games, the “Truce” shall be observed.” 
19
 E.g., paragraph 1 states that “[t]he Truce shall be observed.”  
20
 Paragraph 2. 
21
 E.g., Vancouver in 2010 had ‘Make Your Peace’, where individuals could make peace relevant to their daily 
lives. London’s OCOG established ‘Get Set for the Truce’, aimed at building knowledge and understanding of 
the Truce amongst youths and having them apply it to their communities, The Truce Timeline,   
<www.olympictruce.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&layout=item&id=3&Itemid=268&lang=en> 
accessed 19th September 2016. 
22
 IOC’s Executive, ASOIF, AIOWF and ANOCA, Appeal, n. 8. 
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Charter, the IOC’s constituent document, does not mention the Truce. A significant lapse if the 
Truce is as central to the Movement as it claims. Although its 2nd Fundamental Principle gives 
the Truce a generic nod as “[T]he goal of Olympism is to place sport at the service of the 
harmonious development of humankind, with a view to promoting a peaceful society”.23 The 
Charter does little to advance a Truce definition aside from this 2nd Principle which suggests it 
is a tool, lacking in legal clout as perceived by the organisation that initiated its instigation.  
 Nevertheless, the IOC attempts to fulfil this 2nd Principle and the propagation of the 
Truce via its establishment of various institutions, such as the IOTF and IOTC.24 The IOC and 
the Greek government established the IOTF and IOTC in 2000 as a joint venture to promote 
the Truce world-wide and to give it real effect. Their language might therefore help to elucidate 
a Truce definition. They say that the Truce is an:-  
“institutional compact; a ceasefire; a suspension or interruption of 
hostilities; an act of peace; non-inception of war; a means or tool for 
peace; or an educational process.”25  
They also favour using ekecheiria when referring to the Truce. The IOTF uses the 
aforementioned interchangeably and synonymously with ‘ancient truce’, ‘Greek tradition’, 
‘concept’ and ‘ekecheiria’.26 This suggests that the Truce could be an armistice, binding law 
and yet a loose concept – all potentially conflicting each other – leading to confusion. 
Furthermore, these long-winded, multi-faceted descriptions lack focus and devalue the Truce’s 
clarity and potential legal impact. This and its lack of further definition suggest the Truce is a 
confusing concept involving some form of conflict cessation, which must assume to be 
deliberately intended by Olympic institutions. Therefore, to find any further definition of the 
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 2nd Fundamental Principle, IOC Charter, 2nd August 2015. Rule 2.4 expands this requiring the IOC to cooperate 
“with the appropriate bodies to promote peace” and support the UN and its goals. Yet the IOC’s ‘peace promotion’ 
differs to the UN’s “maintaining peace.” 
24
 Part of ‘Olympism in Action’, and its Peace through Sport initiative. The IOTF is chaired by the IOC President 
and the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs. They are headquartered in Lausanne, governed by Swiss law, but are 
Greek funded and have bases in Olympia Athens, Jean-Loup Chappelet and Brenda Kubler-Mabbott, The 
International Olympic Committee and the Olympic System: The Governance of World Sport (Routledge, 2008). 
See also IOTC About, <www.olympictruce.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&layout=item&id=1& 
Itemid=266&lang=en> accessed 19th September 2016. 
25
 Introduction, Georgiadis, Konstantinos, and Syrigos, Angelos, Olympic Truce: Sport as a Platform for Peace, 
IOTC Publication 2009. 
26
 The IOTF states its main objectives is promoting “the ancient Greek tradition of the Truce and initiating conflict 
prevention and resolution through sport, culture and the Olympic ideal, by co-operating with all inter and national 
governmental organisations specialised in this field, by developing education, and research programmes and by 
launching communication campaigns to promote the Truce”. Olympic Movement, IOC, Olympic Truce, IOTF 
<www.olympic.org/content/the-ioc/commissions/public-affairs-and-social-development-through-sport/olympic-
truce/?tab=international-foundation> accessed 11th February 2016. See also Rogge, foreword, Georgiadis and 
Syrigos, n.25, “the IOC revived the ancient Greek tradition of “ekecheiria”, the Truce: using sport as an instrument 
to foster dialogue for reconciliation and peace, with the support of the UN calling on its member states.” 
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Truce beyond the parameters of the initial IOC Appeal requires examining the UN Truce 
Resolutions. 
 
5.2.2 UN Resolutions and Solemn Appeals 
The IOC on its own was unable to do little more than the aforementioned soft 
measures:- its initial Appeal and the establishment of its Truce institutions, although the latter 
were a joint venture with the UN. After the initial Appeal in 1992, that was passed to the UN 
in 1993, the decisive factor in the UN ‘hearing’ this Appeal for a Truce was due to the Bosnian 
team27 being trapped in Sarajevo by the surrounding conflict.28 Being trapped by war was an 
important historical reason for ekecheiria’s existence and underpinned the Truce’s revival. This 
entrapment was compounded by the fact that the international community felt it owed a ‘moral 
duty’ to the 1984 Winter Games Hosts to aid their participation. The UN therefore believed 
that the Truce could help advance UN and IOC Charter principles that it would:-  
“protect[ing] as far as possible the interests of the athletes and sport in 
general and to encourage searching for peaceful and diplomatic 
solutions to the conflicts around the world.’29  
Between the 1992 SC sanction Resolution and the Lillehammer 1994 Games, a 
turnaround in UN policy on sport as a sanction can be seen. UN policy was brought into 
alignment with IOC inclusiveness. Consequently, the UN uplifted the Appeal and transformed 
it into a UN Truce Resolution, 48/11, on the 25th October 1993, in advance of the winter 1994 
Lillehammer Games. The UN quickly established a precedent passing a Truce Resolution 
several months in advance of every summer and winter Games. The Resolutions state the UN’s 
commitment to the Truce for the upcoming Olympiad as it (the Truce and any global, local, 
national or international conflict) are deemed permanently on the UNGA’s agenda.30 These 
Truce Resolutions are followed by the SG’s Solemn Appeal, that urge observance of its related 
Resolution, a few weeks ahead of its Games.31 
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 Allowed to attend as individuals as per the IOC-UN agreement and the Barcelona precedent. 
28
 Briggs, Rachel; McCarthy, Helen; and Zorbas, Alexis, 16 Days of Peace, The Role of the Olympic Truce in the 
Toolkit for Peace, Demos Athens (2004) (Hendy Banks and IOTC). 
29
 Olympic Movement, Olympic Truce, History <www.olympic.org/content/the-ioc/commissions/international-
relations-/olympic-truce/> accessed 11th February 2016. 
30
 Jarvie, Grant, with Thornton, James, Sport Culture and Society: An Introduction, Routledge, 2nd ed, 2012. 
31
 Titled, the ‘Olympic Ideal’ and/or ‘Building a Peaceful and Better World Through Sport and the Olympic Ideal’. 
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5.2.2.1 Lillehammer Games’ first Olympic Truce Resolution and Solemn Appeal (1993) 
Lillehammer’s Resolution commences by affirming its support and endorsement from 
184 NOCs, close to 96% of all NOCs in 1993.32 This support mirrors one of the reasons for 
ekecheiria’s observance according to Georgiadis and Syrigos - its universal application. In the 
ancient world, this universality indicated the Truce codified a customary norm. However, 
universal application and universal support are different. Resolution 48/11 had near universal 
support, but it did not have universal application as conflicts still continued during the Games’ 
duration. In February 1994, the Balkan conflict continued, the Rwandan genocide was brewing 
and there were on-going troubles in Iraq and Afghanistan. Lillehammer’s Resolution did 
nothing to quell these conflicts – it only enabled Bosnian attendance. 
The Resolution goes on to affirm the 2nd and 4th Fundamental Principles of Olympism 
before mentioning the Truce.33 This Fundamental Principle affirmation is significant as UN 
recognition of the Charter. This could elevate these to recommendations to the international 
community or show evidence of a customary norm. This again shows the linking of the IOC 
and the UN, and the IOC and its Charter’s special status. 
Lillehammer’s Resolution and Appeal begin a repeated UN linking of the Truce to 
ekecheiria, as begun in the IOC’s Appeal.34 For example, the Resolution states that the UNGA 
“recognise(es) … the efforts of the IOC to restore the ancient Greek tradition of ekecheiria, or 
“Olympic Truce”. And the Appeal adds that:- 
“The Olympic Truce, or ekecheiria, is based on the ancient Greek 
tradition…. All conflicts ceased during the period of the Truce…”, and 
“I urge us to place at the forefront of our thoughts and actions the 
principles and ideals which the ekecheiria and the Movement seek to 
propagate.”  
These indicate that the Truce is therefore akin the ancient’s ekecheiria. The Appeal also 
emphasises the armistice aspect of the Truce, for example, it calls on those “engaged in armed 
                                                          
32
 1993 saw a rise of 25 NOCs following the dissolution of the Eastern Bloc, bringing their total number in 1993 
to 192. This meant that almost 96% of NOCs at the time, supported the resolution. 
33
 “Recognizing that the goal of the Movement is to build a peaceful and better world by educating the youth of 
the world through sport, practised without discrimination of any kind and in the Olympic spirit, which requires 
mutual understanding, promoted by friendship, solidarity and fair play,” Resolution A/RES/48/11, 25th October 
1993, paragraph 2. 
34
 E.g. the Appeal says that “[B]y applying the principle of ekecheiria the world can at least hope for some respite, 
however temporary, from….conflict”, Solemn Appeal ‘Building a Peaceful and Better World Through Sport’, 
issued by the UNGA President on the 19th January 1994 in advance of the February Lillehammer Games (A/48/851 
(1994)). It addressed all states to observe the Truce for the upcoming Games, and such Appeals now occurs in 
advance of every Games. These Solemn Appeals are as unbinding, if not more so, as the Truce Resolutions to 
which they relate. They are simply pleas or calls for its observance. 
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struggles to… suspend hostilities” and that “[b]y applying the principle of the ekecheiria, the 
world can at least hope for some respite, however temporary, from….conflict.” Thus the 
Appeal gives marginally more detail to the Truce than the Resolution does, but there still 
remains little understanding, outside conflict ‘cessation’ during the relevant time frame 
regarding its Terms. Meaning that in UN ownership (as opposed to the IOC’s initial Appeal) 
there is a lack of definition.  
However, paragraph 2 of Resolution does add some depth by reaffirming the limited 
duration first seen in ekecheiria, and later in the Movement’s Appeal. It:-  
“urg[es] Member States to observe the Truce from the 7th day before 
the opening and the 7th day following the closing of each of the Games, 
in accordance with the Appeal launched by the IOC;”.  
The SG’s Appeal reiterates that the Lillehammer Truce was to last just over a month giving 
specific dates (5th February to 6th March). Hence the Resolution and Appeal together do give 
some certainties regarding the modern Truce, with more certainties appearing in the Appeal 
than the Resolution.35 
The Appeal goes further than its Resolution yet again, as whilst both direct all states to 
observe the Truce, the Appeal adds “whether or not they are now parties to a confrontation”. It 
clarifies that it is not just warring states that must observe the Truce – it is all states.  
Lillehammer’s Resolution also calls upon “all Member States to cooperate with the IOC 
in its efforts to promote the Truce”.36 This aims to develop the UN-Movement partnership. Yet 
it only extends to UNGA member states, excluding UNGA observers, non-state UNGA 
member parties and states that are not GA members. This would not ordinarily be an issue but 
Resolution 48/11 raises a recurring problem when viewed within the Olympic framework. 
Palestine is a UN non-member observer state but it has a NOC.37 Furthermore many non-
sovereign states, such as the British Virgin Islands that have NOCs, only commit to this 
Resolution via their sovereign state, the UK. Hence unaddressed gaps exist here in terms of 
reach, agreement and parties.  
In furtherance of this UN-IOC partnership, building on the special relationship and 
status of the IOC and Charter, the UN proclaimed 1994 as the ‘International Year of Sport and 
the Olympic Ideal’, commemorating 100 years of the Games.38 The Movement bore sole 
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 A problem as the Appeal carries even less weight than the Resolution. 
36
 Paragraph 4. 
37
 Granted in 2012, Resolution A/RES/67/19, 29th November 2012. 
38
 Resolution on the ‘Olympic Ideal’, 48/10, 25th October 1993 (A/RES/48/10) at the UNGA’s 36th Session. 
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responsibility for its financing and organisation.39 Whilst this may seem wily of the UN, 
handing responsibility for peace through sport initiatives to INGOs, may amplify the Truce’s 
effectiveness. Together they could reach all conflicting parties by operating on the state and 
sub-state level. Yet it may also be seen as evidence of the UN’s lack of commitment to sanction 
breaches of the Truce Resolution as it is advocating soft measures instead. Furthermore, the 
International Year of Sport Resolution does not mention the Truce, not adding anything to its 
definition. It does, however, reiterate already familiar soft UN language. For example, it 
“recognis[es] the Olympic ideal” and “commends the Movement for its ideal to promote 
international understanding”.40  
The Olympic Truce Resolution 48/11 also requires the UNSG (Boutros-Ghali) to be a 
figurehead in Truce promotion, globally and amongst Member States.41 Boutros-Ghali was the 
first SG to actively bring the two organisations together and treat the Resolution’s obligations 
sincerely, developed by later SGs.42 However he did not add any definition and only 
compounded its woolly nature. For example, he stated that:-  
“the Olympic ideal is a hymn to tolerance and understanding between 
people and cultures. It is an invitation to completion, but competition 
in the respect for others… Olympism is a school of democracy. There 
is a natural link between the ethics of the Games and the fundamental 
principles of the UN.”43  
Resolution 48/11, the Lillehammer Appeal and the IOC’s Appeal are the Truce’s 
original formal documentation from which later sources draw and refer. When read together, 
especially with the two Appeals, they define the Truce as ekecheiria, conflict cessation for a 
specific period of time and a peace – all much broader than the ancient ekecheiria, which was 
                                                          
39
 E.g., the UN and its Member States bore no “financial implications … nor will it require the setting up of any 
administrative structure”, A/RES/48/10. Further initiatives this year included the cooperative agreement between 
the IOC and the UN Environment Programme and the Centennial Olympic Congress. This helped promote 
“respect for the environment to be one of the Charter’s Fundamental Principles and calls for the Movement and 
environmental organisations to cooperate and contribute to the education of the sporting world and young people 
in ecological sustainability.” IOC Commission for Sport and Environment, Sustainability Through Sport – 
Implementing the Olympic Agenda 21 – 2012. 
40
 It reaffirms the values of Olympism, specifically the Charter’s 2nd Fundamental Principle (building a peaceful 
and better world through sport), indicating the special status of the IOC and the Charter once more. 
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 He was to “promote the observance of the Truce among Member States, drawing attention … to the contribution 
such a truce would make to the promotion of international understanding and the maintenance of peace and 
goodwill, and to cooperate with the IOC in the realisation of this objective.” He facilitates this partnership. 
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 In the modern era, the Truce was only mentioned for the first time in 1956, at the Melbourne Games, Mestre, 
Alexandre Miguel, The Law of the Olympic Games (Asser Press, 2009). For example, Boutros-Ghali stated that:- 
“in the IOC, the UN has a precious ally in its action in the service of peace and bringing peoples together”. Stated 
in 1994, Miller, David, The Official History of the Olympic Games and the International Olympic Committee, 5th 
April 2012, Mainstream Publishing Ltd. 
43
 Kidane, n.12. 
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simply an armistice. This lack of clarity regarding the Truce hampers its observation as 
compared to the legally binding ekecheiria Treaty.44 
 
5.2.2.2 Atlanta Games’ Resolution and Appeal (1995/6) 
The next Olympic Truce Resolution and Appeal called on Member States to reaffirm 
Truce observance for the 1996 Atlanta Games.45 It echoed the previous Resolutions and again 
affirmed the Charter’s 2nd Fundamental Principle potentially meaning a loose adoption of 
Charter Principles into the UN system, but gives these concepts no legal definition or weight.. 
It once more focused on joint IOC-UN endeavours and called for SG involvement.46 These 
editions offer little further definition to the Truce. It therefore remains a woolly and looped 
concept. 
 
5.2.2.3 Nagano Games’ Resolution and Appeal (1997/8) 
The Nagano Resolution and Appeal formalises the UN-IOC partnership by introducing 
the UN flag at Games’ sites. Potentially this is Nagano’s ‘most significant development.’47 
They also develop the Truce by linking it to development, environmentalism, peace and 
security in advance of the Millennium Declaration.48 The Appeal develops this bridge to the 
future aspect by stating that:-  
“Today the Truce has become an expression of mankind’s desire to 
build a world based on the rules of fair competition, peace, humanity 
and reconciliation …symbolic link to the next millennium… [the Truce 
is a] bridge from the old and wise tradition to the most compelling 
purpose of the UN – the maintenance of international peace and 
security….where ideals of peace, goodwill and mutual respect form the 
basis of relations among countries.”49 
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 IOC Factsheet Olympic Truce Update, December 2015, <www.olympic.org/Documents/Reference_ 
documents_Factsheets/Olympic_Truce.pdf> accessed 23rd June 2014. 
45
 A/RES/50/13, 21st November 1995, entitled ‘The Olympic Ideal’ and Solemn Appeal 50/997, adopted at the 
GA’s 50th Session, 11th July 1996. 
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 E.g., noting ‘with satisfaction’ their increased number and the inclusion of more parties in the fight and it 
“request[s] the SG continue to co-operat[e] with the IOC in joint endeavours for the promotion of peace, equality 
among nations and the harmonious development of humankind”. It also suggests Member State’s Ministers of 
Youth and Sport collaborate with the IOC. This could be again seen as linking of the state and Olympic systems. 
47
 Georgiadis and Syrigos, n.25. 
48
 Resolution 52/21 of the 8th of December 1997, e.g., it:-“Urges Member States to observe the Truce during… 
Nagano… the vision of which is to be a link to the 21st C, inspiring the search for wisdom for the new era”. 
49
 Appeal 52/782 of 2nd February 1998, made five days before the Nagano Games opened. 
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This and the Resolution broaden the Truce’s impact, indicating it is a tool for change.50  
However, they also re-affirm familiar vernacular about the Truce, that it is an 
‘expression’, ‘tradition’. That the Truce is only temporary - an armistice. It pairs the Truce to 
ekecheiria by using the same language as the IOC Appeal and Lillehammer’s Resolution.51 
They also refer to Charter Fundamental Principles (fairness, peace and respect for humanity).52 
Again, it calls for member state cooperation with the IOC and requests the SG promote Truce 
observance.53 In 1997 Kofi Annan, as UN SG, took this seriously, building on Boutros-Ghali’s 
work. Annan actively attempted to find diplomatic solutions to the re-emerging Iraq and Gulf 
conflicts.54 These reiterate already familiar wording and content of previous Resolutions and 
Appeals, adding little more to a Truce definition. 
It is worth noting that the Appeal mentions international conflicts only, contrary to the 
IOC’s appeal which did not distinguish conflict types, ignoring the changing nature of war. 
This could lessens its impact, and increases its framing as simply a concept.  
   
5.2.2.4 The Millennium and the Sydney Games’ Resolution and Appeal  
Sydney’s Resolution was co-sponsored by 180 Member States, meaning it was on its 
way to achieving ekecheiria’s universality.55 However, it and its Appeal offer no further Truce 
definition, only more woolly language.56 They continue to broaden the Truce’s reach by 
welcoming and encouraging cooperation at different levels, beyond national boundaries, urging 
concrete action at regional and global levels.57 But this raises difficulties for states curtailed by 
their sovereignty. This explains why Sydney’s Resolution re-affirms that the ‘work’ is to be 
done by the IOC for example by the newly created Truce institutions, and not the UN.58 The 
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 It may “bring about even a brief respite from conflict”, Appeal. 
51
 “[T]he idea of the Truce, as dedicated in ancient Greece to the spirit of fraternity and understanding”, and 
discusses the “Olympic Ideal”, e.g., For example, its preamble states that “The Olympic ideal promotes 
international understanding … through sport and culture in order to advance the harmonious development of 
humankind”, A/RES/51/21, 8th December 1997. 
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 Fair play is mentioned in the 4th Fundamental Principle, and peace and humanity in the 2nd, Charter. 
53
 As per Resolution 48/11. It also tabled a future Truce Resolution on building a peaceful and better world through 
sport and the Olympic ideal for Sydney, ensuring its reoccurrence every Olympiad, A/RES/52/21. 
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 Georgiadis and Syrigos, n.252. 
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 54/34 of 18th January 2000. 
56
 For example, the Games’ vision “at the dawn of the new millennium, [is] to be highly harmonious, athlete-
orientated and environmentally committed”, A/RES/54/34. 
57
 This builds on Sport Ministers using sport to build peace in their states from Atlanta’s Truce Resolution. 
58
 As per earlier Resolutions and is part of solidifying the UN-IOC partnership once more. Here the UN is simply 
the Truce’s endorser, it ‘welcomes’ the IOC’s decision to mobilise all ISFs and NOCs of member states to 
“undertake concrete action at the local, national, regional and world levels to promote and strengthen a culture of 
peace based on the spirit of the Truce … [and the IOC’s establishment of the IOTC that is to] promote peace and 
human values through sport and the Olympic ideal”. It also specifically mentions the IOC-UNESCO partnership, 
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IOC could have greater reach than the UN, and is one of the reasons this thesis advocates for 
the Movement’s singular control over a Truce Treaty. But as it stands, the IOC does not have 
the same authority as they UN and is why the institutions have to work together or for the 
Movement to have amplified control.  
This Resolution and its Appeal again confirm that the Truce is a concept and tool.59 It 
also links the Truce again to ekecheiria.60 But significantly it states a time extension of the 
Truce - “beyond the Games period.”  The Truce is to extend beyond the Games, unlike previous 
Resolutions and Appeals that restricted it to the Games (and 7 days either side).61 This 
extension could hamper its effectiveness ekecheiria’s temporary nature was a reason for its 
success.62  
Less than a week after Sydney’s Appeal, the Millennium Declaration Resolution was 
passed reaffirming various UN Charter principles and Truce Resolution wording.63 It again 
mentioned the Truce in woolly language, offering no definition, but it did solidify the UN’s 
backing of it as an ideal at the turn of the millennium.64 
  
5.2.2.5 Salt Lake Resolution and Appeal  
Salt Lake’s Resolution, despite the UN-IOC partnership, confirms UN superiority and 
Truce ownership, showing a power shift back to the UN.65 This dominance can be attributed to 
the newly created UNOSDP office. This Resolution and Appeal also reframes the Truce as 
‘safe passage’ for Games participation rather than an ‘armistice’.66 Safe passage is an easier, 
more accessible concept to accept than a global armistice or permanent peace. This could be 
                                                          
e.g., it notes the joint work fighting against AIDS and juvenile delinquency (laid down in GA Resolution 53/243 
of 13th September 1999). 
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 E.g. it is an “instrument to promote peace, dialogue and reconciliation in areas of conflict”, A/RES/54/32. 
60
 E.g., the President states that the “idea of the Truce dates back to … ekecheiria … [it is an] expression of 
mankind’s desire to build a world based on … fair competition, peace, humanity and reconciliation”, Appeal 
54/971, 1st September 2000.  
61
 With the potential for soft initiatives to be on-going. 
62
 Georgiadis and Syrigos, n.25. 
63
  A/RES/55/2, 6-8th September 2000. 
64
  Paragraph 10 states “We urge Member State to observe the Truce, individually and collectively, now and in 
the future, and to support the IOC in its efforts to promote peace and human understanding through sport and the 
Olympic ideal”, A/RES/55/2. 
65
 A/RES/56/75, 10th January 2002, e.g., Truce observance must be within the UN Charter’s framework, meaning 
that UN Charter obligations dominate over the Truce with all related action being under its auspices. Furthermore, 
the UN’s calls for IOC aid programmes show UN dominance. And the Resolution moves from ‘welcoming/noting’ 
IOC work, to ‘urging’ its endeavours and it urges the IOC to develop aid programmes in countries affected by 
conflict and poverty for physical education and sport. 
66
 The Resolution requests Truce observance “by ensuring safe passage and participation of athletes at the Games” 
(Res/56/75) and is reiterated in its Appeal which calls on “all States to demonstrate their commitment to the Truce 
….to ensure the safe passage and participation of athletes”, Appeal, 56/795. 
105 
 
due to the global climate of the day and events such as the September 11th terrorist attacks, 
which are specifically mentioned in the Appeal, alongside the need of the Truce to counteract 
these.67 It is however a slight redefinition of the Truce akin ekecheiria’s purpose, and somewhat 
confuse the Truce definition. 
Salt Lake’s Appeal again paired the Truce to ekecheiria.68 But the Appeal added that 
states had to demonstrate their ‘general’ Truce support. This leaves the usual question as to 
how this will occur or whether safe passage fulfils this. This shows why the Truce is 
deliberately vague and fluid - so it can be interpreted and adapted to suit contemporary needs. 
 
5.2.2.6 Athens Resolution and Appeal  
Athens’ Resolution had unprecedented UN support and was the most widely supported 
UN Resolution in its history.69 It was unanimously adopted by 190 member states, showing 
near universal Truce support, potentially in light of the war in Iraq and Afghanistan 
commencing the previous year.70 The Greek government’s support of the Truce’s revival was 
instrumental to Athens being awarded the Games, for example, the Appeal notes Greece’s 
important role in the Truce and in the IOTC/IOTF.71  
Again this Resolution and Appeal reiterate previous editions as they: refer to 
Millennium Declaration goals;72 broaden the Truce to other fields;73 frame it as a tradition;74 
pair it to ekecheiria;75 emphasise safe passage;76 note the importance of the IOC/IOTC/IOTF’s 
growing work (rather than more formalised measures); UN superiority;77 and highlight its 
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 “[E]ven more concerted efforts and cooperation on the part of the world community are needed to ensure that 
the …. Winter Games are safely and peacefully conducted”, Solemn Appeal 56/795. 
68
 E.g., “In 1992, the IOC renewed this tradition by calling upon all nations to observe the Truce”, Appeal 56/795 
of 25th January 2002. 
69
 A/RES/58/6, 18th November 2003. See also Briggs, et al., n.28. 
70
 Ibid. 
71
 “We are confident that the appropriate measures taken by Greece, in close cooperation with the international 
community, will ensure the staging of the Games in a safe and peaceful environment”, Appeal. Greece carved 
itself a new role in 1998 when it proposed Truce reform and institutionalisation ahead of the millennium, IOTC, 
Solemn Appeal, 58/863. 
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 It ‘takes into account’ the Millennium Declaration and its Truce work and notes that Greece was the home of 
the tradition of the Truce, n.69 and ibid. 
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 It reaffirms the Truce’s connection to worthy issues in education, poverty and health etc., ibid. 
74
 It states that “Resolution 48/11 …. Revived the ancient Greek tradition of ekecheiria or ‘Truce’ … that would 
encourage a peaceful environment and ensuring the safe passage and participation of athletes and others at the 
Games”, ibid. 
75
 The Appeal reiterates the “Greek tradition of ekecheiria (truce)”, calling it the “longest lasting peace accord in 
history”, ibid. 
76
 The Solemn Appeal reiterates its contribution to “providing safety and a peaceful environment” for attendees, 
ibid. 
77
 It “welcome[es]… the establishment by the IOC of an IOTF and an IOTC…[and]… individual support of world 
personalities for the promotion of the Truce”, ibid. Their work was visible this year by the Olympic Flame Relay, 
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utility as a tool.78 It adds little more to the Truce’s definition aside indicating its growing 
universality. 
 
5.2.2.7 Resolution and Appeals 2006 - 2012 
The Resolutions and Appeals for Turin, Beijing, Vancouver and London were similar 
to previous incarnations offering little advancement to a definition.79 However, they did make 
two minor developments. Firstly, from Beijing onwards, the UN dropped equating the Truce 
to safe passage – showing a fluidity to the Truce’s definition.80 Secondly, Vancouver’s Appeal 
recognises the IOC’s invite from the UNGA to be a permanent observer.81 This more 
formalised role could potentially pave the way for a more specific and defined Truce. 
 
5.2.3 Conclusions on Olympic and UN Language 
A thorough examination of the aforementioned sources reveals that certain themes are 
discovered when trying to ascertain a Truce definition. They recur in Olympic and UN 
language, becoming more chronic over the years, obfuscating any clarity that might have 
initially been established. This thesis has ascertained six recurring traits when attempting to 
define the Truce. 
Firstly, it is difficult to gain sufficient legal understanding of the Truce from the 
available sources, as no suitable definition exists as to its terms or status. The few certainties 
established by the IOC’s Appeal and Lillehammer’s Resolution are lost over the years by 
conflicting terms and no further definition being given to recurring ones, such as ‘conflict’ or 
‘ekecheiria’. In addition to the UN and the IOC, many such as Georgiadis and Syrigos, even 
avoid defining it.82 
Secondly, when the Truce is actually mentioned, it is described in altruistic, emotive 
and woolly, imprecise terms, which leads to a lack of clarity. Definitions are often circulatory, 
cross referring to another woolly term, where none are actually defined or carry any legal status. 
                                                          
which for the first time was a global event in 2004. IOC website. Resolution A/58/863 reaffirms this 
internationality by stating that the Flame appeared at UN headquarters. 
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 The Truce is an instrument in the promotion of peace during and beyond the Games period, ibid. previously 
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 Resolution 62/4, 31st October 2007.  
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 Georgiadis and Syrigos, n.25. 
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If terms and status are not known, they cannot be adhered to. This is the first stumbling block 
regarding Truce observation, and is the first factor that must be remedied in a Truce Treaty. 
Clear definition in a Truce Treaty would ensure parties were aware of their commitments and 
increase its observance. Even if the Truce were binding, such wooliness would inhibit its ability 
to be so considered. 
Thirdly, these woolly terms describe the Truce as a non-binding, symbolic concept, 
practice, ideal or a tool, rather than international law.83 Each carry different definitions and 
weights, could potentially conflict and are not defined. It therefore appears that the Truce is to 
mean different things to different parties in order to gain maximum support. This means that 
the IOC does not have to exclude parties and the UN does not have to enforce international 
law. This severely hampers the commitment that states and other actors will place on its 
observance. In any event, the UNGA passing of Truce Resolutions mean that the Truce itself 
is not-binding. Their associated Solemn Appeals are also simply pleas from the UN SG to 
observe it. But it still means that the international community is ‘being seen to be doing 
something’. Perception of the Truce as a tool and not law, is upheld by independent third parties 
such as Demos.84 
Despite stating the Truce is a non-binding conceptual tool, the UN and IOC still 
describe the Truce as ekecheiria.85 This is confusing as it overlooks that they are different 
concepts - ekecheiria was international law and a tool is not necessarily.86 It was a Treaty, 
signed by three Kings, requiring warring parties to lay down arms for the Games’ duration, 
plus travel periods either side.87 The Greeks were sure on its terms and it was largely observed 
ensuring the Game’s peaceful staging. Ekecheiria was international law, potentially enshrining 
customary law. The modern Truce is not Treaty or customary law (not being the later as the 
parties do not perceive it as law nor is it universally observed). They equate a modern soft tool 
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 “the ancient concept of the Truce “, Olympic Movement, Olympic Truce, History 
<www.olympic.org/content/the-ioc/commissions/international-relations-/olympic-truce/> accessed 11th February 
2016. Briggs, et al., n. 28. 
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 Discussed more below and in Chapter 6. See also Georgiadis and Syrigos, n.25. 
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 To allow all those attending to have safe passage from their homes to Olympia on the western coast of the 
Peloponnese Athletes, coaches, spectators, judges, artists etc.…., see Chapter 5. 
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without force, to ancient international law. This pairing does not turn the Truce into 
international law.  
The fifth and sixth observations to be drawn from an examination of the Truce sources 
is that it is framed as an armistice and is of limited duration. However, at times, the UN attempts 
to extend it beyond this time frame, thereby negating on of the Truce’s few certainties. 
 These conflicting and confusing definitions, that lack detail, lead to the conclusion that 
such wording is deliberate. It can mean different notions to different parties according to their 
own motivations thereby gaining wide support. A loose concept to some and ekecheiria to 
others. Yet this confusion means it avoids any real international commitment to a binding 
norms whilst avoiding the difficulties in enforcing and sanctioning international law or 
unpopularising the Games with an exclusion. This means the Truce is destined and deliberately 
intended to fail. Therefore, as Chapter 6 will show, the Truce needs to be codified into a binding 
Treaty with governorship by an organisation with significant international clout. It should 
contain proper, legal definition, adding to its formal weight. This could be done by mimicking 
the Treaty of ekecheiria that contained sanctions – as it currently claims the Truce to be.  
 
 
5.3 Is the Olympic Truce effective? 
 The first sections of this Chapter focused on what constitutes the Truce and what the 
international community’s attitudes are towards its binding nature. They are correct that the 
Truce is not binding. It is a non-binding UNGA Resolution, and the other party involved (the 
Movement) does not have the ability to create binding norms in its current guise. Despite the 
Truce’s lack of binding status, the next question to be asked is, nevertheless, is the Truce 
observed? And if not, why not? Is it linked to its lack of binding status? Although not perceived 
as law by the international community, if it is universally observed, this may add credence to 
evidencing customary law.  
 
5.3.1 Breaches of the Olympic Truce 
It is easy to determine whether the Truce is observed or not by examining whether 
conflicts continued or commenced during the Truce’s duration. A cursory glance reveals that 
despite the Truce’s revival in the early 1990s, it has had little impact on hostility cessation. 
States and other entities involved in modern armed conflicts therefore frequently contravene 
the Truce.  
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This section will focus on the breaches of the Truce by states, specifically host nations, 
as the primary subjects of international law.88 Although the divide between the Olympic and 
the UN state systems arises again here, it can be bridged by Host Nations. They should have a 
higher commitment to and observance of the Truce, but continually fail in this. This is because 
Host Nations table the Resolution at the UNGA and call for Truce observance, even though 
this may be at odds with their aggressive foreign or domestic policies. Furthermore, the Host 
City contract is entered by a governmental division of the Host Nation and the IOC, potentially 
linking the Olympic and state system here. Hence this section will focus on observance of the 
Truce by Host Nations. It will also examine whether the Truce’s lack of observance is the result 
of its non-binding status and whether it needs to be turned into a binding international Truce 
Treaty.  
 
5.3.1.1 Sochi 2014 
The selection of Sochi for the 2014 Winter Games was a controversial choice due to 
the instability of the region following the Georgian and Chechen conflicts, aggressive Russian 
foreign policy in the region and its poor human rights record.89 Nevertheless, some claimed 
that the Games could have helped bring peace and stability to the region. This was dispelled 
by the kicking off what would become the Russian-Ukraine crisis in late February 2014. 
Although active Russian involvement in the Crimea did not begin until later in 2014, it passed 
a resolution on the 1st of March permitting the use of Russian force in the Crimea, one day out-
with the Truce period, taking an interpretation of the Truce as an armistice to the extreme. 
 
5.3.1.2 War in Afghanistan 2001 – 2014, and, War in Iraq 2003 - 2011 
The ‘Wars on Terror’ started with a US led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and lasted 
thirteen years with a marginally shorter occupation of Iraq. During this time, the US and its 
allies hosted many Games. The US hosted the 2002 Salt Lake Games, and its allies hosted 
Games in 2012 (the UK), 2010 (Canada) and 2006 (Italy). The UK was the first Member State 
to obtain all 193 UN signatures to the Truce Resolution, indicating Truce universality and 
potentially a customary status. This is immediately dispelled when it is discovered that the UK 
had 10,000 troops in Afghanistan. Whilst the UK could have employed a cease fire during its 
Games, the emphasis of the Truce as a tool sits against such Host Nation involvement. This 
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also shows, that at this time, the Truce was unable to dispel wars involving non-state 
combatants, dispelling claims that it can affect all different conflict levels.90  
 
5.3.1.3 Norway and Greece 
Norway and Greece hosted the 1994 and 2004 Games respectively. They were involved 
in the Balkan and Afghan Wars (respectively) during their staging of the Games. This was 
despite the Truce being specifically revived for Lillehammer and aiding Bosnian participation. 
And was despite Greek propagation of the Truce securing its election as Host Nation and co-
founding of the IOTC/IOTF. It can therefore be said that Host Nations maintained their 
involvements in ongoing wars, during their hosting of the Games. 
 
5.3.2 Instances of Observance of the Olympic Truce 
Consequently, since the Truce’s revival, it seems that it has only been taken seriously 
during three Games: Nagano 1998; Sydney 2000; and Beijing 2008. Japan’s hosting of the 
1998 Games was considered a Truce success due to the aforementioned Kofi Annan talks in 
Iraq. The Australian millennium hosting and Truce success was just before the ‘War on Terror’, 
in which they nevertheless participated. It was a brief respite in the eye of the continually 
warring storm. Furthermore, many would dispute China’s mention on the list of Truce 
observers, due to its aggressive policies in Tibet. It seems that the only Host Nation to honour 
and observe the Truce is Japan.  
 Georgiadis and Syrigos (writing in 2009) mention three additional Truce successes but 
all were before the ‘War on Terror’, potentially limiting the Truce’s ability to cease modern 
wars.91 They mention the successful contribution of the first Truce and the Sudanese NOC’s to 
organising a ceasefire between the government of Sudan and the Sudanese People’s Liberation 
Army.92 They mention the contribution to the ceasefire between Georgia and Abkhazia and 
how the first Truce helped ensure a ceasefire to deliver humanitarian aid to the people of 
Bosnia.93 With regard to Truce observance, it can be concluded that it was limited to its first 
edition where some clarity and newly garnered momentum helped ensure Bosnian participation 
via safe-passage, to millennial years, before the global climate changed again. This reasoning 
can be extended to suggest that initial Movement control, rather than UN domination heralded 
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success (Bosnia) and where non-Anglo (Japan and China) or non-European states (Australia) 
were Hosts and not involved in their wars on a global stage. 
 
5.3.3 Reasons for the Olympic Truce’s Failure 
It cannot be ignored that one of the reasons for the Truce’s lack of observance is because 
it is deliberately not binding. States understand that they are not compelled to observe it, 
legally, morally or customarily, as it is not law. In turn, it is not given binding legal status 
because it is perceived as only capable of being toothless and redundant - a tool at best. The 
vicious cycle repeats. It is this cycle that is at the heart of its lack of observance alongside the 
confusing and erroneous comparison to ekecheiria, which this Chapter has demonstrated.  
Demos rightly claim that the Truce fails because it is not sufficiently alike ekecheiria, 
i.e. binding. Their reasoning as to why the Truce fails and ekecheiria was observed, is too 
narrow and not fully reasoned (the latter is explored more in Chapter 6).94 Demos claim that 
ekecheiria was observed because it was temporary, universal,95 and perceived as law.96 This 
thesis in Chapter 6 extends these reasons and adds the religious compulsion forcing 
observation. Hence for the Truce to be observed (like ekecheiria), it must possess these same 
features. The Truce shares the temporary aspect with ekecheiria, but has proven insufficient to 
generate observance. The Truce has universal support but not universal application, hence 
indicating this as a reason for its failure. And crucially as mentioned above, the Truce is not 
perceived as law, with no religious duty attached. However, the only factor that cannot be 
replicated from antiquity is ekecheiria’s observance due to religious reasons. Our laws are 
rightly secular today. 
 
5.4 The Olympic Truce as a Treaty 
Despite Truce breaches, this thesis asserts that it, in Treaty format, is the right vehicle 
to secure peace and security in and around the Games, preserving their longevity, all as 
recognised in ancient Greece. That is, provided that three developments are made to rectify its 
current defects.  
As shown by this Chapter, and in Chapter 6, the first defect to be remedied is for the 
Truce to be codified into binding international law - a viable possibility based on the historical 
precedent of ekecheiria. Its present status as a non-binding UN GA Resolution is one of the 
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main reasons it is not observed – parties do not view it as mandatory. Recognition of it by the 
relevant parties (states, the Movement and its entities) as international law will be the first step 
towards ensuring its observance. Parties need simply know it is law and must be observed and 
this move would break the vicious cycles of cross-definition. 
The second defect to be remedied is that the Treaty be framed as an armistice – a 
temporary cessation of hostilities. This temporary Truce ensures it would not over-reach or 
deter potential signatories and is therefore achievable. The ancient Greeks recognised this as a 
necessity for ekecheiria’s success. They also emphasised ‘safe-passage’ a concept toyed with 
by the UN in its middle Truce years, but ultimately dropped by London. This could also be 
uplifted into a Truce Treaty. Remedying these two defects would ensure that the parameters 
and commitments be clear. This would make a Truce Treaty more appealing that the woolly, 
lukewarm and confusingly wide sentiment of today’s GA Resolutions.  
The third defect to be remedied is that it needs to be placed under the governorship of 
a single body that has capacity to impose real sanctions: the new singular Movement. It should 
have the power to unilaterally sanction signatories, such as Host Nations or NOCs for their 
state’s breaches. Sanctions should be limited to the Games or fines, as it was in ancient Greece. 
Yet NOCs are not states and are not involved in war mongering and their punishment seems 
harsh. However, as shown in Chapters 2 and 4, they are inherently linked to the state, justifying 
NOC assumption of state liability and vice versa. NOCs must, for the purposes of the Games 
be viewed as their state’s extension, which does comprise the political independence of the 
Movement, which it nevertheless invariably is. 
Moreover, the Movement is the perfect vehicle, and the Truce the perfect tool, to 
combat modern warfare. This is recognised by the UN but they are unable to successfully 
implement this as detailed by the aforementioned reasons. It is the perfect tool today as it can 
adapt to the shifting nature of war.97 The Truce’s re-birth coincided with the collapse of 
communism and the rise of decentralised ‘humanitarian wars’.98 Conflicts moved from inter to 
intra-state, ignoring political boundaries.99 Actors were no longer states, but terrorists, 
warlords, local actors and mercenaries, who possessed extreme religious or ethnic ideologies. 
Traditional peace-keeping and conflict-resolution methods were seen as out-dated, being too 
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 Moving from interstate wars which are now rare, down to high risk tensions (troubled societies with continual 
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light or deep to resolve these new types of conflicts and ideologies.100 For example, Demos 
asserts that traditional high-level diplomacy can still work but not on sub-state actors.101  
The Truce and the Movement can step in here and plug this breach as they are mobile.102 
The Movement can move and operate at all levels of a conflict, ‘outside, across and within 
states’, which the UN cannot.103 At the highest level, the Truce has world leader support due 
to the Movement’s influence. The recurrence of the Games every two years gives them and the 
Truce, a global influential reach.104 It also has a ‘bottom up’ influence because the Movement 
has a ‘dense network of grass root level sports organisations’ enabling it to affect community 
level change.105 Lederach believes this community-level influence is just as important as 
governmental talks, as a peaceful world starts with educating individuals.106 Thus Demos 
claims that the Truce and the Movement can influence sub-state actors, governments and the 
bodies sending Olympic teams.107 If states are losing the ‘monopoly’ on war, then they must 
also be losing it on peace-building. Therefore it appears that the UN is failing in its peace-
building objectives, and this failure is only solvable by the Truce due to its mutability and 
mobility and its frequent successes.108  
It is worth bearing in mind the parties’ intent here – that they do not desire a binding 
Truce due to a multitude of legal and political difficulties. This thesis offers solutions to 
overcome this unwillingness. The Truce, as a UNGA Resolution, is constricted by current 
assumptions on international law meaning that it is easier for the parties to frame it as non-
binding than re-work existing norms. This means that the UN and the IOC are unable to impose 
real sanctions, due to a lack of status or jurisdiction. This thesis solves these practical 
difficulties by solidifying this partnership (giving control to a singular Movement) whilst 
keeping offence to a minimum – only the Games would be affected or related fines imposed. 
With a new normative basis, the Movement can have jurisdiction here. Furthermore, a Truce 
Treaty may be politically unwelcome due to the current trends of inclusivity at the UN and the 
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 Briggs adds that strong intervention methods have uneven records of success whereas mediation has more 
mixed results and gives the examples of the Dayton Agreement regarding Bosnia and Serbia, and the US’s on-
going role in the Middle East. There is little consensus as to what works e.g. between sanctions, preventative 
deployment or peace enforcement, Briggs et al., n.28. 
101
 Ibid. 
102
 Ibid. 
103
 It talks of the pyramid of conflict and that the UN must find ways for its work to transcend national borders, 
helping actors on all levels of the pyramid, Briggs et al, n.28. 
104
 Briggs, et al., n.28. 
105
 E.g. ISFs, continental associations, regional bodies, local clubs etc… Briggs et al., n.28. 
106
 In Briggs, et al., n.28. 
107
 Ibid. 
108
 Ibid. 
114 
 
Games. However, as the SA example in Chapter 7 shows, however undesirable sanctions are, 
they are effective and must be embraced. Wrestling the Treaty away from UN control would 
lessen the political stale-mate and ensure swift and specific action. Furthermore, parties would 
have an incentive to consent in the first place due to a desire, like the Greeks, to attend the 
Games. The incentive would therefore outweigh possible disincentives. Furthermore, the Truce 
is deliberately non-binding because it has been construed too broadly, it is framed as meaning 
too many things to all people. Focus and clarity would reduce this ensuring a narrowly 
construed armistice Treaty and a less onerous commitment than the broad ideals of the 
Resolutions. 
Therefore, the stage is set for a Truce Treaty as a joint venture between the UN and the 
Movement. Signatories would know and understand its terms, a temporary armistice, that 
would not be unduly onerous. A singular Movement would be able to impose real Games-
relevant sanctions for its breach. Thus desire to attend the Games would prompt observance. 
And the barriers to its observation: lack of binding legal status, confusion regarding clarity of 
terms and collegiate IGO control; will have been remedied. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
This Chapter has demonstrated that there are few observations of the Truce following its 
initial facilitation of Balkan Game’s participation in the early 1990s. The Truce is barely ‘real’ 
out-with the pages of Greek history and it is difficult to accurately identify.  
 The Movement is dominated by states such as the US, US, Russia and France who have 
a frequent involvement in global conflicts. They are unlikely to take any non-binding Truce 
seriously when this could compromise their foreign policies, unless they have legally agreed 
to this. They know the Truce is not a binding legal commitment. However, as this Chapter and 
Chapter 8 examine, if a Truce Treaty is constructed sufficiently accurately and narrowly, no 
compelling reasons exist for states to avoid it.  
Furthermore, difficulties exist for the UN in turning the Truce into a legally required 
obligation. It would mean merging the non-state Olympic system with the UN state system, 
compromise IOC independence and autonomy, and set a dangerous precedent for the 
Movement being an enforcer or source of law. The UN and the Movement’s subjects differ, 
meaning that their potential obligations also differ, but the current framing of the Truce groups 
them together, emphasises their partnership and yet does not address this huge institutional 
difference. This is another potential reason why grassroots rather than state-led initiatives are 
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focused on. It means that international law as it relates to the Games does not have to be 
enforced against states, but can be delegated to sub-state actors. This thesis offers a viable 
solution to these difficulties – a Truce Treaty in control of a singular Movement that merges 
the state and non-state system and that can apply Games related sanctions. A true extension of 
the UN-IOC partnership relationship. 
 Hence it seems that as it stands, the Truce is deliberately intended to be a vague, woolly 
concept. The UN and IOC liken it to ekecheiria to further confuse and obfuscate matters and 
to repeat the cycle of indeterminacy and impotency, as the term is not defined and the Truce is 
not law. Lawyers have a duty to bring clarity to the Truce by way of serious consideration and 
drafting of an international Truce Treaty.109 This would increase its certainty and its 
observance, furthermore parties would know to abide it. Its narrow construction in a Treaty, 
rather than its wide framing as a concept, would secure parties’ commitment. This requirement 
of a binding nature is something that the ancient Greeks recognised nearly 3,000 years ago. 
Hence the ancient concept of ekecheiria and the reasons for its observance shall now be 
examined in the next Chapter to discover whether these can be replicated today in a modern 
Truce Treaty. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
 
What lessons can be learned from the ancient Olympic Games and 
ekecheiria? 
 
 
6.1 Introduction  
The origins of the ancient Games and the reasons for their occurrence are cloaked in 
myths. Stories abound that the Delphic Oracle ordered King Iphitos of Elis to stage games 
every four years to counteract inter-Greek wars. Whilst the veracity of this is unknown, what 
is certain is that the ancient Elean Games can be reliably dated to 776 B.C. They grew over the 
following millennium, like the modern Games have grown in their 121 years, and reached their 
pinnacle around 500 BC.1 They began as a single-day sporting festival of only one event, with 
more events accruing over time. Most events had a martial theme extending the Game’s overall 
purpose to avoiding war.2 The Games were also dedicated to Zeus and other Gods making 
religion another integral part of competition.3 Therefore, the Games were a sporting, religious 
and a martial festival that held cultural, diplomatic and commercial importance. By the time 
the Romans conquered the ancient world in the years A.D. and the later spread of Christianity, 
Game celebrations started to fade, as they were associated with a heathen past.  
In furtherance of the Game’s martial purpose, Elis concluded peace treaties, known as 
ekecheiria, with Hellenic states who sent athletes to the Games to safeguard their arrival and 
the Game’s success. Ekecheiria offers an important precedent for the modern Truce because 
ekecheiria, unlike today’s Truce, was observed in the ancient world.4 However, what is less 
accepted, are the reasons for ekecheiria’s observance. This Chapter will examine and determine 
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 It is unclear when they actually began, although records show Coroebus (an Elean cook) won the stade in 776 
B.C., but the Games may have been well underway then, Symons, Michael, A History of Cooks and Cooking, 
University of Illinois Press, 2003. See also, Olympic Museum Educational and Cultural Services, The Olympic 
Games in Antiquity, 3rd ed. 2013 <www.olympic.org/documents/reports/en/en_report_658.pdf> accessed 8th 
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Swaddling, Judith, The Ancient Olympic Games 2nd ed. 1999 University of Texas Press. 
3
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IOC, History of the First Ancient Olympic Games <www.olympic.org/content/olympic-games/ancient-olympic-
games/history/> accessed 7th December 2015. 
4
 This Chapter operates from the generally accepted position that ekecheiria was observed. 
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the various reasons for ekecheiria’s observance. Understanding why ekecheiria was observed 
can help remedy why today’s Truce is not observed. These reasons can be replicated for the 
UN Truce and potential Treaty. This analysis will ask whether ekecheiria’s observance 
stemmed from:  
a. its construction as an armistice;  
b. its perception by the contemporary international community as a tradition and 
binding international treaty law concluded between states. This Chapter will 
therefore also determine whether ekecheiria was law, its type of law (Treaty 
and/or custom) and if even international law and the bodies capable of forming 
it, existed; 
c. respect for the rule of law and general observance;  
d. its absorption into the state system and governance by a single state or 
organisation - Elis; 
e. the existence of definite sanctions;  
f. or a religious requirement; and 
g. corresponding desire to attend the Games. 
This Chapter will therefore address whether ekecheiria’s unilateral state-control (rather than 
today’s IGO control) with international recognition of its status as law (alongside available 
sanctions), were the most important reasons for observance.  This Chapter therefore addresses 
this thesis’s first research question of whether a singular organisation with legal rights equal to 
that of a state, should have control of a Truce Treaty. It is also necessary to understand what 
ekecheiria is and why it was observed as this is crucial to understanding today’s Truce and its 
status/potential under international law’. Today’s Truce makes numerous references to 
ekecheiria and this means they are inherently and conceptually tied together.  
 
6.2 Why was ekecheiria observed? 
On the whole ekecheiria was observed with only a few recorded instances of its breach. 
Thucydides records a breach in 420 B.C., when Elis accused Sparta of military manoeuvres on 
its territory.5 Sparta had deployed infantry to Lepreum and attacked Fort Phyrcus, both within 
Elis.6 Sparta claimed this was before ekecheiria’s proclamation, but Elis disagreed fining them 
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 As part of the ongoing Peloponnesian Wars, Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Book 5. See also 
Ross, Stewart, The Original Olympics, Peter Bedrick, September 1 1999. 
6
 Totalling c.1,000 hoplite soldiers. 
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per deployed hoplite, totalling 200,000 drachmas to be collected in Zeus’ honour.7 Sparta 
refused to pay, and was then banned from the Games for twenty years, until the Peloponnesian 
War ended.8  
This Chapter will determine why ekecheiria was observed and whether this can serve 
as replicable precedent for today’s Truce. It will do this by necessarily asking what was 
ekecheiria and what status did it have in the ancient world, as per the hypotheses ‘a’ and ‘b’ of 
the introduction above. It will examine its content, legality, and influence as it may have had 
greater weight and wider reasons for observance than today’s Truce. It will then progress 
through the remainder hypotheses above in c – g which will show that ekecheiria had more of 
an impact and stricter observance than today’s Truce. 
Georgiadis and Syrigos identify some of these reasons but not all.9 They do not 
necessarily go far enough or comprehensively break the reasons down. They emphasise 
ekecheiria’s temporary duration, its universality and that observation stemmed from a 
customary moral obligation. However, if each of their reasons are unpacked, temporary 
duration is actually its conceptualisation as an armistice, and universality actually means the 
Greeks strong desire to attend the Games. Also, their customary moral obligation actually 
means a respect for fairness and the rule of law, and that ekecheiria was a Treaty that codified 
a custom, hailing from a tradition. They also fail to accept the dominant part that religion played 
in its observance. Hence they have a worthwhile insight as to why ekecheiria was observed, 
but not a comprehensive one. 
6.2.1 What was ekecheiria? – Commencement, Content and Status 
There are many uncertainties regarding ekecheiria including when it commenced and 
what it was, in terms of its content and status.  
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 Demonstrating that ekecheiria was a temporary armistice. 1 mine is equivalent to 100 drachmas, a skilled 
worker’s daily wage. 
8
 There was also the religious sanctioning where Sparta could not participate in the hecatomb. Following 
exclusion, Elis posted soldiers to guard the Games as they were fearful of Spartan reprisals. 
9
 Georgiadis and Syrigos, Introduction to the Olympic Truce: Sport as a Platform for Peace, IOTC Publication 
2009.  
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6.2.1.1 Commencement and Myth 
Its precise commencement is unclear. Some date ekecheiria to the first reliable records 
of the Games at the end of the 8th Century B.C., and others to 864 B.C. (before reliable 
records).10 
Although its commencement is unclear, the mythical reasons for its birth have endured. 
Myth attributes the start of the Games to Elean King Iphitos who organised them upon advice 
of the Delphic Oracle that Games would help counteract inter-Hellenic wars.11 War was 
substituted for bonhomie sporting competition. To facilitate the Games, Iphitos and two other 
kings purportedly signed a long-term Treaty, establishing ekecheiria, helping to bring Hellenic 
peace, stability and prosperity.12 Hence the Games and ekecheiria were tied, each serving the 
other. The veracity of this legend is unknown, but it is clear that ekecheiria and the Games 
were real, inspiring its modern revival.  
 
6.2.1.2 Operation and Content - Armistice 
Even if ekecheiria’s commencement is unclear, what is more certain is its operation 
and content. Heralds from Elis, spondophoroi (truce bearers), travelled throughout the Hellenes 
to proclaim ekecheiria and the upcoming Games. Ekecheiria was therefore necessary to allow 
safe-passage of these officials as well as athletes, trainers, pilgrims, spectators, artists and 
families. Nearly 45,000 people attended.13 Ekecheiria therefore meant free movement and 
immunity even when crossing hostile territories.14 In addition to this safe-passage, ekecheiria 
also ensured that Elis and the Games themselves were not attacked during the festival.15 Once 
again showing the tie between the Games and ekecheiria. Ekecheiria also required that games 
attending states cease their judicial disputes and capital executions.16  
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 And amongst the 3 Kings mentioned in n. 12. The IOC itself states that the Truce was a tradition on which the 
Games were built on in 776 B.C. so they existed then.  Swaddling, n. 2. See also, Antiquitatem, ‘The Sacred Truce 
Made Possible the Continuity of the Olympics for 1.170 years’, 17th December 2013 
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Furthermore, Philip II’s ambassadors supported the view that regarding ‘foreigners – barbarians’, all Greeks have 
and ever will have is eternal war’ and that war was the natural default setting of the Hellenes, Bederman, David, 
International Law in Antiquity, 2007, Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law. 
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However, ekecheiria’s duration is a little unclear. Some accounts state it initially lasted 
for throughout the Games plus seven days either side. Other accounts say it totalled a month 
and grew over time to three months.  
Furthermore, uncertainties surround the content, wording and resultant obligations of 
ekecheiria, which are compounded by the passage of time.17 Pausanias mentions ekecheiria 
whilst writing about the Elean Temple of Hera:- 
“There are here other offerings also:…. the quoit of Iphitos; a table on 
which are set out the crowns for the victors…. The quoit of Iphitos has 
inscribed upon it the truce which the Eleans proclaim at the Olympic 
festivals; the inscription is not written in a straight line, but the letters 
run in a circle round the quoit!”18 
From this it can be gathered that ekecheiria took written form although no physical copies have 
survived. Nevertheless, its depth and content are likely superficial, if it fit entirely on a metallic 
quoit.19  
There is little further hard evidence regarding ekecheiria’s wording and content. A 
literal translation of ekecheiria explains it as ‘holding back one’s hands’ or ‘laying down arms’. 
This suggests that arms may be picked-up following ekecheiria’s expiration.20 Ekecheiria must 
therefore have been an armistice – an abstention from arms over a given period, or, a cessation 
of involvement in on-going hostilities.21 Ekecheiria’s construction as an armistice is reinforced 
by its mythical recommendation by the Delphic Oracle. Furthermore, ekecheiria could not have 
been a permanent peace (eirene) as it was temporary in duration. Therefore it did not equate to 
or deliver peace, permanent or otherwise.22  
Ekecheiria’s construction as an armistice is a significant difference between it and 
today’s Truce. The latter focuses on establishing peace, with incidental inclusion of an 
armistice. Chapter 5 shows the modern Truce’s prolific usage of ‘peace’. For example, 
Resolution 66/5 passed in advance London 2012 mentions peace 15 times.23 It seems possible 
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 As individuals due to their sworn Olympic Oath had obligations here, like modern international law has come 
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that ekecheiria’s framing as an armistice and not as a ‘peace’ may be a reason for its historically 
successful application, as compared to today’s limited success.  
However, Mestre dismisses any emphasis on a difference between armistice and peace 
as he claims they are the same. He says states desired peace and hostility cessation in the 
ancient world. This would therefore mean that ekecheiria’s success cannot solely be attributed 
to its construction as an armistice. As this one difference to today’s Truce, it is argued, is 
negligible. 
 
6.2.1.3 Status - Legal Nature of Ekecheiria 
In terms of status, ekecheiria has been described as an early form of international law, 
the longest running peace accord in history, custom, myth, concept, principle, tradition.24 Such 
disparate descriptions are one commonality it shares with today’s Truce. Consequently, as with 
ekecheiria’s content above, its precise legal nature is also unclear. It may have been a legally 
binding treaty (serving as a precedent to today’s Truce and potential Treaty), custom, or it may 
have simply been a tradition (which is how today’s Truce is framed today). Indeed it may have 
combined elements of each and this could be the reason for its success. Each shall now be 
examined. 
 
6.3 Was ekecheiria a Treaty? 
The nature of ekecheiria’s formation indicates it was an international Treaty – a 
significant advantage it has over today’s Truce. Ekecheiria was codified on bronze discs and 
Elis sent their spondophoroi heralds to other poleis detailing its terms. Poleis either formally 
accepted or rejected terms by sending athletes and returning the disc to the Games. These were 
formal measures for ekecheiria’s acceptance, equivalent to modern day Treaty signing or 
ratification. 
Yet, there were no formal criteria in the ancient world for successfully identifying the 
conclusion of Treaties. Modern criteria for Treaty formation (or at the least customary 
international law), can be applied to ekecheiria to determine whether it was an international 
Treaty. Article 2 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties contains the modern 
requirements of treaties, and says that they are:- 
“an international agreement concluded between states in written form 
and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single 
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instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its 
particular designation”. 
Therefore, for ekecheiria to be a Treaty, it would have to fulfil all requirements of Article 2: 
that it be between states; in writing; and governed by international law.  
    
6.3.1 Concluded between States  
In order for ekecheiria to be an international Treaty it would need to have been agreed 
between states. But before this can be determined, the related question of whether states - the 
bodies capable of forming such law - existed in antiquity?25  
Some claim categorically that states did not exist in antiquity, as constant and endemic 
inter-poleis wars meant no international community.26 However, Melko and Weigel call claims 
of constant war an exaggeration. They say that whilst war was endemic, at some points in 
certain locations, “peace was normal and war exceptional….as at any time a border was being 
violated, tens or hundreds of others were being respected.’27 If war was so endemic then the 
Games would have been un-thinkable due to the waste of eligible soldiers. Nevertheless, this 
all ignores the fact that war/peace is largely irrelevant to state existence. A state exists 
irrespective of whether another takes up arms against it, unless by war, it is subsumed under 
another state’s dominion.  
This potentially occurred during the high period of the Games when Philip II of 
Macedonia ‘united’ the Hellenes into his Kingdom.28 Thereafter poleis states may not have 
existed due to losing their independence and autonomy.29 Bederman calls this the end of the 
international state system.30 However, even after ‘unification’ polis retained their governments 
and signed treaties with each other, which makes this unification and evidence of a lack of 
states, irrelevant. Furthermore, Philip’s unification itself confirms their earlier existence. For 
Philip to unify them, means they must have been autonomous, sovereign states. At the least, 
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 Alongside the rise and fall of the poleis, and the transitional nature of their governments, other states formed 
and declined over this time: republics (4th C. B.C. Athens); monarchies that became republics (Rome, a Kingdom 
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before Hellenic unification, states could have existed.31 Another consideration, is that even 
after unification, the notion of ‘Hellenic’ continued to develop, reaffirming the endurance of 
the sovereign polis. This notion meant balancing their poleis independence whilst still 
identifying as part of superior Greek-speaking club. Hence in theory poleis states could exist 
in the ancient Greek world both before and after Hellenic unification. 
The criteria for statehood shall now be examined, now that the theoretical reasons 
refuting state existence have been dismissed. Again the ancient world had no definite criteria 
regarding what constituted a state, other than the polity thinking it so. Modern criteria can again 
be used to determine whether states existed (with awareness that our understanding of 
statehood may differ to that in antiquity). It may be said that using modern criteria is futile, but 
if a polis can meet modern standards, it can surely be deemed a state. The Montevideo 
Convention 1933 (MC) codified accepted customary law on the criteria for possessing 
statehood.32 Statehood requires:- a permanent population; a defined territory; a government; 
and capacity to enter into relations with other states, in order to be considered a state.33  
 
 
6.3.1.1 Permanent Population 
The first MC criterion requires a potential state to have a permanent population, with 
no minimum or maximum threshold.34 Therefore it is irrelevant that ancient states had small 
populations. They would inevitably possess fewer inhabitants than their modern counterparts, 
but possess a larger percentage of the global population.35  
The Games continued through archaic, classical and Hellenistic time-spans, ceasing 
under Roman Greece in 394 A.D.36 Populations therefore need to be considered throughout 
these time frames. However, Greek statistics from over 2000 years ago are difficult to find 
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despite there being the occasional census occurring elsewhere.37 Yet the main issue in 
ascertaining poleis populations (and their permanency) are that many sources only refer to the 
number of citizens - males of a certain age, class, possessing rights such as landownership and 
the ability to vote - and not necessarily to all the inhabitants. Thus it must be ascertained 
whether poleis data represents the ‘citizens’ or the entire population. Therefore whilst such data 
may not necessarily be reliable for overall inhabitants, they can at least show the permanency 
of the populations if they continue to show the numbers of only a set group.38 
Athens and Sparta were the largest poleis in ancient Greece. Sparta, a major military 
power, was somewhat smaller than its Athenian rival.39 Athens possessed around 250,000 
inhabitants and 30,000 citizens, whereas at its peak Sparta had around only 8,000 citizens.40 
However, Sparta’s low figure is disputed as it is likely that this only included fighting age 
males in the Homoioi - peer class.41 If the ‘lower classes’ were included, the Hypomeiones, 
with no restriction on age, the figure raises to 16,000 males.42 This swells to 40,000 when 
women are included and to 200,000 when Sparta’s environs are included.43  
Corinth, a large political power occupying a small geographical territory, had between 
10,000-90,000 inhabitants.44 It seems likely that the former figure includes only the wealthy 
upper class fighting age males, and the latter is the entire population. Argos and Elis are 
recorded as having populations around 16,000, and 23,000 respectively. Again it seems likely 
that this was its male peer class, as they are respectively calculated as possessing around 
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110,000 and 186,000 respectively.45 Consequently, ancient poleis including Elis, can be said to 
have possessed permanent populations throughout the Games’ lifespan, fulfilling the first 
criteria of statehood.  
 
6.3.1.2 Defined Territory 
The statehood criterion of a defined territory requires the ‘effective establishment of a 
political community.’46 Ancient Greek poleis easily meet this criterion as they were established 
political communities, with etymological tracing of the word ‘political’ stemming from the 
ancient Greek ‘polis’, meaning town.47 This statehood criterion places no limitations on a 
potential state’s geographical size, which is reassuring for the small ancient poleis, for example, 
Corinth was only 340 miles2.48 Nor does it require settled boundaries at any time, again 
reassuring to warring poleis.49  
Furthermore, to participate in the Games, strict geographical entrance criteria had to be 
met.50 The Games were open to ‘any free born Greek-speaking male in the world.’51 As the 
Greeks held land throughout the Mediterranean, from Gibraltar to the Black Sea, any such male 
from these regions could participate.52 Statehood and nationality were therefore recognised in 
antiquity, and crucial to Games participation. This requirement was so strong that ‘Barbarians’ 
- foreign non-Greeks who were automatically perceived as uncivilised – were banned from 
Olympic competition.53 This demonstrates that states were recognised as such by their own 
nationals and by other states, the polity of the day, including the Elean Games organisers. The 
defined territory requirement is therefore met as states did exist at the ancient Games due to 
recognition. The Games themselves also helped to form and apply the concept of international, 
which shall be discussed more below. 
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6.3.1.3 Existence of Government 
Statehood also requires that a territory have its own government.54 Poleis had organised 
political life with their own governments. By the 5th Century B.C., Athens had established itself 
as the world’s first democracy which adds credence to it fulfilling this statehood criterion. Its 
plenary assembly (ecclesia) was a debate forum, an election/lottery forum for city officials and 
had power over its military.55 It widened and advanced its democratic institutions, eventually 
possessing further assemblies, courts and judicial institutions, becoming the most politically 
organised poleis.56 Athens clearly possessed a government and was therefore a state. 
Sparta’s was governed by two kings who were advised by an elected Elder Council who 
also held judicial functions.57 Alongside this was the powerful ephors, a modern day executive 
who also had judicial and legislative functions, and the plenary demos assembly.58 Sparta had 
an equally developed government to Athens. However, the establishment of democratic 
government was less successful in Corinth in the archaic and Hellenistic periods when it was 
intermittently a tyranny.59 Yet, tyrannies aside, even monarchies and oligarchies had 
government forums.60 Thus Argos (a monarchy) and Elis and Thebes (oligarchies) also meet 
the governmental requirement for statehood.61 Hence it can be said that poleis possessed their 
own governments during the staging of the Games, fulfilling this statehood criterion. 
 However, in order for an entity to be a state, its government must not be subject to 
control or ‘hegemony’ of another state. During the time of the Games, poleis and their 
governments were mostly uninfluenced by outside control,62 however as mentioned above, 
Greek colonialism meant conquered territories may not always have had ‘independent’ 
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governments, and thus not be a state.63 This is because conquered territories were assumed into 
the conqueror’s political ideology. Their supreme governments were the conquerors, even if 
they maintained their own, token, governments. Hence it is unclear whether during Hellenistic 
unification, or at times of other Greek dominion, whether this government criterion is fulfilled, 
and poleis were thus, ‘states’. Nevertheless, even during times of external control, Greek 
patriotism meant they still saw each other as different, but in a Greek-speaking club, meaning 
that at times of Greek dominion, this statehood criterion may still be fulfilled. Fulfilment may 
be less likely when domination came from non-Greeks, such as the Persians in the 5th century 
B.C., as non-Greeks were considered barbarians.64 Control was domination and by an ‘other’. 
However, it is irrelevant whether a polis was dominated by a rival or foreign power. Temporary 
domination following hostilities does not affect statehood and such control here may constitute 
this here. Hence government interruption from hostile occupation does not necessarily cancel 
statehood if one existed previously, and the poleis may be considered to have had independent 
governments at most times.65  
 
6.3.1.4 Capacity to Enter Relations with Other States 
The final statehood criterion is that the entity must have capacity to enter relations with 
other states and this helps confirm both relating parties’ statehoods.66 ‘Relations’ can include 
contracting, negotiating, treating or entering diplomatic relations, and be uni or multi-lateral.67 
Ekecheiria could even be evidence of this.68  
Such entities, must again, be independent from each other in order to fulfil this criterion. 
This again raises the issue of poleis ‘relating’ to other poleis as opposed to non-Hellenes - 
xenos. This is because whilst other poleis were ‘foreign’ to an extent, they may not always have 
been independent of each other during the Hellenistic-unification period or at other times of 
Greek domination. If poleis treated with xenos, then the independence criterion is more readily 
fulfilled, but of course foreign control during the 5th Century B.C. Persian wars also occurred. 
Nevertheless, Hellenic and xenos relations shall be addressed in turn as the latter amplifies the 
requirement of independence.  
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6.3.1.4.a) Hellenic Treaties 
Examples of Hellenic agreements are plentiful, particularly involving Elis and 
Olympia. Elis concluded the Treaty of Alliance with Heraria in the 6th Century B.C.69 This 
Treaty shared certain features with ekecheiria. It too was written on a bronze tablet and held in 
Olympia with sanctions for its breach.70 
The Thirty Years Peace Treaty of 446 B.C. attempted to regulate affairs between Athens 
and Sparta but contained insufficient arbitration provisions, helping to contribute to the 
Peloponnesian War of 432 B.C.71 Hence the same problems existed then as now, regarding 
arbitration and enforcement of international law. Yet lack of enforcement does not negate its 
initial formation and status.  
A further example of Hellenic ‘relating’ comes from the later Hellenistic period when 
Philip formed the League of Corinth in 337-322 B.C. to help enforce his ‘common peace’ 
treaties – koine eirene.72 This League was not subjugation, as poleis had volition in joining. 
The larger and (historically) powerful city states, such as Athens, did not see much benefit to 
the League, and Sparta was noticeably absent.73 Thus the states were still independent of each 
other and the League remains evidence of ‘relating’. Consequently, polis treated with each 
other on matters of war and envisaged sanctions for their breach.  
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6.3.1.4.b) Hellenic-Persian Relations 
If inter-poleis relations cast doubt on the parties’ independence meaning that they may 
not be states, then relations with xenos could demonstrate this more persuasively, instances of 
foreign control aside. The Greeks had open discourse, trade and relations with Persia that took 
a variety of forms. They observed customary diplomatic practices of the day, for example, 
envoys secured permission to cross foreign territory.74 Persia acted as guarantor to Treaties, 
such as the Peace of Antalcidas in 387 B.C. which ended the Corinthian War.75 Persia entered 
many peace treaties,76 and trade Leagues with Greek poleis.77 Therefore the various poleis 
entered agreements with Persia in a variety of fields: peace; security; and trade, ultimately 
evidencing statehood.78  
However, any discussion of Greek relations with xenos requires asking whether 
xenophobia negated the existence of true ‘relations’ as Greeks may not have viewed them as 
sovereign equals.79 This often meant a reluctance to enter treaties and frequent hostilities and 
could in turn hamper the existence of statehood. Xenophobia meant an overwhelming 
patriotism, a tolerable regard for other poleis, and treating non-Greeks as barbarous – with 
complete disregard.80 Although xenophobia clouded Greek relations with all foreign states, 
they specifically used it as propaganda against Persia.  
Nevertheless, despite their xenophobia, the Greeks were largely keen to treat with xenos 
as equal sovereign powers, including the Persians, especially when it was to their advantage, 
even over a Hellenic rival.81 This shows that xenos could not entirely be beneath poleis 
contracting scope, as at times, the Greeks respected them more than their Hellenic brothers.82 
Thus extensive relations with other states, Hellenic or xenos were undertaken, showing that the 
poleis fulfilled the last criterion of statehood. These relations took many different forms and 
were for varying purposes: trade; diplomacy; and peace-keeping and war.83 Although relations 
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and agreements sometimes failed, and the Greeks had disdain for their brothers and foreigners, 
this does not negate their existence or legality.  
 
6.3.1.2 Conclusions on State existence  
This section has shown that poleis, including Elis, meet the criteria of statehood and 
were states. The only potentially tempering factors being Hellenic unification and subjugation 
(Greek or foreign), meaning that the entities may no longer have been ‘independent’. However, 
the persistence of individual governments, their continued entering relations with others in their 
own right, enduring poleis patriotism and identity, and the fact that temporary subjugation 
following war does not negate statehood, means that the poleis as independent sovereign states, 
persisted throughout these set-backs. The various poleis party to ekecheiria fulfilled the 
requirements of statehood and thus the first requirement for it to be considered law be met: that 
it have been between states. The next requirement for ekecheiria to have been international law 
is that it have been written down.  
 
6.3.2 Written Codification 
Ekecheiria easily fulfils the second requirement to be international law.84 It was written 
on bronze discs and kept in Hera’s temple at Olympia likely after having achieved customary 
status, which is discussed further below.85 Codification was fairly unusual at the time, as many 
treaties were customary rather than written.86 Hence ekecheiria’s codification shows how 
seriously and highly it was regarded amongst the poleis. As Olympia held other important 
treaties, its sanctity was reaffirmed and can invoke comparisons to it and the UN today.87  
 
6.3.3 Governance by international law 
The final criterion that ekecheiria must meet in order to be a treaty is that it have been 
governed by international law. This necessitates addressing whether international law existed 
during the Games. If it did, it would certainly have governed ekecheiria, which was concluded 
between states, in writing and given serious consideration. 
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It seems that there was a ‘law of the Hellenes’ or ‘laws common to men’ with a Hellenic 
‘common idea of justice’, that required them to act in prescribed ways.88 This suggests that at 
least customary international law existed. Its lack of codification compounds its customary 
status, and also shows that state autonomy and choice were present.89 The foundation on which 
legitimacy of all international law is based.90  
However, some disagree that international law existed and they cite four arguments in 
support of this. Firstly, it is asserted that international law could not have existed as there was 
no notion of sovereignty or universal community.91 However, the examination of statehood in 
section 6.2.3.2 above and the inviolability of territory recognised by ekecheiria, show that the 
notion of sovereignty was recognised. With regard to a universal community existing, Bull sets 
the test:- 
“An international society exists when a group of states conscious of 
common interests or values forms a society and conceives that they are 
bound by a common set of rules in their relations with each other”.92 
This clearly existed with regard to the ancient Greeks and the Games. Their common interests 
were: peace; security; fair play; justice; honesty; and the rule of law. All foundations for 
international law. 
 Secondly, it is asserted that international law could not have existed because the norms 
were unwritten and that the nations forming them, too primitive.93 However, there were many 
examples of written codifications, particularly kept at Olympia.94 Furthermore, the detailed 
Laws of Olympia reveal that their societies and legislatures were developed, not primitive.95 
They may not be akin modern developed nations, but that does not preclude the existence of 
states and international law. If today only non-primitive territories were states, then that could 
mean fewer states.  
Thirdly, it is argued that international law could not have existed as these norms were 
limited in range and were based on religion.96 Firstly, this argument is self-defeatist. It admits 
the existence of norms but limits their number and scope. Law cannot be less so because of its 
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paucity. Furthermore, although international norms were limited, they were reasonably 
comprehensive in diplomacy,97 respect for treaties and alliances (pacta sunt servanda),98 and 
war (jus ad bellum).99 They cannot be considered less binding due to their paucity. 
Furthermore, the claim that international law could not have existed because its link to religion 
lessened its legality, rendering it primitive and irrational ignores that religious laws exist 
today.100 It also ignores that law is still law, whatever the reasons for its observation. Phillipson 
agrees and adds that it is:- 
“of no consequence... where the [sanction] lies: the fundamental 
question is whether there is an admitted rule regulating certain 
[international] relationships.’101  
Finally, it is argued that international law (specifically custom) could not have existed 
because consistent, certain rules did not develop. Yet, although there were few international 
norms, they were certain.102 Furthermore, the longevity and consistency of ekecheiria and the 
sophisticated Laws of Olympia also quash this argument. All parties knew what these laws 
entailed and were considered the longest running peace accord in history.  
 
6.3.3.1 Fundamental Laws of Olympia 
Ekecheiria was part of the Fundamental Laws of Olympia – a well organised pyramid 
of three different types of laws, ranked according to their importance with relative sanctions.103 
They were based on fairness, respect for the individual and the collective unit and had an 
international element to them. The most important of the Fundamental Laws, were Olympic 
Laws. These were important enough, like ekecheiria, to be written on bronze plates and held 
at the Olympic Senate.104 These were similar to today’s international Treaty law, the Charter’s 
Fundamental Principles and UN Truce Resolutions. Next in importance were Olympic 
Regulations, which assisted Olympic Law application, similar to the remainder of today’s 
Charter.105 Lastly, Competition Rules governed individual events and were sport specific, 
similar to today’s ISF and NFs rules.  
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6.3.4 Conclusions on ekecheiria as international Treaty law 
This section has shown that ekecheiria meets the threefold Vienna Convention criteria 
to be considered Treaty. Elis and other poleis agreed on the written ekecheiria and it was 
framed against the wider agreed international law norms of the day. Whilst ekecheiria was 
Treaty law, it was also governed by contemporary written and unwritten customary 
international law norms. Although, the Games themselves helped create the normative concept 
of statehood and the laws to deal with their international relations.  
 
6.4 Ekecheiria as a Tradition or Customary International Law 
This Chapter has shown that ekecheiria was Treaty law, yet its status as such is 
somewhat lessened by frequent references to it as a ‘tradition’, as the UN, its Resolutions, the 
IOC and many others do today.106 As well as ‘tradition’, they refer to it as customary law, 
making it unclear which it is.107 Ekecheiria may therefore have been a tradition and customary 
law, before being codified. Custom and Treaty law are, of course, not mutually exclusive.108 
Consideration of ekecheiria as custom law is largely redundant to this thesis due to its later 
codification, but will cursorily be considered here.  
Custom evidences “general practice accepted as law”. There must be evidence of state 
practice (usus) and state acceptance that law requires that practice (opinio juris sive 
necessitates). 109 Abidance and observance (usus) of ekecheiria was extensive and near uniform 
with no deviations, and is discussed further in section 6.2.4 below, and is the ‘tradition’ 
element. Customary law also requires that the state practice occurs over a sufficient time. 
Ekecheiria and the Games’ repetitive nature over a millennium fulfils this, again supporting it 
as a tradition. Poleis also knew that they were required by law to observe ekecheiria, as they 
indicated their agreement to it and abided by its sanctions (opinio juris). The use of ‘tradition’ 
therefore appears to feed into both of these customary tests, the usus and opinio juris. This 
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 Papandreou (Former Greek Prime Minister), Rogge (Ex-IOC President), and Syrigos (IOTC Director), UN and 
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section has demonstrated that ekecheiria appears was Treaty law, rooted in tradition and 
customary international law. It is both custom and Treaty and references to it as a ‘tradition’ 
bolster its initial customary status. Thereby it has demonstrated that parties observed ekecheiria 
due to perceiving its binding status.110 
 
6.4.1 Respect for fairness, justice and honesty 
Bederman claims that the Greeks observed their commitments such as ekecheiria, 
because they valued fairness, justice and honesty.111 Greeks treated in good faith, and swore 
Oaths to abide by their commitments.112 If they swore an Oath (religious or otherwise), they 
were compelled to keep it and the promise was deemed enforceable.113 Oaths were therefore 
an integral part of respect for fairness.  
Respect for the Olympic Oath, meant the Greeks observed the Laws of Olympia, 
including ekecheiria.114 Mestre calls this the religio athletae, where noble, respectful and 
honest competition honoured and pleased the Gods and is indicative of their wider respect for 
fairness and the rule of law.115 Indeed, the Games themselves were considered the ultimate 
evidence of fairness as they were ‘open’ competitions and fairly organised. However, the 
concept of fairness was relative to its time as many exclusions to participation applied.116 And 
fairness at the Games were ensured by the Hellanodikai - judger of Greeks - enforced the Laws 
of Olympia and competition rules. They were highly esteemed, skilled, independent and 
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impartial judges.117 There was even a fair check on their power as their decisions were 
monitored by the Council of Elders.118 Hence review, appeal, checking and sanctioning 
occurred - all essential in due process and the rule of law. Therefore, respect for fairness, 
honesty and justice underpinned the Games, and observance of ekecheiria and the Laws of 
Olympia.  
 
6.5 State Control by Elis 
One of the significant differences between ekecheiria and today’s Truce is that Elis 
unilaterally controlled it. Elis organised it, dictated its terms and could impose sanctions for its 
breach, without consultation or hindrance from another entity, unlike today’s. Ekecheiria, in 
its formation and sanctioning, had the power and status of a state behind it. It is this power that 
meant its observance and is the factor that could be replicated today in a Truce Treaty. The UN 
Truce’s lack of binding status passed by a general assembly forum means that singular, decisive 
action cannot and will not occur. Furthermore the control of the Games by a spread of actors 
today, means action by relevant bodies is slow and piecemeal, unlike when ekecheiria or the 
Laws of Olympia were breached. If the power of a state such as Elis was invested, in a singular 
organisation, a united Movement, then unilateral action could be taken on a breach of a Truce 
Treaty. This demonstrates the value of the precedence that is ekecheiria and the ancient Games 
to today’s concepts and Olympic frameworks. 
 
6.6 Sanctions 
Elis was clear that breaches of ekecheiria would not be tolerated. It imposed real and 
severe sanctions for its breach, such as heavy fines (on poleis and individuals) and bans (in 
extreme cases).119 For example, Elis fined Sparta for breaching ekecheiria in 420 B.C. and 
imposed religious sanctions by excluding them from the hecatomb, the Games’ most important 
religious ceremony.120 As the Greeks desperately wanted to attend the Games and festivals, it 
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 They were considered fairly appointed by lottery after initial election to a pool from upper class Eleans. Lottery 
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seems likely that fear of non-participation and condemnation ensured their observance of 
ekecheiria,121 meaning few recorded breaches.  
Sanctions were also unilateral and swift due to ekecheiria and the Laws of Olympia 
being governed by a single state, Elis, who could unilaterally take decisive action on breaches. 
It was unhindered by collegiate (UN) action, unlike today’s Truce. 
Various real sanctions also occurred for breaching the Laws of Olympia: political; 
economic; sporting; and corporal. Each had their own spectrum of severity depending on the 
breach.122 Political penalties included Hellanodikai condemnation for decision challenging,123 
and the statute of shame for cheats, alien concepts today.124 Hellanodikai could fine athletes 
and can be seen in ISF/NSF finings for breach of their rules today. Historically, if athletes 
refused to pay fines, their home polis assumed the liability.125 If the polis refused, it was banned 
for the following Olympiad or until payment had been made. This merged political, economic 
and religious sanctions, as bans meant polis were prevented from Olympic sacrifices, risking 
the wrath of the Gods.126 Hence a mix of sanctions were often used for serious offenses. Polis 
assumption of liability for athlete wrongs and/or fines is an interesting precedent for this thesis’ 
proposed Truce Treaty. Sporting sanctions included Games expulsion and stripping of titles 
and has survived today.127 Corporal sanctions meant athletes and officials could be whipped 
for corruption or intimidation and are non-existent today.128  
Breaches of ekecheiria and the Laws of Olympia were met with real and religious 
sanctions, underpinned by good faith and the rule of law.  
 
6.7 Religion 
Part of the reason why the Greeks considered the Games so important was their 
religious roots. Religious reverence was not restricted to the Games – they were an important 
religious festival – but it also guided Greek observance of ekecheiria and the Laws of Olympia. 
They swore Oaths before the Gods to observe these.129 If they breached Oaths (laws or rules), 
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fought near or disrupted the sanctity of Zeus’s Temple, then they feared the God’s disfavour. 
Breach risked sanctions from:- the Gods (such as abandonment); their priests; or the 
Hellanodikai.130 Hence sanctions were real and perceived.131 And observation due to religious 
reasons appears to have ensured fewer breaches of ekecheiria and the Laws of Olympia than 
today’s Truce. Although, it is likely that these Oaths and sanctions were known to be imposed 
by humans and not the Gods, but they observed them out of fear anyway.  
Olympia was also a holy site. Plutarch, citing Aristotle, states that:- 
“Olympia is a sacred place. Anyone who dares enter it by armed force 
will be branded as sacrilegious. Equally godless is he who has it within 
his power to avenge a misdeed and does not do so”.132 
Ekecheiria required Olympia’s recognition as inviolable, religiously sacred and neutral, for its 
duration.133 If troops entered, then they had to lay down their weapons.134 This in turn helped 
secure Game attendance, as attendees were reassured as to their safety.135 It also reinforced 
Elis’ impartiality as host, a fortuitous move rendering Elis a modern-day Switzerland or UN.136  
Olympia was itself often the source of conflict and thus required a religious 
proclamation of inviolability and neutrality. For example, in 668 B.C. Pheidon, tyrant of Argos, 
captured the Tempe of Zeus. Pheidon then hosted the Games for an Olympiad, but Elis soon 
regained control.137 The Eleans again lost the Olympic Games and Temples in 364 B.C. this 
time to the Arcadians. Elis regained the Temples after a day-long battle involving thousands of 
soldiers during the Games’ festival.138 They felt it necessary to restore the Temple’s sanctity, 
by any means, after Arcadian defilement.139   
Hence the Games, ekecheiria and religion were linked. Ekecheiria’s observance140 
stemmed from this religious link. However, religious respect was not the only respect that 
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drove the Greeks to observance. Respect for fairness and the rule of law also underpinned 
observance. 
 
6.8 Importance of the ancient Olympic Games 
The ancients considered Games attendance important and they did not want to 
jeopardise their attendance by being sanctioned for ekecheiria’s breach. This is demonstrated 
by the Spartan breach above and the famous battle of the 300 Spartans at Thermopylae. There 
were only ‘300’ Spartans at Thermopylae repelling Xerxes’s Persian invasion because the 
remainder of the Greeks were marching to the Games.141 Syrigos and Georgiadis have termed 
this ‘esteem’ as universality. They say that the Games were universal and that this is one of the 
most important reasons for ekecheiria’s observance. However, universality falls short in 
explaining observance, as the Games were universal because they were important to the 
Greeks. High esteem includes and goes further than universality, as a reason for ekecheiria’s 
observance. 
 
6.9 Conclusion 
The commencement of the Games in the archaic period places it alongside, emerging 
concepts of international law and statehood. Using a modern framework – a higher criteria than 
what would have existed then - this Chapter has demonstrated that ekecheiria (and the Laws of 
Olympia which it comprised) was observed for a variety of inter-linked reasons. This chapter 
operated from the standpoint that ekecheiria was more widely observed than today’s Truce, 
with only a few recorded breaches. 
It was observed because it was an armistice, meaning that it did not seek to do the 
impossible by imposing a permanent eirene – peace. It simply allowed the cessation of 
hostilities for ease of travelling to the Games.  
It was Treaty law that codified customary international law that had historically also 
been a tradition. This meant that the relevant parties viewed it as binding. This Chapter 
examined whether the necessary features existed in the ancient world for ekecheiria to be 
Treaty law, using the modern framework of the Vienna Convention. It demonstrated, in theory 
and with specific regard to ekecheiria that: states existed (by possessing permanent 
populations, defined territories, independent governments and the capacity to enter relations 
                                                          
141
 Although the figure of 300 is apocryphal and some claim the absence was because of the battle of Marathon - 
Thermopylae’s paucity of soldiers was because of a different religious festival, Pausanias, n.18. 
139 
 
with other states); that ekecheiria was in writing; and governed by international law. Poleis, 
including Elis, were states, able to form binding international law, which existed at the time of 
the Games.142 In addition to ekecheiria, this Chapter saw many international law examples, 
Greek and non-Greek, regarding war, trade and diplomacy. International law and the Laws of 
Olympia were not rudimentary. This suggested that in order for today’s Truce to be 
successfully adhered to today, it must be codified into Treaty law. Yet this is not sufficient in 
itself to ensure observance as whilst the Greeks observed ekecheiria because it was Treaty law, 
they also had a high respect for the rule of law, potentially lacking today. And is a further 
reason for ekecheiria’s observance over today’s Truce. 
However, the main reason for ekecheiria’s observance is because the Games were 
streamlined and linked to one state: Elis. Its ability to enforce and sanction breaches without 
balancing other’s needs, as is the case with the UN now, is significant. This explains why there 
were real sanctions, economic, corporal, sporting and political. All swiftly applied, unilaterally, 
by one state. Reinforcing the fact that ekecheiria and the Laws of Olympia were binding.  
In addition to these ‘real’ sanctions there was the fear that breaching ekecheiria and the 
Laws of Olympia would invoke religious condemnation, hence the Greeks desperately wanted 
to attend the Games. They had to attend to participate in the religious festival aspects and 
dishonour through breach of an Oath would invoke the God’s wrath. Hence the Games were 
significant to them.  
The Games were an early international forum for applying a robust set of international 
norms, which their existence helped establish. In turn this initial establishment reinforced its 
ouroborus ability to develop such norms again. The Greeks went further than the UN Truce 
does today – no Treaty exists today. Thus the modern Truce needs codification into a binding 
Treaty and governorship by a single organisation with powers on a par of states and their ability 
to sanction and punish its breach: the proposed singular Movement. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
Case Study – South Africa – an Olympic Movement success in 
international peace and security? 
 
List of Definitions 
 
AAM   Anti-Apartheid Movement 
ANC   African National Congress 
ANOCA Association of National Olympic Committees of Africa 
BWF  British Weightlifting Federation 
FASA  South African Football Association  
FIFA  Federation Internationale de Football Association 
GANEFO Games of the Newly Emerging Forces 
IAAF  International Association of Athletics Federations 
INOCSA Interim National Olympic Committee of South Africa  
IOC  International Olympic Committee 
Movement Olympic Movement 
NOC  National Olympic Committee 
NOCSA National Olympic Committee of South Africa 
OCOG  Olympic Games Organising Committee 
SA  South Africa 
SASA  South African Sports Association 
SASF  South African Soccer Federation 
SANROC South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee 
SAOCGA South African Olympic and Commonwealth Games Association 
SAAWBF South African Weightlifting and Body-Building Federation 
SCSA  Supreme Council for Sport in Africa 
TIYC  Transvaal Indian Youth Congress 
UN  United Nations 
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7.1 Introduction 
This thesis has shown so far that the Movement requires to be grouped as a singular 
collective organ if the modern Truce is to be a success. In addition, it should have custody of 
that Truce, in the form of a Treaty with the ability to sanction its breach. 
This Chapter will examine a major success that the Movement had in peace and 
security, which established a precedent for it to act in this field – bringing an end to apartheid 
in South Africa (SA). Hence this Chapter and case study helps address this thesis’s second 
research question of why in international peace and security? It is because it has a precedent 
and because of its universalism and singularity, it is the appropriate body to act. 
Therefore, this Chapter will assess the extent to which the Movement brought about the 
end of apartheid. Or, whether apartheid in Solemn Appeal ended due to the involvement of 
other actors such as the UN, and other factors, such as economic boycotts and Conventions. It 
will do this in Part I by taking a historical methodological approach and chart the history of 
apartheid in SA and the reasons for its demise. Part I will be specifically framed against the 
Movement and the IOC/Movement’s involvement in ending apartheid. Part II will address the 
extent of third party involvement in the end of apartheid, specifically the UN, but also the role 
of international Conventions, individuals, ISFs, states and political ideologies. 
Ultimately it will address whether there is a precedent for the Movement’s involvement 
in peace and security, in turn answering the second research question. It will also determine 
whether this involvement and ultimate end can be attributed to the idea of a singular collective 
Movement, rather than a disparate INGO.  
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Part I  History of sporting apartheid in South Africa 
 
7.2 Early British and Dutch Settlement of South Africa 
To understand the effectiveness of the Movement’s and the international community’s 
reaction to apartheid, an historical examination is necessary, with an emphasis on sport.  
SA was settled by the Brits and the Dutch in the mid-17th Century. Almost immediately, 
there was separation between white settlers and the indigenous or coloured populations 
instigated by the Dutch. For example barrier trees were planted at the Cape to separate whites 
from indigenous populations.1  
In the late 18th Century, the British military are credited with bringing organised sports 
such as cricket and rugby to SA. 2 They also brought their own cultural, social, political and 
economic values, as was usual for colonisation. The Afrikaans, and to a lesser extent the Brits, 
viewed indigenous South Africans, as their subordinates with whom they did not mix, socially 
or sportingly.3 Unlike other colonised states, this superiority and separation took root in SA. It 
would not be revoked in SA until the mid-20th Century with the worldwide recognition of 
human rights.  
Some disagree that the British viewed their society as separate to the black population 
at this time, especially their sporting society. For example, mixed race goodwill sport existed 
and British missionaries used sport as a tool to educate, Christianise and ‘tame’ indigenous 
black youths.4 These British missionaries felt obligated to Christianise these children, to 
safeguard their moral, spiritual and physical health, and sport could help do this.5 Therefore, 
on the church and school sports field, there was some mixing of races. However, they treated 
the ‘civilised youth’ differently to their ‘uncivilised’ parents, who were ostracised from such 
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mixing.6 This leads some such as Nongogo, to conclude that there was no true mixing, in 
sporting social terms, amongst adults, only in outreach missionary work.  
With SA’s domestic sporting scene being thus entrenching by the end of the 19th 
Century, it began to participate in international sporting competitions, mostly alongside other 
colonial, European or English speaking nations. For example, a South African pair lost the first 
ever men’s doubles final at Wimbledon in 1884,7 and nine years later, SA achieved their first 
world record in cycling at the World Fair in Chicago. Thus by the close of the 19th Century, 
SA was becoming ‘sports mad’,8 making a successful international sporting name for itself 
which it used to form a link between itself and those with whom the minority felt a cultural 
affinity with.  
 
7.3 Early years of Olympism - Athens (1896) - London (1908) 
It is at the fin de siècle that a fractured relationship develops between the two colonising 
forces in the form of the Boer War.9 This coincided with changes to SA’s internal governance 
and the rebirth of the Games. These wars and changes explain why SA did not attend the 
inaugural 1896 Athens Olympics and the 1900 Paris Games.10 Although at Paris, SA exhibited 
at the attaching Exposition but fielded no athletes.  
After these Wars, SA’s European descendants identified sport as a way to build bridges 
amongst themselves, with little thought to or inclusion of, the indigenous blacks or immigrant 
coloureds.11 This led to the interesting non sequitur of the 1904 St. Louis Games where an 
unofficial team of 8 represented SA. This team comprised one white British descendant, five 
Boers and two blacks.12 The Boers took part in the tug-o-war and were somewhat apart from 
the rest of the team. But the remaining three athletes ran together in the marathon, meaning that 
SA’s whites and blacks, raced as part of the same national team in an international 
competition.13 This leads Mbaye to conclude that apartheid did not always exist in South 
African sports, but was consciously introduced.  
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 In any guise from the four provinces. 
11
 This was also their policy for international sport competition.  
12
 The white British descendant was Robert Harris and the two blacks were Len Tau and Jan Mashiani. 
13
 The results were 9th place, 15th and DNF.  
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To assume that these athletes competed together because SA in 1904 was a more 
tolerant and inclusive place than four years later in London, or 50 years later under apartheid, 
due to the Boer War’s ‘ground levelling’ factor, is erroneous.14 The 1904 team was unofficial 
and Tau and Mashiani were only included because they were primarily in Saint Louis for the 
World Fair. They were part of the ‘Workers of the Anglo-Boer War’ exhibit, and whilst there, 
took advantage of the opportunity to compete. Therefore, their participation was coincidental 
and fortuitous.  
Nevertheless, racism, that would later form apartheid, was not yet entrenched at this 
time. This coupled with the early Coubertin Olympic philosophies of tolerance and inclusion, 
could explain why Tau and Mashiani participated.  
Furthermore, in 1904 the entity that competed internationally as ‘SA’ was British 
ruled.15 This lessened the austerity of some of the Dutch policies over their historically ruled 
lands. Yet even so, when ‘SA’ appeared at the 1908 Games they had no non-white athletes.16 
When the four regions came together to form ‘SA’ in 1909, later Olympic teams represented 
domestic policies of the Dutch-Afrikaans who were asserting their position within the new 
SA.17 Thus the St Louis anomaly can be explained by a political window in SA’s history. 
Therefore the fact that a mixed-race team did not compete again until 1992, shows that 
in the early years when the Games were paired with the World Fair - this pairing may not have 
been as disastrous as first thought to Olympism.18 It gave individuals the opportunity to 
participate in elite sport who were not wealthy, middle class or white. Also, Game’s 
participation at this time was simpler and less bureaucratic than in the mid-20th Century. Athlete 
selection was not yet in the clutches of a South African National Olympic Committee (NOC) 
or government organisation (indirectly by yielding pressure). It was left to individuals and their 
employers.19  
However, by London 1908 there was no Olympic and World-Fair pairing. This meant 
that SA’s first official team was fifteen white athletes, and it then continued its already 
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established international sporting precedent of only fielding white teams.20 As there were no 
official laws supporting racial sporting segregation at this time, this means that an all-white 
team mirrored societal attitudes.  
However, Nongogo goes further than attributing separation to societal attitudes. He 
says that SA’s authorities had a conscious and deliberate unofficial policy of race exclusion 
(and later separation) that fell short of hard law that would exist half a century later. This 
observation gains credence when it is shown that other Olympic teams contained black athletes. 
For example, Henriquez de Zubiera competed for France in 1900,21 George Poage winning two 
sprint bronzes in 1904 for the USA22 and Joseph Stadler winning medals in the triple and high 
jump once again in 1904 for Team USA.  
Therefore, this shows that at the time, mixed teams existed, and yet, the IOC took no 
issue with SA’s unofficial race exclusion. Furthermore, even at this early stage, the Olympics 
and politics were mixing in SA. Thus it is a ‘misguided cliché’ that the two were separate. For 
example, the Cape’s Prime Minister lobbied the BOA to wield its influence at the IOC to vote 
and invite SA into the Movement and to the 1908 Games.23 Hence, even in early Olympic life, 
politics, discrimination and sport were already intertwined.  
 
7.4  1912 – SA’s Final Olympic Participation in Melbourne 1956 
Therefore before apartheid laws were introduced in the 1940s, SA had a custom of race 
segregation in sport, in contrast to say, France or the USA. For example, NSFs such as the 
athletics association and the cricket unions, developed along uni-racial lines.24 This affected 
black athletes domestically and internationally. They could not compete abroad and foreign 
teams visiting SA had to exclude non-white players. For example, in 1919 New Zealand’s (NZ) 
army rugby team left Ranje Wilson behind,25 and in 1928 their Rugby National Federation 
                                                          
20
 It comprised seven track and field athletes, four cyclists, three tennis players and one fencer, all traditionally 
white sports. Furthermore, officially SA was not independent of the UK in 1908. Naughright, John, and Parrish, 
Charles (ed.) History, Culture and Practice – Sports Around the World 2012ABC-CLIO p. 85 & 155. 
21Wiggins, David Kenneth (ed.), African Americans in sports, Volume 1, p 264. 
22
 Lockyer, Bridget, Minority Black Athletes in the 20th and Early 21st Centuries, 2009, Sport and Society, The 
British Library. 
23
 The PM was Sir Starr Jeason and the vote was unanimous at their Hague meeting of 1907. 
24
 These were white only by 1931, with blacks being specifically excluded in the 1930s. Blacks and coloureds did 
set up their own federations in order to participate in sport. Mbaye, Keba, The International Olympic Committee 
and South Africa: Analysis and Illustration of a humanist sports policy, 1995, The Committee. 
25
 One of their best forwards, Nongogo, n. 2. 
146 
 
excluded George Nepia.26 At this time, other states and the IOC tolerated this exclusion and an 
international backlash had not begun.  
It would take an entrenching of the white South Africans views in the 1930s to kick-
start the anti-apartheid sports campaign. This decade saw unofficial policy become official 
policy (although still short of law), with non-whites being banned from NSFs.27 For example, 
the national weightlifting association barred blacks in 1939, having initially been open to all 
colours.28 SA was also applying this thrawn attitude internationally. For example, a South 
African journalist remarked in 1921 that the South African Springboks had to play against the 
‘coloured sports person’ on tour. This resulted in the international community entrenching their 
views towards SA too, such as when the NZ Maoris collectively as a rugby team refused to 
play the visiting Springboks in 1937. This ‘tit-for-tat’ retributive stance developed 
internationally, at least amongst states with a significant mixed population.  
These official policies of the 1930s, that were not yet law, were a stepping stone to the 
official apartheid laws of the 1940s. The National Party came to power in 1948 and introduced 
apartheid laws that affected all areas of life: whites were geographically segregated from 
blacks, Indians and coloureds.29 However, it is worth noting that these general apartheid laws 
did not specifically ban inter-racial sport.30 This is confusing given the practical segregation. 
Instead, the government achieved this segregation by using and manipulating the Group Areas 
Act 1950 to hinder inter-racial sport. Although not out-rightly banned, it was practically 
impossible. This Act prohibited mixed public sports and audiences, except by permit. Permits 
were seldom granted, and if they were, they required strict segregation.31 Therefore SA's 
government did openly interfere in sports.32 
The fact that no hard law existed that specifically banned mixed sport was tested in a 
case from the early 1960s.33 Discussion of it is relevant to this time frame as it shows what the 
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position was in SA in the 1950s. In this case, the state pursued two whites, five blacks and two 
Indians for a mixed sporting encounter in Durban using the Group Areas Act. The state lost the 
case and thus Mbaye, draws from this that SA had no law against mixed sporting events. Mbaye 
also adds that the government itself did not view this policy as law, as in early 1963 the Minister 
of the Interior made a Declaration regarding sports competitions.34 Amongst other things, the 
Minster stated that “whites and non-whites may not compete together in SA “but internationally 
they can against non-whites of foreign countries but still not alongside non-white South 
Africans.35 The Minister added that:-  
“South African sports bodies may not send mixed teams to represent 
SA internationally. White teams represent the whites and black teams 
the blacks of SA.”36  
The Minister then attempted to assert his government’s dominance over bodies connected to 
the Movement. He added that:- 
“non-white bodies must develop alongside the corresponding white 
body. The white executive council must co-ordinate all activities of 
non-white bodies.”37  
Furthermore, the most significant assertion that the Minister makes is that if these 
government policies are not respected by sports bodies, then laws “will be promulgated to 
enforce them.” This therefore shows, that this government policy is not based on specific 
legislation and is not law but were expected to be respected nonetheless.38  
Although there were loopholes around these policies that has a loose backing in law, it 
nevertheless ended any mixed race good will sport. This was because blacks and whites did 
not meet, play or compete together as they had different sports clubs in different locations. 
Thus the government did not have to resort to passing official laws to segregate sport.39  
At the next level up, NSFs dictated membership along race legislation lines, meaning 
that trials for national team selection were only open to whites via their white national 
federation as blacks were excluded from such organisations and teams. Therefore, whilst the 
rest of the developed world was moving into the human rights post-WWII era, SA took an 
opposing route and enacted racial segregation laws.40 
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In response, the black and coloured majority formed official opposition to these new 
laws.41 And a variety of actors came to the fore, such as the African National Congress (ANC) 
and the Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM).42 These South Africans also looked for external 
assistance to help assert their civil and human rights from countries such as the UK due to their 
historical links. However, when this proved to be unfruitful they sought political and sporting 
support from African states. One such example of external support was the ultimately 
unsuccessful ‘Indian Passive Resistance Campaign’ which started in 1946 and they had the 
support of Indians in SA and India itself.43 Their peaceful occupation of municipal land 
rendered ‘Ghetto’ Acts unenforceable but they failed to amend the proposed and enacted 
apartheid laws.  
In addition to the political protests of the late 1940s, there was equal complaint by the 
oppressed majority with regard to segregation and discrimination in sport specifically. The 
influence of the Indian Passive Campaign can be seen in Ragasamy’s application for non-white 
South Africans to affiliate to the British Amateur Weightlifters. He was seeking their external 
support and a solution to wide-spread South African exclusion, but his application was 
refused.44 Nevertheless, this shows that Indians and South African Indians were early anti-
apartheid vocalists. Further complaints were made to the IOC by Indians, black and coloured 
athletes and their sporting bodies that they were being excluded from Olympic participation. 
However, the complaints were referred back to their NOC, which was the all-white South 
African Olympic and Commonwealth Games Association (SAOCGA), who had a policy of 
prohibiting inter-racial competition amongst its members.  
This became a vicious and inescapable circle of impotence as they could not participate 
in international sport by their de facto exclusion from the Games, nor could they participate in 
national sport on a non-segregated basis. One fed the other, with many athletes being 
practically unable to meet international competition standard as they did not have access to the 
same opportunities and education as those available to whites.45 Crucially this shows that from 
early on the IOC was aware of SA’s apartheid laws and their influence on bolstering 
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discriminatory sporting policies, and non-white Game exclusion. This is why many took issue 
(domestically and internationally) with SAOCGA’s ‘unqualified’ recognition by the IOC.  
The passivity and soft approach of the anti-apartheid resistance campaign of the 1940s 
gave way to a more assertive and radical approach by the 1950s. New laws had been passed in 
SA with more areas of life being affected, and according to Nongogo, sport was another highly 
visible arena in which to field this opposition.  
In the mid-1950s it was the ISFs that were the leading lights in the anti-apartheid 
sporting movement, by way of denying or revoking recognition to single race NSFs in SA. For 
example, in 1955 the Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) denied 
recognition to the all-white South African Football Association (FASA).46 A year later, the 
International Table Tennis Federation (ITTF) went further than this blanket non-recognition. 
It showed its support to the all-inclusive South African Table Tennis Board (SATTB)47 by 
recognising and revoking membership to the all-white body. These ISFs could take such a bold 
stance as they were a globally centralised force. Their likely headquarters were in Europe or 
America where an exclusive stance would not be supported and they would be beyond the 
jurisdictional reach of SA’s apartheid laws. However, this does not explain, why the IOC did 
not follow suit and revoke SAOCGAs recognition. 
This rocking of the status quo by the ISFs had two repercussions from SA’s government 
and the IOC.48 Firstly, the South African government exerted domestic and political control by 
refusing passports to athletes who wished to travel to international competitions.49 This meant 
that coloured and black athletes could not compete internationally at world championships or 
at Games. A sentiment which was in stark contrast to the Movement’s principles of inclusion 
and non-discrimination. The South African government therefore ensured by actions rather 
than hard law that only members of white NSFs could compete internationally. It also 
confirmed that the government would not be swayed on its domestic policy thus upholding 
apartheid and its control. For example, SATTB members wished to compete in the 1957 
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Stockholm World Championships but the SA government refused to issue them passports to 
travel.  
Secondly, the IOC also responded to this ISF status quo disruption by re-confirming 
and entrenching their stance. Albeit this inadvertently supported apartheid as it referred 
exclusion complaints back to the NOC.50 For example, when the IOC was solicited by the all-
inclusive South African Amateur Weightlifting and Body-building Federation (SAAWBF) for 
participation in the 1956 Melbourne Games, they passed the complaint back to the all-white 
SAOCGA. Unlike in the 1940s, the reasoning for this now was a desire not to ‘interfere in local 
affairs.’ Hence the IOC, via its SAOCGA, considered access to sport and Game participation 
as a ‘local’ and not an ‘Olympic’ matter. The IOC was therefore shirking responsibility for 
implementing Olympism and its Fundamental Principles, relying on others to uphold these for 
them when they would not.  
In the 1950s it was the all-white SAOCGA that was IOC recognised and not the multi-
racial NSFs or NOC. Albeit these NSFs had more of an influence on and a sympathetic ear 
with the ISFs who bestowed their recognition. Therefore these ISFs were initially more 
inclusive to SA’s oppressed majority and less tolerant of discrimination than the IOC was, as 
the latter tolerated SA’s discrimination and human rights breaches.51 
 
7.5  Munich 1959 Meetings – Olympic Expulsion of South Africa 1970 
The 1960s brought a shift in IOC and international attitudes towards SA. Mbaye notes 
this as moving from a long period of hesitation and indifference, to a growing awareness and 
increasing action. Albeit many would still claim that the IOC’s inaction meant it was in 
‘dereliction of duty’ and in contravention of its own Fundamental Principles, the UN Charter 
and international and human rights law.52 
Mbaye attributes this IOC shift to external pressure on Brundage to deal with the 
political ramifications and international derision of SA’s participation in the 1958 Welsh 
Commonwealth Games. Whereas Nongogo attributes the IOC shift to the founding of the 
multi-racial unofficial Olympic Committee of SANROC and the AAM’s heavy external 
pressure.53 Nevertheless, they both attribute the change to external influences. Mbaye focuses 
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on reaction to a single event (the Welsh Games) whereas Nongogo, focuses on the influence 
of localised actors.  
However, their assessment of the influential factors on the IOC shift is overly simplistic. 
Firstly, the Welsh Games were only a single incident. The Games are a global phenomenon 
that occur on a larger stage than the CGs. Therefore IOC change occurred due to a wider 
amalgamation of events.  
Secondly, their assessment ignores the influence on the IOC from ISFs, SA’s multi-
racial NSFs, and more importantly, the calls for action from states from Africa, Asia, and 
crucially the USSR (with her Eastern bloc allies). Collectively these states levied some 
influence on ISFs, but their Olympic influence was more significant. African and Asian states 
supported the anti-apartheid movement to safeguard the position of their citizens at 
international sporting events. Such states had growing (combined) international power and 
influence with the IOC and ISFs, as their numbers increased following decolonisation in the 
1950s. The reasons for the Eastern bloc support are more complex. Communist philosophy 
supported the movement on ethical grounds, yet a more sceptical view would be that they could 
use this movement to wield leverage on the IOC and on the international community in general. 
54
  
It is this multi-pronged onslaught that eventually forced the IOC to put the SA question 
firmly on its agenda. Its determination to ignore it began to crack. For example, in 1958, IOC 
President Brundage wrote to Emery, Secretary-General of SAOCGA, saying that  
“pressure is mounting and I am receiving many protests and requests 
for an official [IOC] statement from all over the world. Sooner rather 
than later the apartheid question would be placed on the IOC agenda 
and when that time came, there could be only one result, because the 
rules of the Charter were clear.”55  
Brundage wanted SAOCGA to give a response that would satisfy those disputing SA’s 
involvement at the upcoming May 1959 Munich IOC Executive Board Meeting and Session. 
Thus, in the last year of the 1950s, apartheid was first ‘officially’ discussed by the IOC in 
Munich.  
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7.5.1 Munich Meetings 1959 – SAOCGA Called to Account 
At the Munich meetings, the IOC’s sole concern was whether SAOCGA had violated 
the Charter, specifically its anti-discrimination provisions.56 And consequently whether it could 
continue to be recognised.57  
Apartheid clearly breached Charter anti-discrimination Fundamental Principles and as 
Brundage stated, only “one result was possible”.58 This fait accompli, or as Mbaye calls it, ‘a 
recognition of inevitable sanctioning’, explains the IOC’s reluctance to address the SA 
problem. Expulsion was final and contrary to another Charter principle, inclusion. It was this 
inevitability that the IOC was attempting to avoid. This exclusion is particularly ironic, as it 
shows that the IOC preferred one exclusion to another, i.e. SA’s black athletes to SANOC.  
The inevitability and hint at a change of IOC policy in Munich is however, tempered 
by Brundage’s actions on the eve of the Session. Following the IOC’s demand for SAOCGA 
to respond at Munich, SAOCGA tested the IOC’s position by threatening to leave the 
Movement. Therefore SAOCGA preferred Movement withdrawal to renouncing apartheid, 
upholding Charter principles and reaching a compromise.59 This threat worked as it provoked 
a conciliatory attitude from Brundage towards SAOCGA pre-Munich. He acknowledged in 
conspiratorial tones to SAOCGA, that “social and political problems have been accumulating 
before our door.”60 This suggests he viewed sporting apartheid as irksome, and that the IOC 
supported and tolerated SAOCGA’s behaviour. Brundage’s apologetic words also show that 
the desire to address the issue does not come from him.  
Thus at the Munich 1959 meetings, a lukewarm debate by the IOC on the SA question 
emerged. SA’s IOC member, Reginald Honey, made a statement defending SAOCGA’s 
position and all-white team. He said that whites had been selected as they were the only ones 
who met the qualification standards. Non-whites had not met the standard, as they “did not 
have enough experience or talent”. He reasoned that this was because non-white sport was 
badly administered, disunited and divided, if it existed at all, and that non-white Olympic 
interest was recent.61 Therefore Honey emphasised that there was no objection to non-white 
participation if they met the requisite international and Olympic standard. Honey added that no 
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non-white had been excluded from the national team on that basis, as a colour bar did not exist 
within SAOCGA as it treated white and non-white athletes on equal footings.62  
SAOCGA also stated that most non-white athletes were professionals and therefore 
automatically ineligible for Game competition under the OC. He added that the complaints and 
requests for affiliation and recognition by complainer sporting bodies were all politically 
motivated, thus again falling foul of the corresponding Charter and Fundamental Principles.  
Nevertheless, Honey and SAOCGA conceded that although they had no colour bar, 
some of their affiliated units did. They claimed this was a South African tradition that was 
dictated by their government. They asserted that they wished to help non-white athletes in their 
Olympic goals, therefore they could be selected to SA’s Olympic Team if they were associated 
to the recognised organisations. However, the recognised organisations were all white, with 
colour bars, and would not recognise them. Therefore, an impenetrable cycle of exclusion 
continued, allowing the IOC to wash its hands of the SA question.  
The IOC accepted Honey and SAOCGA’s statements. However, the delegates from the 
USSR and India took serious contention with them. The Soviet IOC member stated that he did 
not think that “the situation [was] as Mr Honey describes” and the Indian member demanded 
guarantees to ensure equal competition. This shows early Indian and Russian support against 
sporting apartheid and how instrumental they were in elucidating change. 
 
7.5.2 Examination of and Responses to SAOCGA’s Munich Statement 
The South African Sports Association (SASA) also examined Honey and SAOCGA’s 
Munich comments by drafting a Memo to the IOC.63 This Memo was the cornerstone of the 
anti-apartheid movement in sport, although it had no effect as it the IOC did not respond to it.64 
The Memo refuted SAOCGA’s comments one by one, and made four requests of the IOC, all 
of which it ignored. For example, SASA asked the IOC to defend its Charter Fundamental 
Principles so that there be “no discrimination towards a[n]… individual for reasons of race, 
colour, religion or pol creed.” They also asked the IOC to apply this to SAOCGA and its related 
Olympic organisations by having them cease all discriminatory behaviour.65 Alternatively 
SASA suggested that the IOC:-  
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“request the ISFs to conduct investigations on the functioning of their 
South African affiliates or that SAOCGA be expelled from the 
Movement because of its Charter violations.”  
Therefore, even by the late 1950s, the suggestion of the various Movement organs being able 
to enact collective action to uphold Olympism by excluding SA was being mooted.  
SASA also turned the mirror on SAOCGA’s claims of them and the other complainers 
being political. For example, it asked the IOC to “examine the level of interference of the 
government in the administration of amateur sport in SA”. This demonstrates the twin core of 
the SA problem, that it merged politics and sport, and that the Charter compelled the IOC to 
address discrimination within its movement. Thus their indifference and laissez faire attitude 
was remiss.66 
Nevertheless, the IOC side-stepped SASA’s Memo, the Indian and Russian complaints 
and following up on SAOCGA’s Munich comments and commitments. Mbaye attributes this 
to various SAOCGA subterfuges. This avoidance meant the IOC could support the South 
African stance of debating the problem from a qualification perspective. Rather than debating 
it from a discriminatory perspective. It therefore resulted in no practical consequences for 
SAOCGA.67 Brundage said the Charter’s anti-discrimination rule applied only to the Games, 
and not to domestic competition. Yet this deliberately ignores the operation of the Movement 
and trial selection, and of the barriers to Olympic international competition experienced by 
coloured athletes.  
Brundage, as a concession, suggested instigating a twin and parallel system of NSFs 
with a composite national team, or that elimination rounds be held.68 This he thought, would 
allow them to meet their Charter obligations. Therefore Brundage and the IOC were reluctant 
to support SA’s non-white athletes and condemn apartheid supporters (including SAOCGA) 
and a deliberate avoidance of the issue.  
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7.5.3 Rome 1960 Meeting and Olympic Games 
SAOCGA continued its racial exclusion policy for selecting its Rome 1960 Team which 
many attributed to subterfuge.69 They had no open selection heats and the all-white NSFs had 
not affiliated or accepted memberships of non-whites. This was despite the promised changes 
made at Munich, and the start of their marginalisation by the IOC and SASA.  
At the Rome 1960 meetings, SASA reiterated that SAOCGA’s policies were 
discriminatory and that the IOC discuss the problem again. However, Brundage thought that 
the problem was solved, although he did not think that there even existed a problem at all.70 
Nevertheless, this did check on whether SAOCGA’s Munich promises had been met and the 
SA question was placed on the Rome Agenda. SASA were permitted to attend alongside Honey 
(SA’s IOC member) and Braun (SAOCGA’s representative).71  
However, the IOC favoured SAOCGA’s submissions at the Rome meetings and thus 
they retained their recognition (and implied IOC validation). They accepted that SAOCGA had 
made “every reasonable effort” to abide by their Munich statements, so that no ranking athlete, 
whatever colour, was excluded.72 Again Brundage was quick to state that he thought the 
problem resolved, as “we have had our discussion…. in Rome and the subject will not be on 
the agenda of our Athens [June 1961] meeting.”73 Brundage was therefore still keen to wash 
his hands of the SA question. 
It was the period from the 1960 summer Rome Meetings to April 1961 that the real IOC 
turnaround occurred. This was because following the Rome Meetings SAOCGA were allowed 
to compete at the 1960 Rome Games.74 Whilst the visibility of this participation may have 
prompted the IOC’s turnaround, it seems more likely to have occurred due to Honey’s 
controversial statements. Honey openly admitted to SASA in 1961 that racial discrimination 
existed in SA and that it must be accepted.75 Hence SA’s IOC representative admitted that 
Charter Fundamental Principles were being breached and that the IOC was to do nothing about 
this. This statement destroyed non-white faith in the Movement and its ability to enact change, 
and it was this that that prompted other actors to intensify their pressure for change.76  
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Consequently the IOC moved from considering that the problem had been resolved, to 
acknowledging “protests from all sides” and that the SA question was unresolved.77 Honey’s 
admittance of racial discrimination and its effect on the anti-apartheid movement meant IOC 
inaction was no longer possible. Yet this in no way meant that real change would occur, or that 
the IOC would support boycotts of SA. It simply meant that the IOC now recognised that 
SAOCGA constituted a real problem. Moreover, Brundage was still stating that the 
accumulating pressure was external and not at his impetus.  
The anti-apartheid movement amplified its pressure by establishing the all-inclusive 
London-based South African Non Racial Olympic Committee (SANROC) in 1962. It aimed to 
be recognised by the IOC as SA’s NOC instead of SAOCGA.78 However, this did not occur, 
as SAOCGA was still recognised. Instead the IOC chastised and rejected SANROC and was 
told to delete ‘Olympic’ from its name.79 The IOC said this was because SANROC was 
politicised being led by politicians and not sportsmen.80 This shows that the IOC’s modus 
operandi was avoiding politicisation when dealing with the SA question.  
Consequently, in the early to mid-1960s Brundage and the IOC wished to keep 
SAOCGA on board, over and above rival committees.81 The IOC therefore supported 
SAOCGA’s view that it would be a “tragedy” if it were to withdraw from the Movement due 
to a few “political agitators” in non-European sports.82 Lack of IOC sanctioning against 
SAOCGA, meant its omission amounted to its endorsement including its apartheid policies. 
Furthermore, at this stage, SAOCGA still preferred the prospect of Movement withdrawal to 
changing its domestic policies and laws.83 
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7.5.4 First Exclusion of South Africa by the Commonwealth – 1961 - 1962 
The following years other bodies began to exclude SA and this compounded pressure 
on the IOC to quicken its glacially-slow shift in dealing with appropriately with SA.84 For 
example, the Commonwealth excluded SA by taking advantage of its 1961 declaration as a 
republic. SA’s declaration meant it had to reapply for Commonwealth membership as it was 
no longer automatically eligible for participation in the 1962 Commonwealth Games.85 The 
ethnically diverse Commonwealth did not support or appreciate racial exclusion, especially as 
many African states were members.86 SA responded to this exclusion by reaffirming segregated 
sport, but as a compromise, it proposed having segregated Olympic trials abroad.  
At this time in the 1960s, the Commonwealth’s influence on the Movement becomes 
apparent. The 1963 IOC Session was to be held in Nairobi, but the Kenyan government refused 
visas to SA’s delegates. This forced the IOC to hold the meeting in Baden-Baden instead. 
Therefore SAOCGA, now called the South African National Olympic Committee (SANOC), 
had not changed its position, and yet African states were committed to isolating SA to force it 
to end apartheid.87 
 
7.5.5 Baden-Baden Session 1963, IOC Ultimatum and South African Suspension 
At Baden-Baden, SA’s delegates attempted to reassert that apartheid was a domestic 
matter out-with IOC interest. 88 However, this time, two events conspired to elicit a definitive 
change in IOC policy forcing SA’s revocable suspension, based on an Indian proposal.89  
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The first event was that the Baden-Baden session imposed on SANOC a two-staged 
test that they had to meet by the end of 1963, in order to be invited to the 1964 Tokyo Games.90   
Failure to satisfy this test, meant their exclusion from those Games. This was because the IOC 
took the view at Baden-Baden that SANOC had not done enough. The IOC credited SA as 
having made “important progress … there was still much to be done”.91 As the Rome promises 
had not been implemented. 
The first Baden-Baden criterion was that SANOC had to declare its support for the 
Charter and its spirit. The IOC specifically wanted to see support of Principle I: that the Games 
are “fair and equal competition” with “no discrimination …against any country or person on 
grounds of race, religion or politics”. 92 They also wanted to see a declaration supporting 
Charter Rule 24 that “every athlete will be entered in the Games, provided that he has the 
standard necessary and whatever his colour may be.”93 The IOC were therefore attempting to 
ensure some guarantee from SANOC that their athlete selection would be honest and fair. The 
second Baden-Baden requirement placed on SANOC, and in direct contrast to non-
politicisation, was that it had to secure from its government, a change in policy regarding racial 
discrimination in sports in SA. This was an ambitious task to secure in the last quarter of the 
year.94  
These declarations and changes did not occur and the Baden-Baden requirements were 
unfulfilled. This lead to the unprecedented situation of SANOC being excluded from Tokyo 
1964. It remained affiliated to the IOC with their return to Olympic participation secured should 
they fulfil the Baden-Baden conditions. It seemed hopeful and likely that SA would return for 
the following Games in Mexico City 1968. 
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The second factor that led to the IOC’s revocable exclusion of SA was the gathering 
pressure and successes in the early-mid 1960s of the organisations formed to tackle (sporting) 
apartheid. For example, in 1966 after having increased its international campaign, SANROC 
was allowed to affiliate to the Association of National Olympic Committees of Africa 
(ANOCA). The Supreme Council for Sport in Africa (SCSA) was also established in 1966 by 
the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), thus it had political backing.95 Its mission was to 
have SANOC (or apartheid SA) excluded from the Movement by whatever means necessary. 
They with their allies, introduced the idea of boycotts of the Games if SA were allowed to 
compete. The founding and successes of these bodies shows that within Africa, sporting racism 
was political and needed to be tackled accordingly. 
 
7.5.6 Token Compromise, Non-politicisation and a Fact-Finding Commission 1967 
7.5.6.1 Token Compromise 
The presence and actions of these anti-apartheid sports bodies prompted SANOC to 
propose a compromise at the IOC’s Tehran Session 1967 and meet their IOC obligations as 
they saw it.96 SANOC suggested that separate sports committees would hold trials to select 
athletes, feeding in to an eventual single mixed race team.97 They claimed this would uphold 
Charter Fundamental Principles of non-discrimination and inclusiveness, and not breach 
apartheid rules and laws that prohibited different races competing against each other on home 
soil. SANOC attempted to further demonstrate their agreeability by offering a revocation of 
the policy against mixed race international competition. However, as shall be shown this 
proposed compromise proved unacceptable. 
 
7.5.6.2 Reiteration of IOC Non-politicisation  
However, once more, the conflict between non-politicisation and the IOC’s prescribed 
mandate caused problems here.98 As already seen, the IOC had restricted itself to solely tackling 
whether SANOC had breached its Charter obligations.99 This was expressly reiterated by 
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Brundage to Killannin in 1967, where he said that “our concern is with the NOC and what it is 
doing to comply with Olympic regulations.”100  
The IOC was clear on what its role was not – it was not to examine whether the SA’s 
government or apartheid were contrary to the OC. This was political meddling and to be 
avoided. Brundage specifically stated this, as “We must not become involved in political 
issues” as sport and politics should not mix.101 He added that the IOC “does not deal with 
governments nor with the political policies of any country” and that apartheid was an internal 
matter for SA.102 However, this overlooks that sport and the fight for political liberties were 
inevitably linked.103   
However, it is worth noting that whilst the Charter is clear on the Movement being non-
political, it could be abused by others for such purposes. This explains why Brundage qualified 
the non-politicisation of the IOC in 1967 by saying, “nor permits the Games to be used as a 
tool or as a weapon for extraneous causes”, targeting the anti-apartheid movement.104 What the 
IOC failed to address both then and now, is that it was being used as a political tool/weapon by 
SA’s government to reinforce apartheid. The IOC’s stance also overlooks the difficult position 
of SANOC. If they held open domestic trials this would potentially breach SA’s apartheid 
laws/policies. This was the reason for the offer of international trials in 1962 or the offer of 
separate trials with a mixed composite eventual team in 1967, and would remove them from 
the jurisdiction of SA’s courts. These were the only legal offers it could legally make then. 
However, Nongogo says such an interpretation is naïve as SANOC had the same views as its 
government on apartheid, which Brundage and the IOC did not appreciate. 
Despite the desire for non-politicisation, the IOC via Brundage, nevertheless formed a 
view on apartheid, it: 
“did not approve either the government of SA nor of its policies… if 
we [the IOC] were to judge apartheid per se it isn’t necessary to send a 
commission at all”.105  
This appears to support the human rights campaigners yet commits to nothing specific. 
Furthermore the word ‘of’ is strategically omitted after ‘approve’. A strict interpretation of this 
statement is that Brundage is not making a judgement of SA’s policies or its government, but 
                                                          
100
 Ibid. 
101
 Brundage, in Mbaye, n. 24. 
102
 Brundage to Killannin 1967, Mbaye, n. 24. 
103
 Epsy, n. 5. 
104
 And African, communist states and those oppressed within South Africa, Mbaye, n. 24. 
105
 Brundage was making reference here to the fact finding commission that was to be sent to examine a breach 
of Charter obligations, Mbaye, n.24. 
161 
 
is akin dispensation of recognition. This lack of significant international condemnation of 
SA/apartheid, in favour of a suggesting a lack of recognition, again shows the IOC’s hesitancy 
and averseness in addressing the question in the 1960s.  
Alternatively, Brundage could be balancing IOC observance of Charter Fundamental 
Principles (non-politicisation) in order to meet other Charter obligations (non-discrimination 
and inclusion). As with all rights, this suggests that they can compete and that there exists a 
hierarchy of Charter rights, with non-politicisation being more important than inclusiveness 
and non-discrimination. 
 
7.5.6.3 Fact Finding Commission and SA’s Invite to Mexico 1967-8 
Nevertheless, despite SANOC’s suspension, the IOC was still “ben[ding] over 
backwards” to keep SA in the Movement. To attempt to definitively settle whether SANOC 
had breached its Charter obligations, the IOC sent a three member fact-finding commission, 
chaired by Lord Killannin to SA in September 1967.106 Potentially this gave the IOC more time 
and meant that it was ‘seen to be doing something’. However, the contribution of this 
commission and its Report to SA’s Movement exclusion cannot be overlooked and due 
credence must be given to it, albeit it did not initially deter the SA’s Mexico invite, which shall 
now be discussed. 
The commission delivered its Report to the Executive in January 1968. This was in 
advance of the February 1968 Grenoble Winter Games and its 66th Session.107 A postal vote 
was to occur at the Session regarding the commission’s findings and whether to readmit SA. 
However, instead of debating the commission’s findings, the Session focused on procedural 
voting matters. The Executive had decided that the SA vote should be by post,108 but the 
February Session suggested a live vote which some IOC members disputed. The change was 
allegedly due to the importance of the vote and the resultant increase in attending members. A 
postal vote was considered irregular by the Session when the majority of members were 
present.109 Thus instead of debating the actual issue, the Session voted on whether a live or 
postal vote should occur. The outcome was that a postal vote would occur as it had previously 
been announced and would have affected the attendance of many members. 
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Thereafter, the actual (postal) vote occurred. The IOC asked its member whether 
SANOC should be invited to the 1968 Summer Mexico Games. An absolute majority thought 
that it should. Hence the IOC and the Mexico City OCOG thought that SANOC had made 
sufficient progress to be invited. On the 15th of February, during the Winter Games, the IOC 
announced SA’s invite, on the proviso that all sport discrimination end by the 1972 Munich 
Games. The result could be due to the anti-apartheid supporters not having significant 
IOC/Executive and were impotent in affecting the outcome.110  
Therefore even by the late 1960s, the Tokyo Games suspension was still viewed by the 
IOC as a one-off. A second chance was being given provided SANOC fulfilled a future 
condition. The IOC therefore hoped this would be sufficient to appease the anti-apartheid 
supporters and chastise SANOC.  
 
7.5.7 International Backlash – First Proposed Boycotts 1968 
The Mexico invite was not well received by the international community. Many African 
countries, via the SCSA and the OAU, announced their withdrawal and their intent to boycott 
Mexico.111 The proposed boycott had an element of government backing as the Mexican 
government announced that it would not issue visas to SA and was somewhat propagated by 
the UN.112 This governmental legitimisation could be what resulted in the boycott achieving its 
goals. 
The IOC was not initially concerned by these boycott threats. Brundage responded by 
saying that the “Games must go on”.113 He saw no need to investigate nor call a special IOC 
Session to address the problem. It is likely this was because these African countries had little 
clout either politically or at the IOC. The IOC may not have felt that their absence would be 
detrimental to the Games. Furthermore, the IOC would not want to create a precedent of 
yielding to boycotters when it felt it had already addressed the issue. 
However, the African boycott burgeoned to include more states and groups. Those from 
the Caribbean, the Islamic world, African-American athletes from the USA,114 and crucially, 
India and the USSR and her Eastern bloc states, all threatened to join. The number of states 
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threatening a boycott was over 32.115 They all stated that they would not participate if SANOC 
were present. The IOC were not prepared to risk losing the participation of this  large number 
of states, and were most likely swayed by the proposed Eastern bloc departure and 
consequently rescinded SA’s Mexico invite. 
 
7.5.7.1 Reasons for Revocation of South Africa’s Invite to Mexico 
The weight of this threatened boycott was heavy with four reasons emerging for the 
IOC’s rescission. Each reason demonstrates the political and legal significance of the IOC in 
the fight against apartheid and shall be discussed in turn. However, ultimately one of the four 
factors was more persuasive than the others – the Russian threat.  
The first reason forcing IOC reconsideration of its SANOC invite was its fear that the 
32 states would abandon the Movement and join the potential rival mega-sporting event, the 
Games of the Newly Emerging Forces (GANEFO). Therefore, it was not solely the number of 
boycotting states or their political might that forced an IOC turnaround, but it was these plus 
the existence of a rival Games. The GANEFO Games were organised and aimed at second and 
third world countries that shared political ideologies. They deliberately attempted to rival the 
Games. They took place in 1964 (Jakarta) and 1966 (Phnom Penh), with 51 states attending 
Jakarta.116 With its political links, GANEFO stood in stark contrast to the non-political 
Movement. GANEFO’s constitution deliberately and systematically fused politics and sport.117 
Hence the IOC appeased the majority of its boycotting members over SANOC, in order to keep 
the former in the Olympic fold. GANEFO’s ultimate demise and regionalisation reinforces the 
fact that the IOC made the right choice in dealing with SA and maintaining its non-
politicisation. The IOC chose the will of the majority of its members over the will of one rogue 
nation, with only marginal involvement in politics rather than GANEFO’s complete 
politicisation.118  
The second reason why IOC rescinded SANOC’s Mexico invite was because the USSR 
and her Eastern bloc allies indicated they would join the boycott, and was briefly mentioned 
above.119 It was not necessary for the USSR to actually boycott. Their threat was enough to 
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exact a change on IOC policy. This shows how important Soviet (et al) participation and 
opinion was to the IOC due to its collective policy making might and its athletic 
achievements.120 The IOC chose Soviet inclusion and deference to Soviet policies over SA’s 
(and potentially its own). This suggests the IOC thought that the success of the Games rested 
on the participation and accommodation of certain key players, one of whom was the USSR 
and not SA.  
However, it was not the weight of the USSR’s threatened boycott alone that prompted 
the IOC’s turnaround. It was this in combination with the aforementioned fear of them leaving 
permanently for GANEFO that shook-up the IOC. However, once more the IOC’s worry here 
would prove to be unfounded. The USSR did not plan on leaving the Movement for GANEFO 
- they did not wish to jeopardise their Movement standing.121 Furthermore, the USSR wished 
to attend the Games to demonstrate their athletic accomplishments to the non-communist 
world. This required remaining within the Movement. Thus international politics and the cold 
war were ultimately the wielder and tool in achieving Soviet objectives. This meant that the 
boycott’s success can be attributed to cold war politics and that the Games were nonetheless 
and inevitably politicised. 
The third and related reason to the above two, that forced the IOC’s reconsideration of 
inviting SA, was that the Mexican OCOG was concerned its Games would be deserted, with 
only a handful of NOCs attending. They therefore requested that the IOC reconsider its invite 
to SANOC. This shows that a temporary and ever-changing OCOG, albeit with governmental 
links by way of the Host contract, can exert significant control over IOC behaviour regarding 
who was invited. It also highlights an interesting facet of the Movement-OCOG relationship. 
As seen in Chapter 2, the Games are held by a Host and an OCOG, and although independent, 
they are influenced by their citizens, city councils and governments to hold their Games in a 
manner compatible with their legislative framework and conception of rights. Here the IOC 
deferred to the Mexico OCOG, suggesting that the latter had organisational and political 
superiority over the IOC.  
There is also a fourth reason for the revocation of SA's Mexico invite and this look to 
what was happening in the formation of international law. In 1969, the ICERD became 
effective that incidentally tackled the issue of apartheid. However, within four years an actual 
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convention against apartheid was deemed necessary and the International Convention on the 
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid was passed. Hence with the 
international community taking a zero tolerance attitude towards apartheid and its racial 
discrimination, the Movement had to follow suit. Although it technically was not a traditional 
subject of international law or one of the conventions’ signatories, it would nonetheless not 
want to be seen as taking action contrary to its terms.  
 
7.5.8 The IOC’s second suspension of South Africa 1968 
In the face of these potential boycotts and complaints, the IOC Executive were 
compelled to act. It called a meeting on the 21st of April 1968 to seek a diplomatic resolution. 
It put the question of SA’s second exclusion to its members.122 This time the votes were 
significantly in favour of SANOC’s invitation being revoked, at 47-16.123 Supporters of 
SANOC mainly came from Northern European and English speaking countries.124 On such a 
conclusive majority, the IOC was forced to exclude SANOC with the official recommendation 
being that,  
“due to the international climate the Executive … is of the opinion it 
would be most unwise for SA to participate.”125  
Hence the exclusion only related to the 1968 Mexico Games and was not yet an entire 
Movement exclusion.  
 
7.5.9 South Africa’s Eventual Olympic Expulsion 1969 - 1970 
The IOC would take steps towards full expulsion the following year as this required 
more ‘due process’ than mere suspension.126 It established a committee to further investigate 
SANOC and to find out whether there was merit to the allegations of Charter breaches. The 
committee found such a breach and its Report contained seven specific allegations of 
discrimination.127  
In May 1970, at the IOC’s Amsterdam Executive and Session, the IOC put forward a 
vote on whether to retain SANOC in the entire Movement. This would go further than the 
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temporary Games bans of the 1960s. The permanency of this solution explains why the result 
was closer than the last, with 35 votes in favour and 28 against. Nevertheless, the IOC members 
had spoken. For the ongoing success and non-politicisation of the Games, the IOC formally 
expelled SANOC in 1970, an unprecedented act in IOC history. One small politicised act of 
expulsion, due to abhorrent domestic laws, was favoured in order to deter future political 
boycotts. SA would not reappear at the Games until 1992, post-apartheid.128 There was no hope 
for future SANOC participation and re-admission until their racial segregation policy in sport 
had ended.  
It easy to assume that international politics and states were the primary instigators 
behind SA’s expulsion. However, this overlooks other events, both inside and outside of the 
sporting world. Firstly, within the sporting world, the NSFs and ISFs were the unsung heroes 
who lobbied for change. Their global reach and their degree of autonomy helped create 
sufficient pressure on the IOC for change. Their anti-apartheid stance was in turn influenced 
by many African states, with whom they fought alongside. Many Olympic and non-Olympic 
ISFs excluded SA’s uni-racial NSFs, such as judo and wrestling.129 However, heavyweight 
sports, with large international memberships and significant South African participation, such 
as rugby, did not take action until the 1970s.  
Secondly, out-with the sporting world, non-sporting boycotts, economic sanctioning 
and the actions of the UN worked collectively with the international sports community to end 
apartheid. For example, the Dutch boycotted SA’s citrus company Outspan and shell oil.130 
These wider sanctions and measures began to take hold in the early 1970s and shall now be 
discussed.131 
 
7.6 Expulsion to Re-admission 1992 - South Africa’s Growing Isolation  
7.6.1 A New Type of Boycott Aimed at South Africa’s Sporting Competitors 
With SA excluded from the Games it was hoped that this isolation would force them to 
end apartheid. However, this proved unforthcoming. SA still competed sportingly and gave 
enticement to others to secure this.132 Therefore to further isolate SA and force it to end 
apartheid, there was attempted sporting sanctioning of those who broke that isolation and 
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engaged with SA. For example, in 1976 the NZ rugby All Black Team toured SA.133 The tour 
occurred a few weeks after the massacre of hundreds of protesting High School students in 
Soweto.134 The indelicacy of this timing prompted many African, Middle Eastern and 
Caribbean states to call for NZ’s exclusion from the 1976 Montreal Games, failing which, they 
would boycott once more.135  
However, this time, unlike the previous Games the IOC refused to discuss the NZ issue 
or its sanction. The IOC would not diplomatically engage with the concerned parties. However, 
Tanzania and the Congo were unsatisfied with the IOC’s avoidance and sought to recreate the 
success of the earlier threatened boycott to the Mexico Games. They led 29, mainly African 
states, to boycott the Games, and almost a whole continent did not participate in the Montreal 
1976 Games.136  
There were a few differences in this Montreal boycott as compared to the previous 
(threatened) ones. Firstly, many of the National Teams were in Canada, ready to compete but 
chose not to at the last minute,137 or had participated but later withdrew.138 The uncertainty of 
their participation meant many events were cancelled or re-scheduled. The boycotters sought 
to achieve their objective via confusion. Therefore this was an evolution from the threatened 
abstention in the 1960s.  
Secondly, the IOC did not respond to the 1976 boycott. It considered it had addressed 
the SA problem by expelling it. They were unwilling to ban further NOCs for policies not of 
their making. This shows an IOC desire to inflict sanctions directly on SA and not on third 
party states for their interaction with SA. The IOC was therefore re-asserting their dominance 
over the Games and its non-political stance, following the SA exception. It also seems likely 
that the IOC were attempting to avoid a vilification and ostracisation of NZ. Even though the 
1976 Rugby tour went ahead, the country had a long history of opposing South African sporting 
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apartheid.139 If it had banned NZ, then perhaps there would be no NOCs left to attend the 
Games! 
Thirdly, this time the boycott did not involve the USSR and the Eastern bloc states. 
Any detrimental effect that their absence would have did not arise. Therefore the boycott had 
less international escalation and clout.  
Fourthly, and the IOC’s espoused reason for its resistance to a threatened boycott, was 
that the matter concerned rugby, an ‘Empire’ and not an ‘Olympic’ sport.140 The All Blacks 
had no links to the NZ Olympic Committee (NZOC), and therefore the IOC felt it had no 
mandate for its sanctioning. Hence NZOC were permitted to attend the Montreal Games. Thus 
the IOC was operating within its Charter mandate, including its non-politicisation, as it had in 
earlier dealings with SA, with the exception of its 1970 expulsion.141 
 
7.6.2 Empire Sports and Commonwealth Action – The Last Nail in the Coffin 1977 
The IOC did not appreciate Empire sports’ and the Commonwealth’s potential 
contribution to fighting apartheid. Such sports were SA’s focus, before and after, its Olympic 
exclusion. SA competed intermittently with Commonwealth countries in Empire sports during 
its Olympic exclusion years, although they had been banned from the Commonwealth Games 
since 1958. However, occasionally, teams would refuse to play against SA.142  
This encroachment on SA’s isolation led the Heads of Government of the 
Commonwealth to target the inroads SA was making into international Empire/Commonwealth 
sport, as opposed to Game or Commonwealth Games participation. It did this by adopting the 
anti-apartheid Gleneagles Agreement in 1977 (GA77).  
However, the Agreement did not purely stem from altruistic desires to preserve human 
rights. The Heads of Government were concerned that their Commonwealth Games would be 
adversely affected by protests and boycotts, despite their exclusion of SA. The Commonwealth 
Games were in a difficult position. If they sanctioned those who engaged with SA then this 
would adversely affect its dominant Anglo members. And if it did not sanction these third 
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parties, then potentially, the more numerous but less influential states, could boycott the CGs. 
Hence the GA77 was the Commonwealth’s concession to the anti-apartheid campaign.143 
 
7.6.2.1 The Gleneagles Agreement 1977 
The GA77 recalled and reaffirmed the Singapore Declaration of Commonwealth 
Principles 1971. The Singapore Declaration denounced racism generally and reaffirmed this 
with regard to apartheid sport.144 The GA77 then added that apartheid in sport is an abomination 
and that sport:- 
“is an important means of developing and fostering understanding…. 
[that] sporting contacts… encourage[d] the belief (however 
unwarranted) that [such nations] are prepared to condone this abhorrent 
policy or are less than totally committed to … the Singapore 
Declaration… [it is] the urgent duty of each of their governments 
vigorously to combat… apartheid by withholding any form of support 
for, and by taking every practical step to discourage contact or 
competition by their nationals with sporting organisations, teams or 
sportsmen from SA.”145 
Albeit it was left to the governments to determine how to discharge this obligation, its intent is 
clear. There was to be no games with SA, at home or abroad. This condemnation and call for 
action/avoidance of SA therefore goes further than the Movement’s attitude of the time which 
was to tolerate those that did play with SA. Albeit both the Commonwealth’s and the 
Movement did not call for actual sanctions for those that played against SA.  
Furthermore the GA77 is significant. It is an international commitment by governments 
to act or refrain from acting in a certain manner. However, it overlooks the problem that it is 
not governments that arrange these sporting competitions but individuals, teams, federations 
and organisations, aside from the marginal input governmental authorities have in the two 
mega-events of the Games and the CGs. This may explain why the ‘methods’ section of the 
GA77 is blank. States themselves must fulfil this obligation by methods at their disposal, for 
example, by visa or passport refusal.  
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7.6.2.1.a) Economic Sanctions Against South Africa – 1970s – 80s 
The Commonwealth’s isolation of SA coincided with UN developments,146 and the 
flurry of boycotts from consumers and businesses in the 1980s. The economic boycotts and 
embargoes were intended to hit SA hard. Banking,147 oil,148 agriculture,149 were all affected. SA 
had difficulty exporting its major resources of gold, diamonds, uranium, coal and agriculture. 
Reconciliatory meetings began in the commercial world in the late 1980s and sporting 
organisations, not wanting to be ‘left behind’, began re-integratory attempts.150 However, 
SANOC failed to be invited to Seoul 1988 and SA was excluded from the first rugby union 
World Cup in 1987, which was sorely felt domestically amongst whites.151 Thus in the late 
1980s, although dialogue had begun, there was no turn around in IOC policy. The IOC would 
exclude SA for as long as apartheid continued.152 
 
7.6.3 IOC’s Institutional Action Against Apartheid – 1980s 
The IOC, in the mid-late 1980s, contributed two developments in the eradication of 
racial sporting discrimination. These coincided with the UN’s amplification of the matter via 
its International Convention Against Apartheid in Sports (ICAAS) and its 1986 SC Resolution 
591, mandatorily calling for an arms embargo against SA.153 The first IOC development was 
that it adopted on the 21st of June 1985, the Declaration Against Apartheid In Sport and, 
secondly thereafter, it helped form the Apartheid and Olympism Commission. Each shall now 
be examined to determine how effective they were in ending apartheid. 
 
7.6.4 Declaration Against Apartheid in Sport 1985 
The IOC was keen to reaffirm its anti-apartheid stance in the 1985 Declaration, made 
the same year as the UN’s ICAAS.154 However, neither organisation were the first to make such 
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a Declaration against apartheid, given that the Commonwealth had done so seven years earlier 
in its GA77, and SA had been banned by certain ISFs.155 Nevertheless, the IOC’s Declaration 
urged:- 
“all members of the Movement, particularly the ISFs included on the 
Olympic programme… [to] implement the IOC’s previous 
recommendations to exclude or suspend South African NSFs and to 
discourage strongly sport contacts with SA and South Africans until 
the abolition of apartheid.”  
Once more, this wording shows the importance of the ISFs in the fight to end apartheid due to 
their large network which was recognised by the international community.  
The Declaration broadens its call, in a similar way to GA77, by stating that all sports 
organisations should refuse:- 
“to enter into any contact, official or otherwise, of a sporting nature 
with official South African organisation or South African sportsmen 
and women.” 
This call is categorical in its objectives specifying what bodies cannot do, rather than what they 
can do, thus the call is a prohibitive one.  
However, the most important development made by the IOC’s Declaration, similar to 
the Commonwealth’s GA77, is that it is attempting to encourage other states to isolate SA. This 
is in addition to reaffirming previous acknowledgement of the abhorrence of sporting apartheid. 
Both documents urge states and organisations to not engage in sporting contact with SA, 
whether within the Games or non-Games orbit, whilst not providing for any sanctions if they 
do. However, the Declaration (unlike GA77), specifically labels sporting engagement with SA 
as a ‘disrupt[ion]’ to the Movement’s unity. It is this disruption that justifies the IOC’s mandate 
in directing non-apartheid parties i.e. third parties to isolate SA. 
However, in addition to this IOC advancement, the Declaration goes further than 
historic IOC conduct in two further ways. Firstly, it is the IOC’s first written attempt at a 
blanket SA exclusion extending beyond its Game’s one. As the first IOC written Declaration 
on the matter, it goes beyond previous IOC action (including the ban) which focused on the 
merits of committees, meetings, debates and fact finding commissions in dealing with the SA 
problem.  
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However, the Declaration’s potential legal nature and the hardness of its obligation 
diminishes when considered in light of the Movement’s infrastructure. The Declaration was 
the result of a conference of several IOC members, ISFs, NOCs, SANROC and those involved 
in African sports governance. This again shows the Movement’s lack of legal bite as it is 
separate to governments and their legislatives who could give it such legal effect leading to 
real political change.156 The Preamble also lays down the Declaration’s purpose, which is to 
vigorously reaffirm the afore-mentioned parties’ stance against sporting apartheid. Sentiments 
already expressly given at IOC Sessions and Executive Meetings, or impliedly given by way 
of SA’s expulsion.  
It is also worth noting that the IOC Declaration when compared to GA77 is a softer 
sentiment. The obvious reason being that the GA77 has states parties, whereas the IOC 
Declaration only has organisation parties. However, after this significant difference, the GA77 
diminishes compared to the IOC Declaration. The GA77 only prohibits contact or competition 
with SA with everything else being left up to states to decide. Whereas the IOC Declaration 
provides more of a realistic framework and infrastructure for implementing the shared 
purposes. But this could be precisely because the parties are not states, who would not have 
made such an onerous commitment. 
The second advancement made by the IOC Declaration, is its recognition of apartheid 
sport as a geographical problem, as “no non-African entity can purpose to impose a solution to 
resolve this specifically African problem.” The IOC therefore views the problem as only 
affecting Africans and is not one of general global racial discrimination. This is another IOC 
attempt to prevent the involvement of other states. Although the Declaration also gives 
Africans, whether or not within SA, the ability to accept or deny solutions.  
This Declaration closed with a re-affirmation of SA’s Movement ban as no new 
‘elements’ had developed, albeit it would “not be entirely satisfied” until SA returned on the 
non-negotiable criterion of abolishing apartheid.157 
 
7.6.5 The Apartheid and Olympism Commission 1988 
The second manner in which the IOC developed its anti-apartheid stance was by way 
of the Apartheid and Olympism Commission established under IOC President Samaranch’s 
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impetus in 1988.158 This Commission was to “study and follow all matters concerning apartheid 
in sport”, in order to monitor SA and develop a strategic approach to the problem.159 It was 
headed up by IOC Executive Member Keba Mbaye and drew on the experiences of a variety 
of key anti-apartheid players, such as the SCSA, SANROC, human rights activists, and those 
involved in African sport governance and Olympism.160 It was therefore a “treetop” campaign 
by the IOC where it drew “together all stakeholders”.161 At the same time, negotiations began 
in earnest to end political and legal apartheid. All parties agreed that ending apartheid was a 
prerequisite to re-admission, including SANOC.  
By 1989 following several meetings, some clandestine, Samaranch, Mbaye and Johan 
Du Plessis (SANOC President) agreed and accepted a ‘minimum’ set of conditions for SA’s 
Movement readmission, in addition to apartheid’s abolition.162 These conditions were:- links to 
be established with South African athletes of all races; sport must be organised multi-racially; 
relations must be established with non-racial bodies in and outside of SA (e.g. SANROC) and 
neighbouring or African countries; and a normalisation of relations between a SANOC and 
ANOCA. Similar criteria were again espoused for re-admission in time for Barcelona 1992. 
However, there was real concern that although these conditions might be met on paper, that 
they would be token or superficial and would disguise that real progress in attitudes had not 
occurred. However, as time would show, SA fulfilled these criteria and competed at Barcelona. 
 
7.6.6 Samaranch’s Role in South Africa’s Re-admission  
Samaranch is credited with a propulsion forward in IOC anti-apartheid policy in the 
1980s. This was because he had a desire to uphold, and to be seen to be upholding, Charter 
Fundamental Principles, Olympism and Coubertin philosophies. Credit must be given to his 
role in encouraging SA to end apartheid and to return to the Movement. For example, he said 
that the- 
“Movement has possibly a unique opportunity to show it[self] as one 
of the greatest and beneficial social forces of our time… This can’t 
coexist with apartheid.”163 
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This shows that he is more definite in attacking apartheid that his predecessors, especially 
Brundage. Samaranch thought it his “duty to react committing [the IOC] to the peace and 
wellbeing of our society.”164 Albeit Samaranch was President at a later time than Brundage, 
taking the helm once the civil and human rights movement of the 1960s had already won its 
successes. 
 
7.6.7 South Africa’s Return – 1990s 
With Samaranch as IOC leader at the turn into the 20th Century’s final decade, a 
momentous turn around within SA occurred. In February 1990 President De Klerk announced 
to parliament that apartheid would end, political prisoners, including Nelson Mandela would 
be released from prisons within the fortnight and that the ANC was no longer banned.165 With 
these political changes, there was at last no need for SA’s exclusion and the resultant boycotts 
to continue.166 De Klerk stated enthusiasm for non-racial sport as it was not in SA’s interests to 
“be in a state of conflict with the rest of the world.” 167 This paved the way for bridges to be 
built unifying sport in the new SA but De Klerk did raise the issue of IOC double standards 
and victimisation of SA as many other countries had policies equivalent to or worse than SA.168 
In order for SA to be invited to Barcelona 1992 they had three months to meet the IOC’s 
conditions for readmission agreed between Samaranch and de Klerk. These conditions were 
similar to those agreed in the late 1980s but this time there were five. The conditions reiterated 
the requirement of full abolition of apartheid. Mbaye notes that this requirement was open to 
dubiety. However, what was sought was the removal of apartheid’s three remaining pillars 
(neighbourhood segregation, race classification and the right to purchase land on equal 
footing). The conditions thereafter amalgamated the earlier ones: - resolving the differences 
between rival sports bodies in SA; unification of sports on non-racial grounds; and the 
establishment of good relations with other African sports organisations, especially ANOCA.169 
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However, there was the added and significant addition of Charter compliance by a new NOC, 
thus showing how the Charter ties into respecting human rights and that a sporting bodies’ 
actions, depends on that of its government’s laws. 
 
7.6.8 Foundation of a Multi-Racial South African NOC 
Following the end of apartheid, a racially unified interim NOC was established, with 
the aid of ANOCA and Sam Ramsamy as President.170 The word ‘interim’ was deleted from 
its name in July 1991 following fulfilment of the above conditions.171 A full South African 
NOC, now called NOCSA, was therefore recognised by the IOC.172 Much later, in 2004 
NOCSA became the South African Sports Confederation and Olympic Committee (SASCOC) 
when it merged with other bodies. 
At the same time as the Movement’s reacceptance of SA, other sporting bodies 
clamoured to do likewise. For example, there was a competition between the IOC and the IAAF 
to see who would re-admit SA first, with the IOC blocking and delaying the IAAF’s 
advancements so that it could make the first offer.173 Once again, this shows the ISF’s clout in 
bringing about an end to (sporting) apartheid and how the two streams of organisations worked 
together to help isolate SA and in turn, end apartheid.174   
 
7.6.9 South Africa at Barcelona 1992 and beyond 
With a Movement and ISF welcome, NOCSA returned to the Games at Barcelona. It 
sent SA’s first Olympic team since Rome 1960 and the first official racially diverse team.175 
Many of the vestiges of SA’s identify were considered reflective of the apartheid government. 
Hence NOCSA first competed under the Olympic flag as the orange, white and blue one was 
considered inappropriate.176 SA’s current flag was not adopted until April 1994. They used 
Beethoven’s Ode to Joy for medal ceremonies as SA’s national anthem, ‘Die Stem van Suid-
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Afrika’, represented the old SA.177 The current anthem ‘God Bless Africa – Nkosi Sikelel 
iAfrika’ was not used until 1997. This shows a conscious effort to re-brand SA’s identity post-
apartheid. However, there was some carry over from the old SA in the wearing of its famous 
green and gold colours. This was a concession to white South Africans who were particularly 
attached to these sporting colours.178  
SA embraced Movement re-admission and was welcomed back swiftly.179 It bid 
unsuccessfully for the 2004 Games, but it did host the 1999 All Africa Game in 
Johannesburg.180 This shows that it was looking to solidify and re-establish its Olympic 
presence. 
However, many felt that SA’s turnaround was swift and that although laws may have 
changed, attitudes had not and vast inequalities remained, like the concern in the late 1980s 
over SA’s ability to meet the IOC’s criteria for readmission.181 Booth claims that unity was a 
sham and that figureheads were ceremonial. This sham explains why, almost nine years post-
apartheid, NOCSA selection did not represent other NOC procedures as positive discrimination 
existed.182 For Sydney, NSFs were to select athletes (as was normal practice) but on NOCSA 
pre-approved criteria (which was not normal). This demonstrated NOCSA’s attempt to 
“centralise power” and retain selection control over the NSFs.183 NOCSA’s criteria was both 
objective and subjective, even in non-artistic sports, in order to secure mixed racial selection. 
Nevertheless, the IOC were unconcerned with ‘attitude changes’. They focused on practical 
changes. Ramsamy states that this would be evidenced by having resources and funding 
devoted towards multi-racial training in addition to having mixed teams and bodies.184 
 
Since the end of apartheid, the IOC has sought to maintain and extend its mandate for 
dealing with international peace and security. Although laying down a mandate in this field for 
itself, it was nonetheless conscious of being used by political boycotters once more. Hence it 
has sought to prevent further boycotts and political misuse by third parties by:- the Truce and 
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its IOTC/IOTF; the International Forums on Sport, Peace and Development; and securing 
UNGA observer status. The former are discussed further in Chapter 5. The latter development 
has meant that the IOC and the UN have formed a relationship utilising their different mandates 
and organisational set-ups to the maximum advantage in this field. Moreover by way of their 
constituent Charters, they share many goals, such as preservation of human dignity in a 
peaceful society. The UN’s involvement in ending apartheid and its collective IOC work shall 
be discussed in Part Two, where the interplay between the state and non-state system in ending 
apartheid shall be examined, and that each bolstered the position of the other, reaching and 
acting in ways that only they could. 
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Part II    Observations on the South Africa Example 
 
7.7 Extent of IOC Involvement in Ending Apartheid  
The IOC has asserted that it was the first international sports organisation to address 
apartheid in sport in 1955, and to sanction it by SANOC’s expulsion in 1970.185 However, both 
parts of this are inaccurate.  
Firstly, the IOC’s assertion that it was the first international organisation to address 
apartheid, is a liberal interpretation of events. It did address the issue, but it did not do so of its 
own volition nor with a contemporaneously favourable outcome. In the mid-20th Century, 
apartheid was tabled at Sessions or Executive meetings by members from aggrieved states and 
NOCs. It was not at the behest of the large majority of the IOC or its Executive Members. 
Hence the IOC has embellished its involvement and has erased its avoidance and ignorance of 
the issue through inaction. The IOC was latterly involved in the anti-apartheid struggle, but in 
the early years, its participation was not at the level that it would suggest. 
Secondly, the IOC’s statement that it was the first organisation to sanction SANOC in 
1970 also ignores that SA were rendered de facto ineligible for the Commonwealth Games due 
to their Commonwealth’s expulsion. This was based on SA’s domestic policies and vociferous 
complaints from other Commonwealth member states. After, 1958, SA did not compete in the 
Commonwealth Games until 1994, an earlier exclusion than their Olympic one. 
Hence IOC claims of a pivotal involvement in ending apartheid can considered 
important but not decisive or central. Part II will identify any other actor(s) who had a more 
decisive or central role in ending apartheid. 
Identification proves tricky due to the multitude of interlinking actors, political and 
non-political. This is why exacting further political or sporting change, by the IOC, post-
apartheid has been difficult to replicate. With regard to apartheid, the involved actors and the 
surrounding crucible, helped wilt the IOC’s ignorance and evolve it into decisive action and 
exclusion.186 And in turn, this helped end apartheid. Each of the contributing factors and actors 
will be assessed in turn, with a determination of their influence on ending apartheid, as 
compared to that of the IOC. The influential factors can be divided into ‘actors’ and 
                                                          
185
 “[T]he IOC became the first international sports organisation to exclude SA because of apartheid”, Mbaye, n. 
24. 
186
 Mbaye, n. 24. 
179 
 
‘circumstances’, albeit that the actions of one may deliberately or inadvertently have led to the 
other.  
 
7.8 UN Involvement in Ending Apartheid 
Until now, examination of the end of apartheid has focused on the input of the IOC, the 
NSFs, the ISFs and the Commonwealth. It has largely ignored the significant contribution of 
the UN.187 The UN contributed many valuable developments to the anti-apartheid movement 
by way of:- discussions;188 Conventions;189 UN resolutions; establishing and supporting 
embargoes and boycotts; establishing the Special Committee Against Apartheid; compiling a 
Register of sporting and cultural contacts with SA; and drawing together and legitimising the 
anti-apartheid movement.190 These all helped diminish apartheid’s legitimacy in the 
international state system. Many of these developments interlinked with the work of other 
bodies, including the IOC.  
As the UN is the appropriate forum for dealing with international political issues, its 
contribution to ending apartheid as compared to the IOC, must be undertaken with the caveat 
that it is inherently more capable of dealing with the issue. This is why an examination of UN 
involvement in SA and sports is necessary. However, unlike the IOC, the UN could not address 
the bodies that practiced sporting apartheid as these were not under its international legal 
jurisdiction or its subjects.  
Furthermore, the SA issue shows the inextricable linking of the international UN state 
system with the international Olympic sporting system on three grounds. Firstly, and again, the 
Olympic system inherently made the sporting apartheid issue international. The Movement’s 
unique nature and its infrastructure meant that issues are innately internationalised. Secondly, 
the policies and laws of a state (SA) dictated its NOC’s ability to meet its Olympic legal 
obligations due to the specificity of the Movement system. And thirdly, by not banning the 
errant SAOCGA immediately for its apartheid selection, shows the power that the Movement 
has over athletes and states.  
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The ‘switch’ for sporting apartheid and the Games being considered international, is 
triply switched on. This international aspect to the Movement allows it to work alongside the 
UN and influence areas, and make policies and legal obligations, which the UN cannot. If this 
reasoning is applied to this thesis, it demonstrates that if a Truce Treaty is to be effective, it 
requires governorship by a singular collective Movement with the ability to impose real and 
legal sanctions. This would mean the collective Movement would with regard to the Truce 
Treaty have power on a par with states. Consequently, a UN-IOC comparison in terms of action 
to end apartheid is relevant. This is due to the Olympic Singularity, the inherent international 
nature of the SA question and a need to discover the real reasons for the end of apartheid. 
 
7.8.1 Early UN Attention - 1940s -1960s 
The UN had the SA question on its agenda from its inception. The UNGA’s Indian 
delegate levied its concern at the first UNGA Meeting.191 However, this only focused on SA’s 
Indians and not all non-whites. It also did not mention their sporting participation. The 
UNGA’s response was conciliatory and mediatory, in stark contrast to the IOC’s ignorance. 
By 1950, the UNGA had officially declared apartheid as racial discrimination in Resolution 
395(V) and was therefore condemned SA earlier than the IOC.192 This also meant that apartheid 
was under the UN’s mandate. 
Following the Sharpeville Massacre in 1960 the SA question escalated to the SC, who 
first took action in Resolution 134. Resolution 134 deplored the massacre and SA’s 
governmental policies and called on it to:- 
“initiate measures aimed at bringing about racial harmony based on 
equality… and to abandon its policies of apartheid and racial 
discrimination.” 
Compliance measures were at SA’s discretion and involved no third parties, in that it was only 
targeted towards SA and not states that had relationships with it. Therefore this Resolution 
contains stronger language and directives to SA’s government than the UNGA’s resolutions.193 
It was also more decisive than the IOC’s inclusionary policy of 1960 which permitted their 
Rome 1960 participation. 
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7.8.2 UNGA Resolution 1761, 1962 
Within a couple of short years, the UN had amplified its language and extended its 
scope in dealing with SA. The UNGA in Resolution 1761 stated that SA’s government and its 
apartheid policy disregarded their UN Charter obligations.194 Therefore the Resolution had the 
goal of “bring[ing] about the abandonment” of apartheid.195 
Resolution 1761 also reaffirmed an earlier SC Resolution, as they both recognised the 
potential of the situation to endanger international peace and security.196 Although it had 
already led to international friction. Hence the UN was stating that a lower disruption of 
international ‘friction’ had been met by apartheid. This helps explain the harsher GA language 
and recall of the SC Resolution, as SA’s compliance was sought.  
Resolution 1761 also developed the UN’s standpoint on SA. It requested involvement 
from and of third party states, mimicking the contemporary sporting boycotts. It requested that 
Member States:-  
“separately or collectively… break[ing] off diplomatic relations… 
close their ports to all vessels flying South African flags… boycott[ing] 
all South African goods and refraining from exporting goods, including 
all arms and ammunition to SA”.  
This call set the precedent and tone for the international community’s actions in dealing with 
SA, including the IOC latterly. The UN is clear on what Member States are to do here. It 
launched the notion of a UN backed boycott, going hand-in-hand with the NOC’s sporting 
boycotts and the IOC’s bans of the 1960s.197 However, many western states felt that it and the 
Special Committee Against Apartheid that it established, were too harsh.198 
By the mid-1960s, although the IOC was beginning to treat apartheid seriously, it was 
not as earnestly dealt with as at the UN. The UN was ahead of the IOC at this time – the UN 
involved the relevant actors (states and SA’s government). The UN was the IGO formed to 
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help foster peace and security, placing the issue directly within its mandate and Charter.199 As 
the IOC and UN Charters have some similar themes, it seems difficult to understand why the 
IOC did not enforce compliance of its own Charter from its relevant actor before the 1964 
Games, when the UN had already issued such an edict and set such a precedent.  
 
7.8.3 UN Isolation of South Africa and its Establishment of the Special Committee Against 
Apartheid  
The UN had historically requested political and economic embargoes on SA. During 
the 1970s and 1980s, the UN would escalate the embargo call from the UNGA to the SC by 
way of various resolutions that would become mandatory, and form international law.200 
However these Resolutions did not specifically mention the use of sport in fighting apartheid. 
Whereas UNGA Resolution 2396 (XXIII) 1968 did. Resolution 2396 specifically recognised 
the importance of sporting isolation on SA and the valuable potential contribution that the IOC, 
the ISFs and the NOCs could make in this and ending apartheid.201 Therefore the UN took the 
leap that the IOC was yet to make at that time.  
Moreover, although sporting organisations were not UN members and were not part of 
the international state system, the UN overlooked this sought to control their activities. They 
overlapped their mandate with the IOC’s but targeted only states, which obviously the IOC 
could not. The UN used a blanket policy and wording to do this, ahead of full South African 
Olympic expulsion, for example, Resolution 2396 amongst many other strong calls: -  
“request[s] all States and organisations to suspend cultural, 
educational, sporting and other exchanges with the racist regime and 
with organisations or institutions in SA which practice apartheid.”  
This is the UN’s first mention of sport as a weapon against apartheid. This UN call goes 
someway to explain why the IOC repeated their Game ban in 1968 and finally expelled SA in 
1970.  
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Resolution 2396 also distinguishes between South African organisations that practice 
apartheid and those who do not. It only addresses the all-white bodies to prevent their 
functioning and international acceptance.  
It was also the UN (alongside domestic organisations such as SANROC) that 
recognised the necessity of specialised institutions in combating apartheid. Consequently, the 
UN established the Special Committee Against Apartheid.202 Initially the Committee was not 
well received by many western states. They felt its presence and measures were too harsh. 
Nevertheless, the Committee’s credibility and acceptance grew and support was found in the 
west amongst groups such as the London based AAM and from African and Asian states. All 
of these parties helped promote international (sports) boycotts.203  
In 1976 the UN founded the Centre Against Apartheid and it worked closely with the 
above Committee. The Centre was a useful UN weapon against apartheid due to its permanency 
and long term focus. This meant that it could surpass the IOC’s ad hoc fact finding 
commissions and committees of the same time.204 The IOC did not recognise the necessity of 
a permanent anti-apartheid body until 1988. Therefore, before 1988 the IOC had no formal 
permanent initiatives to facilitate SA’s Charter observance. These could easily have been 
introduced by the IOC, and allowed it to observe the various aforementioned UN resolutions. 
 
7.8.4 Consolidation of UN Resolutions and Sport 
The UN continued to pass resolutions on SA, apartheid and sport. Resolution 2775 was 
passed at the 26th UNGA Session of 1971, and declared the UN’s “unqualified support of the 
Olympic principle of non-discrimination”. This once again shows the overlap in their 
jurisdictions. This gives UN permission for the IOC to uphold its Fundamental Principles, over 
inclusion, alongside approval for SA’s IOC expulsion in 1970. Moreover, it adds legitimacy to 
the suggestion that the Charter may amount to customary international law via its UN 
support.205  
Resolution 2775 adds that “merit should be the sole criterion for participating in sport”. 
This is clearly intended for the Movement and all sporting organisations. They are called to 
                                                          
202
 This was another UN contribution via landmark GA Resolution 1761. Initially it was called the Special 
Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of SA, and commenced work on 2nd 
April 1963. 
203
 Reddy, n. 31. 
204
 These only superficially investigated the problem or submitted inaccurate reports, Mbaye, n. 24. See also 
Reddy, n. 31. 
205
 And that the Movement can form such principles, although likely it is the reverse, that the Charter lays does 
existing customary principles. 
184 
 
uphold this Olympic principle and to deny their “support to sporting events organised in 
violation of this principle”. This attempts to ensure that all branches of the Movement work 
together so that SANOC cannot take advantage of the Movement’s organisational loopholes to 
shirk their Charter responsibilities. Once again the problems of the Movement’s infrastructure 
have been recognised and tackled by the UN, and not the IOC. Consequently, this shows the 
necessity of the Movement to be viewed as one singular organ when it acts on the world stage. 
A further UN recognition contained in Resolution 2775 is to the importance of 
individuals in ending (sporting apartheid). Something which the IOC did not appreciate. Albeit 
the status of individuals under international law is questionable, the Resolution nevertheless 
calls on individual sportsmen to refuse their participation in such events in states that practice 
racial discrimination.206 This is only relevant to Games within SA. Therefore, this resolution 
does not tackle the international aspect of sports, such as SA competing abroad. Something 
which other resolutions, the boycotts and Movement expulsion do instead. Consequently, this 
shows that both organisations were necessary to tackle all levels of apartheid, on the state and 
sub-state level. This acts as a precedent for today’s Movement in dealing with the Truce and 
potential Treaty. The UN and singular Movement should work closely, with the Movement 
having enforcement and sanctioning powers on a par with the UN for it. 
 
7.8.5 Register of Sports Contacts with South Africa 
One tool that the Special Committee established in 1980 was the establishment of the 
annual Register of Sports Contacts with SA.207 This tackled the sub-state nature of sports and 
reaffirmed the recent recognition of the importance of the individual in fighting apartheid. The 
Register was a list of around 2,500 sportsmen and women, teams and officials who chose to 
participate in events in SA during the 1980s.208 Many high profile athletes, ranging in 
nationalities in both Olympic and non-Olympic sports, appeared on the Register. For example, 
the registered named:-209 Jimmy Connors210 and Boris Becker211 in tennis;212 and Seve 
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Ballesteros213 and Greg Norman214 in golf.215 Names could be removed from the Register if the 
athlete wrote an undertaking to the Committee not to compete again in apartheid SA.216  
The Register can be considered ‘softer’ action than the aforementioned UN Resolutions 
and actions. Being listed had no formal legal implications, punishments or recommended action 
attached.217  
However, it could also be considered ‘harsher’ action than UN Resolutions as it ‘named 
and shamed’ specific individuals, some of whom were disciplined and suspended by their 
NSF/ISFs.218 Furthermore, although sanctions were not formally UN backed, some 
governments would not permit the named person to enter or compete in their countries by 
refusing visas.219 The UK banned them from using their sporting facilities.220 The logic behind 
this was so that:- 
“those who profited from apartheid and showed contempt for the 
majority of the South African people, would not be allowed to make 
money in their countries.”221  
Therefore, both Reddy and Mousouris claim that the Register was an effective tool to exert 
“pressure on [a] country's government to eliminate apartheid''.222   
The IOC did not take specific action against third parties appearing on the Register, as 
demonstrated in its response to its treatment of NZ and its NOC. The IOC wished sanctions to 
target SA itself, and not other parties. The IOC rarely sanctioned athletes themselves for 
conduct that breached Olympism, out-with doping and cheating.223 Although the USOC did 
this by stripping its ‘Black Power’ athletes of their 1968 Mexico Game track medals because 
the games were not to be forums for demonstrating political sentiments. Despite SANOCs 
doing precisely this by implementing its government’s apartheid policies. Coincidentally, the 
US action occurred alongside the 1960s civil rights movement, the recognition of rights 
internationally and the backlash over SA’s potential inclusion in the 1968 Games. Although 
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the IOC was forced to take a stance on apartheid, it then re-exerted control on other Olympic 
actors to regain that control and ensure its non-politicisation, which seems ironic to a modern 
audience. Nevertheless, the UN made greater strides than the Movement did or could have done 
here, potentially because of its political mandate, with less fear of offending its members. 
 
7.8.6 International Convention Against Apartheid in Sports 1985 
 A further way in which the UN made more of a significant stab at apartheid than the 
Movement was by the adoption of the International Convention Against Apartheid in Sports 
(ICAAS) 1985.224 This was in addition to the two general anti-discrimination conventions and 
anti-apartheid conventions of 1969 and 1973 respectively. By virtue of ICAAS being inter-
state, it inevitably trumped the IOC’s Declaration of the same year. This again highlights the 
IOC’s lack of capacity in dealing with the international state system and its requirement for 
power on a par with the UN regarding a Truce Treaty. 
 ICAAS drew together UN and IOC historic work in the fight against apartheid in sport 
and non-sporting fields. It once more “strongly condemn[s] apartheid” and undertakes to 
pursue by “all appropriate means” the elimination of apartheid in all sports.”225 Therefore 
although not yet showing an advancement in terms of its content, its codification in a 
Convention, means its terms are binding alongside the fact that sport is a tool to enforce 
international law. 
 
7.8.6.1 South Africa’s Continued Isolation  
 Similar to previous UN Resolutions, ICAAS targeted SA and its sporting competitors, 
even if the latter did not practice apartheid.226 Under Article 3 of ICAAS, signatory states were 
to avoid sporting contacts with those practising apartheid.227 They were to deny entry to those 
who participated in competitions in SA, their representatives, those who invited such 
competition and those who maintained contacts with an apartheid practising country.228 
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Furthermore, Article 10 requested that signatory states use best endeavours to comply with 
Olympic principles.229  
ICAAS therefore appears to fall into the well-fed Movement structural trap, as its 
parties are states and not the INGO sub-state actors that organise international sport.230 This is 
why the Convention requires its signatory states to advise their ISF individuals to abide by the 
Convention’s terms.231 The Convention specifically directs governments to influence, ISFs, 
NOCs and the Movement. It therefore is incidentally trying to target the non-international law 
subjects that organise international sports.232 This again shows Olympic singularity by way of 
their unusual treatment under international law. The Convention attempts to lump them 
together. This shows that a singular Movement must be considered, due to Olympic singularity, 
as on a par with IGOs and states in this field of peace and security. 
ICAAS’s recognition of this lacuna between the state and sport system is further 
evidenced by Article 10 which specifically calls for SA’s ISF expulsion. ICAAS recommends 
specific action, and it rectifies the historic problem of resolutions leaving states to decide what 
anti-apartheid measures they should take.233  
 
7.8.6.2 Repercussions of Breaching the Convention 
ICAAS has no explicit sanctioning provisions for its breach, making it somewhat 
toothless. This omission likens ICAAS to the IOC’s practical stance of the time.234 Therefore 
despite ICAAS, the UN’s practical stance is no different to the IOC’s. Its lack of bite could be 
due to the divide between sporting INGOs and governments. It seems unfair to hold an INGO 
responsible for its governments policies. However, as already seen with SA, the two were 
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merged here, each reflecting and reinforcing the others views, policies and behaviours.235 This, 
alongside the precedent set by ekecheiria, shows why a single collective Movement should be 
able to sanction NOC’s for their state’s Truce breach. 
ICAAS does provide for its monitoring via the Commission Against Apartheid in 
Sports.236 The UN identified that this area was sufficiently problematic to consequently warrant 
a Commission, in addition to its general anti-apartheid UN Committee Against Apartheid. The 
Commission Against Apartheid in Sports considered reports made to it by signatory States on 
the “legislative, judicial, administrative or other measures” which they adopted to give ICAAS 
effect. 237 Hence the UN did provide for monitoring and feedback of ICAAS observance, albeit 
there were no official sanctions. 
 
7.8.6.3 Olympic and Non-Olympic Sports 
ICAAS goes further than the IOC’s Olympic expulsion. This is because the IOC could 
only influence SA’s participation in Olympic sports.238 Whereas ICAAS dealt with all sports, 
whether or not on the Olympic programme. ICAAS therefore included sports that were 
extremely popular in SA.239 Exclusion from which would be sorely felt within SA. 
 
7.8.6.4 Observations on UN involvement in Sporting Apartheid 
ICAAS’s goals was SA’s universal sporting isolation. It drew together the multitude of 
actors in international sports, whilst appreciating that these bodies are not its signatories. And 
that SA’s sporting organisations were not its government. It attempted to address the inherent 
dual problems of the UN and the IOC regarding sport and peace:- the IOC’s inability to function 
in the international state system due to its lack of status; and the UN’s inability to function sub-
state in the international sporting system. Therefore, this shows that a Convention was needed 
in this area that specifically draws these actors together, as a Truce Treaty could do today. It 
too would have the ability to sanction on a par with ICAAS, by way of sanctions and isolation 
The UN would claim that it was ICAAS that finally helped end apartheid within a few 
years of its passing. That ICAAS, reflecting UN backed universal state condemnation, was the 
decisive factor in ending apartheid. However, this ignores the fact that it took the UN and the 
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international community forty-odd years to achieve this. It also does not address why this 
occurred in the mid-1980s and not earlier. The answer to this could be that such political 
pressures and boycotts take time to be effective.  
It is more likely that ICAAS was a catalyst in ending apartheid. ICAAS itself arose due 
to the accumulation of a myriad of circumstantial factors. A turn of the screw. It was the UN 
and the IOC working together that helped create the right circumstances, and then create 
ICAAS, ultimately ending apartheid. If this template is applied to the modern Truce, it shows 
that the single collective Movement must be viewed as an extension of the UN, with UN level-
powers, in order to achieve Truce goals. It was this UN-IOC collaboration with real sanctions, 
placed under the right circumstances that led to ICAAS’s success.  
The circumstances in which ICAAS appeared shall now be discussed below. However, 
it is worth noting here that ICAAS followed the political boycotts of the Games in 1980 
(Moscow) and 1984 (Los Angeles) by the ‘west’ and the ‘east’. Politicisation of sport and the 
Games was happening. The UN and the Movement would have been keen to ensure that either 
they did not reoccur, or if that if politicisation was to occur, then it happen within their auspices, 
and thus ICAAS was born. This shows that boycotts were acceptable if they were institutionally 
condoned. 
Moreover, with regard to the UN as a whole, it was more profligate and forward 
thinking than the IOC in the early to mid-20th Century. However, following Olympic expulsion 
in 1970s, the two organisation’s goals became closer. Yet the establishment of anti-apartheid 
bodies were still predominantly under UN auspices, although both were sanction-less, with the 
Register condemnation aside.  
 
7.8.7 Indian Involvement in Ending Apartheid 
Undoubtedly the IOC and the UN together with the international community greatly 
influenced the end of (sporting) apartheid. However, this overlooks the other circumstances 
that brought about its end, such as the lobbying and work done by key individuals, groups and 
states in this regard.240  
One key group in fighting apartheid were Indians, both within SA and in India itself. 
They were the first groups to vocalise objection to sporting apartheid. Indian groups within SA 
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began to highlight the issue with the IOC in the early 1950s. For example, the Transvaal Indian 
Youth Congress (TIYC) wrote to the IOC (and all other international sporting organisations) 
in 1953 taking issue with the fact that only white South Africans were able to participate in 
international sports. TIYC called for the IOC and ISFs to prevent white South African 
participation and demanded that there be multi-racial representation in South African sports 
both domestically and internationally.241 The TIYC eventually received a reply from the IOC 
in 1955 regarding its earlier call, where the IOC stated that:- 
 “we suppose that this text [Rule 1 of the OC] will give you satisfaction 
with what… the Olympic Games are concerned.”242  
The IOC did not directly answer the call and as Mbaye stated, was making its position clear 
that it was not going to become embroiled in what it saw as South African local affairs. 
 India as a richly resourced developing country, entirely independent of SA with 
sufficient South African emigrants to be concerned with their treatment made anti-apartheid 
moves on their behalf in the UNGA from the mid-1940s.243 They had sufficient education, 
organised sport participation and contacts, to enable them to reach the ears of those in power 
when coloured and black populations did not.  
One of the most notable names in this struggle is Sam Ramsamy, an Indian descendant 
born in SA, who started working against apartheid from the mid-1070s onwards. He promoted 
unity amongst non-whites, who suffered from being split into African, Indian and coloured 
groups with little cohesion and an abundance of internal rivalries.244 However, his strong 
influence was due to the fact that he left SA after studying abroad. He carried out his campaign 
in the UK, enabling him to liaise with journalists, academics, sports administrators and 
politicians across the world.245 As SANROC’s Executive Chairman, a UN consultant, and later 
head of (I)NOCSA, he was able to bring the boycott to international attention.  
 
7.8.8 Individual’s Involvement in Ending Apartheid 
There have been other key individuals who deserve mention in the fight to end apartheid 
in South African sport, either from their own or collaborative work.246 They recognised and 
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took advantage of the fact that the Games are a unique platform where individuals can receive 
global attention. They used this stage to enforce SA’s isolation and the anti-apartheid plight. 
Mbaye applauds the work of ITTF President Ivor Montague who campaigned against 
apartheid sports as early as the 1950s. Under his steam, the ITTF was the first ISF to exclude 
an all-white South African federation and recognise the multi-racial one. He was a humanist 
who believed in the “universality of sport” and Mbaye said that if “a list is drawn up of great 
athletes who fought for the Olympic ideal, we should not forget Ivor Montague.”247 He was one 
of the earliest anti-sporting apartheid proponents and set a precedent for others, of all colours, 
to follow who were attempting to eradicate sporting apartheid.  
Mbaye himself is another notable individual in the anti-sporting apartheid field. He was 
a notable jurist and International Court of Justice Vice President who brought a legal and 
human right slant to the cause. His background meant he could see the advantages of lobbying 
for change from within the existing Movement infrastructure.248 He was a member of the IOC 
for almost 30 years and was also its Vice President.249 Although he was a relative late comer to 
the fight against apartheid, with his hands being somewhat tied due to his IOC appointments, 
his independence and commitment to the cause was recognised. He was appointed Head of the 
Apartheid and Olympism Commission in 1989-1992, which covered the cessation of South 
African Apartheid and its return to the Movement. 
Avery Brundage was IOC President for twenty years commencing in 1952 during 
which time the South African apartheid issue took centre stage. He would no doubt desire to 
be included as a leading light in the anti-apartheid sporting movement. However due to either 
a lack of personal conviction or a restraint placed upon him by his interpretation of his role, 
Brundage was tardy and hesitant in backing the anti-apartheid movement in South African 
sports.  
There is inherently some conservatism in the IOC President’s role. They will have to 
balance competing views.250 This inherent conservatism was amplified in Brundage’s case as 
he was vociferously against the politicisation of the Games. This resulted in him adopting an 
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inclusive stance towards SA and its Rhodesia (who also had discriminatory racial policies).251 
His interpretation of his Presidential role sans external pressure, was to tolerate NOCs who did 
not fulfil their commitment to Olympism’s Fundamental Principles. He favoured the Olympic 
principle of inclusion. A theme already seen in the preamble to the 1958 Charter which states 
that, “the most important thing in the Games is not to win but to take part”.252  
Therefore, Brundage must have ranked Fundamental Principles. He thought it better 
that all NOCs participate, whatever the domestic policies and laws of their government (and 
whether or not they are complicit in these,) rather than have all NOCs uphold their Charter 
obligations of non-discrimination. In any event, Brundage’s favouring of inclusion is artificial. 
He favoured wide NOC participation, despite NOC lack of full inclusion, which in SA’s case 
meant a lack of ethnic diversity and for other teams, may have been a lack of female 
participation. This ranking and conservatism therefore prevented him taking early action 
against apartheid sports and from being considered a serious anti-apartheid advocate. 
Aside from Mbaye, one of the biggest contributors to the sporting anti-apartheid 
movement within the Movement was the IOC Chancellor from 1946–1964, Otto Mayer.253 It 
was Mayer who took an overt interest in dealing with the sporting apartheid issue and was the 
first on the Executive to give it more than a mere fleeting or token nod at their Meeting in 
Munich 1959 and later argued that the SA question contradicted the Fundamental Principles of 
Olympism.254  
By 1963 he had examined and criticised a report by the Swiss Rudolf Balsiger on 
‘Racial Discrimination in South African Sport’ where Balsiger denied its existence.255 Mayer 
in turn questioned Balsiger and demanded answers to his difficult questions, such as why do 
all the races not train together and benefit from elite facilities, especially as sporting apartheid 
is not dictated by law? 256 Why was a non-white golfer insulted by being refused entry to an all-
white clubhouse to receive his Championship winning prize? Mayer correctly added that such 
treatment would surely encourage a movement against white leaders. Mayer also asked 
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Balsiger why two faster qualifying black runners were excluded in favour of white athletes and 
called this oversight, racial discrimination. He questioned Balsiger on the imprisonment of 
Dennis Brutus following his expulsion from meetings and the opening of his mail.257 Mayer 
stated that such examples or racial discrimination highlight the “state of mind that reign[s]” in 
SA.  
Balsiger attempted to answer Mayer’s questions, but his answers were not robust, 
accurate or to the point.258 Balsiger’s responses deliberately misinterpreted Mayer’s questions 
and addressed them from a practical rather than from an ethical perspective. Balsiger saw 
nothing wrong with the situation and accepted the status quo as a given. For example, in 
response to Mayer’s first question above, he said training was separate due to separate 
development. He added that the white South Africans were “safeguarding western civilisation” 
and that they were doing everything possible to “raise the blacks to our cultural level.” A 
striking statement that seems incongruous with the Movement suggesting a white benevolent 
superiority over other races.259 Therefore Mayer, in the face of significant opposition, persisted 
in asking difficult questions and challenged the blind acceptance of South African sporting 
policy. He helped highlight the need for a solution at the Olympic table. 
The aforementioned individuals could be said to have worked within the existing 
Movement parameters of the day in order to bring about change. Others out-with this system 
were more radical and became more personally involved, losing their liberty, freedom and 
domicile in so doing. Dennis Brutus became involved in the struggle to end sporting apartheid 
after it forced him to give-up elite level basketball due to government imposed segregation. He 
eventually helped create SASA in 1958, becoming its Honorary Secretary and later SANROC 
President.260 His work to secure full sporting integration provoked hostile attention from the 
South African government261 and he was placed under house arrest and forbidden under state 
security laws to attend any kind of meeting. Brutus was dedicated to his mission to the extent 
that he breached these sanctions to varying degrees of severity. One notable time was to meet 
a journalist at Olympic offices in SA to highlight the true situation of non-white sport in the 
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country and this gained him international recognition as a player on the anti-apartheid sporting 
field.262  
Another and more grievous occurrence where he breached these restrictive 
governmental orders, specifically his international travel ban, was his attempt to flee SA in 
1963. He wished to leave SA to take a report he had written on SANROC’s behalf, to the IOC 
October 1963 Baden-Baden Session and Executive Meeting. The Report ‘whistle-blew’ on the 
South African government and dismissed their claims that apartheid did not exist in their sport. 
Brutus managed to escape to Swaziland and Mozambique but was arrested and extradited by 
the South African government. In fear of his life from the South African authorities, he 
absconded from police custody by jumping out of a moving car. A shoot out ensued and he 
was seriously wounded from a police gunshot wound to the back and lay on the road for half 
an hour for a ‘coloured’ ambulance to attend him.263  
The South African authorities commuted him to a sixteen month jail sentence in Robben 
Island.264 Nevertheless, his case was given serious attention by the IOC, particularly by 
Chancellor Mayer who publicly asked why Brutus was shot by the police and expressed 
extreme concern at not knowing whether his life was in danger or not. Brutus left a strong 
legacy amongst others one of which was the creation of SASA in 1958. His part in highlighting 
the indignity of sporting apartheid and its ultimate demise must be appreciated. 
John Harris is another noteworthy and controversial name on a list of influential 
individuals in the fight to end sporting apartheid. He was SANROC Vice President. Harris 
initially bridged the gap between those working within and out-with the Movement system. On 
the 5th of June 1963, having been invited to speak at the IOC Executive Meeting in Lausanne 
1964, he made a statement demonstrating SANROC’s reasonableness and its lack of 
politicisation. He said that if SAONGA conformed “fully to the laws of the IOC” then 
SANROC would “categorically dissolve”, which he hoped would place SAONGA in check 
position.265 The South African government reacted to Harris’ strong statement by removing his 
passport and eligibility to travel out with SA so that he would not pick up and deliver the 
poisoned and floundering SANROC report prepared by Brutus. His credibility as an acclaimed 
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actor in the anti-sporting apartheid movement is overshadowed by his conviction for terrorist 
activities and hanging in 1965.266  
Harris’ conviction left him unable to deliver Brutus’ report and it was Robin Farquarson 
who successfully brought it to the IOC having to travel via Swaziland to deliver it. He had to 
live the remainder of his life in exile for his role in conveying the document.  
It is evident that individuals had a great impact on bringing the issue of apartheid sports 
to the attention of the world’s media and to the IOC. However, their main clout was through 
the support garnered from other actors and individuals across the world. This cumulatively, 
could pressure for change. It is difficult to see how the micro level of the individual could affect 
macro-international change in and of itself. Hence they can be considered a worthwhile 
addition to the turn of the screw that ended (sporting) apartheid. 
 
7.8.9 International Sporting Federation’s Involvement in Ending Apartheid 
The work and independence of ISFs in securing full racial inclusion in South African 
sports has been lauded by many, including Epsy.267 However, prudence must be exercised 
when weighing their influence and work in helping to end apartheid. Only a few ISFs were 
notable here - most had their actions tempered.  
The most significant ISF that categorically took a definitive and active early anti-
apartheid stance was the ITTF led by the progressive Montague. The ITTF was the first ISF to 
ban SA in 1956. It took a far more decisive stance than the IOC did at this time.268 Hence it was 
an outlier compared to other ISFs. 
FIFA is another ISF credited as taking an early anti-apartheid stance. It suspended the 
all-white FASA in 1961 after several years of investigations and denials of recognition. 
However, Mbaye states that at first FIFA deferred resolutions and decisions on the matter. It 
thought initially that the South African football organisations should “work it out for 
themselves”. Thus it did not act drastically differently to other organisations, such as the IOC 
at the time, who were also reluctant to become involved in what they saw as domestic matters.  
It is also worth noting that although FIFA suspended FASA, FIFA adopted a less 
tolerant stance following its Executive re-shuffle – FASA were readmitted in 1963.269 This 
shows that the anti-apartheid movement was not universal or permanent at the time. Backlashes 
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occurred with prominent networking done at a sports governance level to ensure white SA 
remained in the international sporting fold. Transience seems to characterise ISF and ISF 
attitudes towards SA in the early 1960s.270 Although FIFA’s plan was unlimited suspension, 
FASA’s readmission within two years shows that their action was only marginally more 
categorical than the ad hoc single Game ban of around the same time in 1962.  
Brundage, writing to SAOCGA Secretary-General Emery in October 1961 said that 
“following the action of FIFA, these protests will probably become stronger and more 
numerous.” Brundage accepts that FIFA’s actions acted as a catalyst or crucible to pressurise 
other bodies to act in a similar fashion. One body that would have been inspired by FIFA but 
yet praised them was the Transavaal Indian Youth Congress (TIYC).271 TIYC were one of the 
earliest documented advocators against sporting apartheid. FIFA’s power as one of the world’s 
most popular sports and ISFs cannot be overlooked. Its potential influence to exact change 
being greater than that many other ISFs but is unlikely to be as great as that of the IOC itself.  
SAAWBF was another vocal ISF that highlighted SA’s racial discrimination in sports 
in the mid-20th century. SAAWBF acted a decade earlier than table tennis and football by 
seeking support from foreign (non-South African) national federations in the 1940s. In 1946 
they sought recognition from the British Weightlifting Federation (BWF) but it adopted the 
same stance as the IOC at the time. The BWF said that it was not within their competence to 
grant recognition and that they had no power to force federations within SA to racially mix.272 
Both the IOC and the BWF washed their hands of the issue.  
A decade later SAAWBF was facing the same closed door in 1956, when it applied to 
the IOC and the Melbourne OCOG to attend the Games. They were told to contact and liaise 
with the all-white South African weightlifting body, who in turn alongside SAOCGA, refused 
to admit them and called them political agitators who threatened SA’s legitimacy and tenure 
within the IOC.273 SAOCGA were categorically trying to marginalise black South African 
athletes as political agitators with unknown objectives to side-line their legitimacy. This 
constant ‘buck-passing’ was faced by others who tried to tackle sporting apartheid, such as 
SANROC. It also shows how the IOC were still the gatekeepers barring the way for change, 
compared to the stance of its component parts.  
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An interesting question is why was there a lack of recognition of multi-racial bodies by 
ISFs in SA? Maintenance of the status quo is a reason. However, if this is laid aside, it seems 
more likely that non-racial NSFs were not ISF recognised because they were split over four 
racial groups.274 This meant that there could be as many as four NSFs vying for recognition, 
with internal rivalries separating them. There was not united front from which to lobby for 
change. This restraint on positive change was domestically recognised in SA relatively early 
on, as in 1958 SASA recognised that its first battle was unification of all the non-white groups 
in order to effect change. 
It was this split that SAOCGA blamed for its policies when called to account by the 
IOC. SACOGA denied it was racist but as South African NSFs were divided over four groups, 
only one NSF could be recognised.275 Yet ISFs only recognised the all-white NSFs. SA 
therefore took advantage and his its discriminatory policies behind the failure in the Olympics’ 
framework. Hence if the Movement is to act in the international sphere it has to be viewed as 
a collective singular organ grouping together all Movement actors as one, so this cannot 
reoccur. The IOC’s status here once again hindered its action. Hence for the Movement to 
engage in peace and security, the lessons from SA require remedying – the Movement needs 
to be viewed as a singular Movement with powers regarding the Truce on a par to that of the 
UN. Furthermore, it was the Movement collectively working here that effected change – the 
IOC dragging its heels was precipitated to change by the ISFs. 
 
7.8.10 African and Commonwealth Games/State Involvement in Ending Apartheid 
 To assessing the effectiveness of the Commonwealth of Nations (Commonwealth) and 
the Commonwealth Games (CG) on ending sporting apartheid, the historical setting must also 
be understood. SA’s introduction of apartheid overlaps the demise of European imperialism 
and decolonisation.  
 The Commonwealth and its Games excluded SA on a political pre-text long before the 
Movement. This appeased Commonwealth states who were calling for SA’s exclusion. SA 
having declared itself a republic in 1961 had to reapply for Commonwealth membership - it 
was not automatically eligible for inclusion in the 1962 Perth CGs. This political loophole 
meant that the Commonwealth and its Games could condemn SA and its previous participation 
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in the Welsh Commonwealth Games of 1958. It took the Commonwealth and its Games, one 
games cycle to take decisive action, as opposed to the decades it took the Movement.276 
 The Commonwealth and its Games includes a huge diversity of nations across the 
globe, small and large. It is tempting to attribute the expediency of response here to this 
diversity and their obvious antipathy towards apartheid. However, in the 1950s and 1960s 
fewer Commonwealth states existed, and if they did, they often did not compete internationally 
in sport.277 For example, only four African states competed in the 1962 CGs.278 Decolonisation 
nevertheless meant a surge in new nations. So although only four nations from Africa competed 
in Perth 1962, the Commonwealth must have recognised that in the future, there would be far 
more nation states. They wished to keep these new states within the Commonwealth. It is this 
future prediction (and potential power) that guided it to exclude SA and to formulate the 
Singapore Declaration 1971 and GA77. Hence the Commonwealth and its Games were 
important to SA. Its exclusion from which must have been keenly felt. The Commonwealth 
and its Games were therefore effective in helping to end sporting apartheid.  
 However, the Commonwealth’s influence here can be lessened because it contains 
smaller, poorer developing states than those who dominate the Movement. The Commonwealth 
Games are also on a smaller international stage than the Olympics. The three superpowers, 
Russia, China and the USA are not part of the Commonwealth and the CGs’s contribution to 
athletic and social development must necessarily be hindered because of this. Furthermore, 
Anglo-Commonwealth countries did still interact sportingly with SA.279 This potentially 
reduces the Commonwealth and its Games’ impact on ending sporting apartheid. 
 However, SA had great affinity to the Commonwealth. Any sanction from it was keenly 
felt. This made it an appropriate forum in which to deal with SA, being a less visible stage 
without the heavy-weights to slow down action. Here, small individual states could enact global 
sporting change. This can be seen from the fact that the Kenyan government refused entry to 
SA’s delegates for the Nairobi 1963 IOC Session, forcing the IOC to change the venue to 
Baden-Baden. Albeit this was only a minor hurdle, it shows that the Kenyan government 
backed the anti-apartheid supporters and would do what they could to aid in the struggle. In 
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addition to this, the influence of the USSR on the end of apartheid cannot be overlooked and 
necessitates a discussion in and of itself in section 7.8.11 below. 
 Nonetheless, the assessment of the Commonwealth and its Games attributes altruistic 
reasons for their struggle to end apartheid.  However, Reddy cites a more functional and 
preservationist reason. He claims that one of the major reasons for SA’s Commonwealth’s 
exclusion was their concern that the Commonwealth Games would be boycotted hampering 
their endurance, following the 1958 Welsh Games outcry. The Commonwealth Games being 
smaller than the Games could not afford to offend or lose the (future) majority of its members. 
It had to keep these within the fold. The Games on the other hand, had no such need to appease 
small groups. It was only when the Games endurance was affected by another contender, 
influenced by communist politics that Movement action occurred. 
 Attention must be given here to the differences between the Commonwealth Games 
and the Games. Whilst both are run by international organisations with memberships 
comprising national outfits separate to their governments, the link between the Commonwealth 
Games and the Commonwealth cannot be overlooked. The Commonwealth as comprising 
states is inherently linked to its CGs, in a way that the Games is not to states or any IGO, such 
as the UN. The Commonwealth Games as the more ‘political’ of the Games had more clout 
than the less political Games. Which is again a lesson to be learned for the modern Movement 
and its dealing with the Truce. For the success of the Truce, it requires assumption into the 
power that the IGO system has, which could be done by giving a singular Movement power to 
sanction its breach. 
 Hence the Commonwealth and its Game’s isolation was a further turn of the screw on 
SA. The real lessons from the Commonwealth example are that change occurs when the 
viability of an international sporting organisations is affected, provided it has the full backing 
of states. For the Commonwealth Games the threatened African boycott in 1958 achieved this. 
However, these same players did not pose a viable threat to the Games, when they threatened 
boycotts in the 1960s. It was only when the Games were threatened with a sufficient exodus 
towards rival GANEFO, and the potential threats of states such as Russia, that Olympic policy 
towards SA began to change.  
 
7.8.11 Communism, Russia and GANEFO Involvement in Ending Apartheid 
 The most decisive factors in prompting the IOC to deal with SA bringing about an end 
to apartheid is the politicisation of the Games, to Brundage’s consternation. The rise of 
communism led by the USSR, the appearance of a South East Asian international games in 
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1962 (GANEFO), and the immediate turnaround in IOC policy, cannot be overlooked, or the 
causal link ignored. 
 The establishment of the Games by a Frenchman, based on English school sports in 
Switzerland, with English and French as its official languages, means that the Movement has 
always had an Anglo-European cultural dominance. These nations and their NOCs wished to 
preserve this genealogy as much as possible. The emergence of communist superpowers in the 
mid-20th Century meant that a balancing act between Euro-Anglo dominance and 
accommodation of the communist superpowers had to be achieved.280 Both were keen to 
promote their ideologies, despite the Movement’s claims of impartiality and non-politicisation. 
This balance is evident in the   Host” elections. These had been dominated by Anglo-European 
countries.281 Communist superpowers were given eventual nods and inclusions by way of 
having their cities elected as   Hosts in 1980 and 2008.282 
 This somewhat explains why the threat of the USSR joining the Mexican Games 
boycott of 1968 was sufficient to change IOC policy.283 Conversely the opposite has been 
tested, in 1976 when the USSR failed to lend her weight to the proposed Montreal 1976 boycott, 
the effectiveness of that boycott was rendered obsolete. Showing definitively that the USSR 
was considered a necessary key player by the IOC. The IOC wanted to keep the USSR on board 
rather than SA. However, it was not the importance of the USSR to the Movement in and of 
itself that effected change. The ‘throwing of Soviet weight’ could perhaps have been tolerated, 
if the USSR had no rival organisation to go to, albeit this is an unanswerable test. It was 
GANEFO’s existence in the 1960s that meant that the USSR could depart from the IOC for 
South East Asian shores. The USSR could have used GANEFO for sporting and political 
demonstrations of superiority, rather than the Games. 
 It was therefore the IOC’s concern regarding the USSR’s potential ship-jump that 
prompted it to act. The Games were faced with replacement and demise. The first GANEFO 
Games of 1964 in Jakarta contained 51 nations. There was the added worry that the 32 odd 
nations threatening to boycott Mexico, would defect to GANEFO. This would have made 
GANEFO, with Russian and boycotting countries support, a serious and viable alternative to 
the IOCs from nations that shared a political ideology. This threatened the IOC on two fronts:- 
one being abandonment; and the other showing how sport and politics could go hand in hand.   
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 However, in hindsight the IOC’s worry was unfounded. GANEFO and its influence 
floundered after its first games. GANEFO’s final games were held in 1966 and were open only 
to Asian states. This could however be due to the IOC’s decisive action. If they had not, these 
states may have left and history could have been different.  
 Furthermore, the IOC should not have taken the Russian departure seriously as they, 
apparently, did not seriously consider leaving the IOC for GANEFO. They sent a sub-Olympic 
standard team to GANEFO and they preferred the bigger Game’s stage, using it to demonstrate 
sporting dominance, and exacting more clout in the IOC Board room.  
 Moreover, the USSR had been given the 1980 games to host. It was therefore invested 
in Olympic success. The USSR would use these games for political and sporting purposes and 
wanted to ensure their success. Hence the clout they swung on potentially altruistic grounds in 
the 1950s and 1960s at the IOC that exacted change, now meant, that they towed the line, 
avoiding boycotts and committing to Game longevity. Hence it was the threat of a Soviet 
departure and ability of the IOC to ensure she stayed that opened a small window of time to 
allow change in. This was set against the back drop of GANEFO and the wider threat of 
communism to an Anglo-European organisation. This shows too, that it was in fact states (and 
politics) that ensured the turnaround and prompting of action by the IOC. A valuable lesson for 
today’s Movement despite its desire to remain apolitical.  
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7.9 Conclusion 
This Chapter has shown that the IOC had some involvement in ending apartheid, but 
its claim of it being ‘one of its key successes’, is an exaggeration. For a long time, the IOC was 
reluctant to become involved due to a general reticence of its Presidents and its adherence to 
its supposed politicism and independence. The IOC only became involved after a variety of 
actors and circumstances forced its hand.284 Although tardy, this Chapter has shown that the 
IOC was part of a collegiate effort that turned the screw to end apartheid. 
This Chapter has shown that the involved actors who were lobbying for change were 
manifold.285 Their pressure on the IOC was also set against equally manifold anomalous 
circumstances. Together they provided the right, but fleeting window for change and produced 
boycotts, sanctions, UN Resolutions, Declarations and Conventions.286  
From this myriad of actors and circumstances, ICAAS stands out as particularly 
significant in ending apartheid. Within a few years of its passing, this UN sponsored 
Convention was followed by apartheid’s end. This suggests apartheid ended when the UN 
passed a Convention, in addition to its involvement.287 That binding international law with the 
UN at the helm was the significant factor in ending apartheid.  
However, this suggestion is overly simplistic. This Chapter has shown that change 
occurred because ICAAS specifically utilised states and the Movement as a whole to fight 
apartheid.288 ICAAS successfully drew together state and Movement actors and requested their 
action in a binding Treaty. The SA example therefore shows that success occurs due to the 
linking of the state and non-state sporting systems, when it is backed by Treaty law. This could 
be used as a template for the Truce today – codification of the Truce into a Treaty drawing 
together the Movement and UN state system. With the Movement having appropriate 
sanctioning ability. Therefore the SA example shows that the Movement and states cannot be 
considered as operating in different spheres.  
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Furthermore, the SA example and ICAAS’s successes within it, also shows that success 
occurred when the Movement worked as a whole, alongside the UN and the other actors. 32 
NOCs backed the 1960s boycotts and the ISFs were significant lobbyists for change. Hence it 
was the Movement’s collective unity, and pairing to the UN and codified action in a binding 
Treaty that made it a rain-maker here.  
The IOC’s efforts were therefore only part of a collegiate effort alongside the rest of its 
Movement and the aforementioned actors and circumstances. The Movement as one 
organisation linked to the international UN state system is what effected change.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
Conclusion – Has Olympic Singularity created a new actor in international 
peace and security? 
 
 
8.1 Introduction – Traditional Assumptions  
 The traditional assumption is that the ‘Olympic Movement’ is only a term for ease of 
use by the OC. It groups together the various Olympic actors who have a vested interest in 
staging the Games. The term has no legal weight attached to it. Thereafter, the traditional 
position has assumed that it has determined the status and capacities of the Movement’s 
individual actors correctly. It has categorised the IOC and ISFs as regular INGOs, and the 
NOCs and OCOGs as ordinary examples of whatever form is best as per the jurisdiction in 
which they are incorporated. These traditional assumptions tie into this thesis’s first general 
research question – ‘why should the Movement be viewed as a singular and special 
organisation?’ Traditional thinking has assumed that it should not be a singular extraordinary 
organisation with atypical subject status and personality. 
Furthermore, the traditional assumption is that none of these Movement bodies can 
directly make international law in peace and security – this is reserved for states, and their 
IGOs. This means that the Movement can therefore only fulfil its 2nd Fundamental Principle of 
‘promoting peaceful societies’ by grass-roots projects and acting as a complainer at the 
international level to those that can makes laws - states and IGOs. However, this is not strictly 
accurate on two counts. Firstly, the specificity of sport has allowed the exemption of sport from 
law, meaning that there is now an element of legal dualism in sport. Sporting institutions are 
now regarded as making sports laws that apply an internationally. This thesis has accepted this 
as true to an extent and consequently has briefly mentioned this debate. Secondly, the 20thC 
has shown that international law now has a myriad of new actors that have the potential to act 
extensively on the international legal stage, such as the ICRC with a partial amount of 
personality and recognised subject status. The potential of those who possess personality and 
subject status can evolve, meaning they can have an involvement in the making and 
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enforcement of international laws.1 This assumption therefore ties into this thesis’s second 
general research question – ‘why should the singular Movement be able to act in international 
peace and security by way of custodianship of an Truce Treaty?’ Traditional thinking has 
assumed that it should not be able to so act. 
 
8.2 Olympic Singularity’s Challenge to Traditional Assumptions 
Section 8.1 summarised the two traditional assumptions that this thesis has operated 
against. This thesis has challenged these assumptions by way of the two general research 
questions. It has answered these general research questions with the novel concept of Olympic 
Singularity, which has a basis in law by way of the EU law doctrine of the specificity of sport.  
This Concluding section rebuts the traditional assumptions in the order of their 
appearance above and consequently deals with the eight cumulative factors of Olympic 
Singularity as they interlink, rather than sticking to the order that they appear in their Chapters. 
This adds to the idea of the Movement as a web, as the factors all link-up. The Chapter order 
stands for a detailed explanation of the concept of Olympic Singularity, rather than a 
concluding comparison showing the over-view of inter-linking ideas. The Chapters deal with 
Olympic Singularity ruthlessly by splitting it down and dealing with the factors as they build 
cumulatively on each other. The Chapter order is therefore valid and acts as a ‘walk-through’ 
to Olympic Singularity.  
Working through the traditional assumptions above, this thesis has firstly successfully 
asserted that the Movement is not just an ease of use grouping term, with no legal meaning, as 
the Charter suggests. Its frequent usage has unintentionally created a new beast. This was the 
sixth factor of Olympic Singularity and was demonstrated in Chapter 4 as the Charter refers to 
it 61 times and bestows upon it rights and obligations.  
Secondly, this thesis has shown that the individual actors of the Movement are not 
regular examples of their type, contrary to popular thinking, case law and the Charter’s 
wording. It did this by examining the various involved actors:- the IOC, the NOCs, and the 
ISFS in Chapters 2 – 4 and showed the extent of their functions, purposes, powers and status.  
Moreover, these same Chapters, and specifically Chapter 4, demonstrated that these 
Movement’s actors were atypical because of their special treatments, rights and recognitions 
they receive under law by states and the international communities. This was the fifth aspect 
                                                          
1
 E.g., individuals have some accountability under international law and there has been the development of 
international private and trans-national laws. 
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to Olympic Singularity. Therefore this thesis demonstrated that the Movement at its core, is 
not unique. Each of the Olympic actors possess some of the features that justify other atypical 
subjects’ existence and personality. The NOCs have universalism and a link to the state system. 
The ISFs and IOC have the potential to be considered law makers. The IOC has the mandate 
in peace and security. And together they share a unique history and purpose of Games staging 
with a focus on peace. All of which (Games staging aside) the ICRC possesses justifying its 
atypical status and personality.  
Taking firstly the IOC, it is as Rule 15.1 of the Charter states, an ‘international not-
governmental not-for-profit organisation’. Yet it is more than this. It is a specific and unique 
INGO, the fourth aspect to Olympic Singularity. Chapter 3 demonstrated this by showing how 
the IOC fulfils and then exceeds the UN’s INGO checklist, more than any other INGO, with 
the potential exception of the ICRC. This therefore showed it was an atypical subject. The 
IOC’s special status was also proven in Chapter 4 and incidentally in Chapter 2. Part I therefore 
cumulatively demonstrated that the IOC has rights, obligations and capacity for action far 
beyond those of a regular INGO. Moreover, Part I also demonstrated the IOC’s 
extraordinariness attributable to its special treatments. The IOC receives almost unprecedented 
special treatments and recognitions by a variety of national and international actors. Swiss law 
gives the IOC many legal and fiscal privileges, and it is also a UNGA observer.2 Whilst other 
organs may have special Swiss status, they do not possess it to the extent that the IOC. 
Therefore, it is the combination of the many special treatments of the Movement that make it 
extraordinary. The ICRC is the Movement’s closest corollary and this thesis argues for similar 
recognition of the Movement as the ICRC under international law in terms of its status and 
personality, with regard to a governance and sanctioning of a Truce Treaty. 
With regard to the powers, purposes, functions and treatments of the other Movement’s 
actors (the various NOCs, ISFs and the OCOGs), they are alike after a fashion, but they vary 
as per the domestic legal systems in which they are incorporated. However, many of them, such 
as the ISFs, also have special status in Switzerland. Although this is to a lesser extent that the 
IOC as was shown in Chapter 4. 
Thereafter, Part I of this thesis continued to challenge traditional assumptions by 
demonstrating that in addition to the Movement’s core actor irregularity, these actors link 
together to form a unique international singular Movement.3 The Movement is unique at its 
                                                          
2
 Resolution A/RES/64/3. 
3
 The core specificity adds to the potential for the cumulative specificity, but the latter does not rely on the former 
– Olympic Singularity has other reasons. 
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core and at the cumulative level. It is their web framework and the way in which it links that 
is unusual, and this was the first submission of Olympic Singularity and was shown in the first 
three core Chapters. Which is also a recognised justificatory reason for the doctrine of the 
specificity of sport. 
This thesis has also submitted that the Movement’s web is universal, which was the 
second aspect to Olympic Singularity and one that it shares with the specificity of sport. The 
Movement is universal because it operates nationally and internationally via its various actors. 
This was demonstrated by the examination of the various actors in Chapters 2 – 4 and their 
global reach. For example, the Movement has presence in all states around the world – 206 
NOCs and scores of ISFs. They are one of the biggest events on earth with huge amounts of 
commercialism attached. However, a universal web framework is not exclusive in and of itself. 
Other organisations have webbed universality drawing from national and international actors, 
such as the individual ISFs. Although, they lack the Movement’s full reach and are themselves 
part of the Movement. They also lack the Movement’s other Singular features which shows 
that all Olympic Singularity factors are required – they are cumulative and work together, as is 
the case with the ICRC. 
Part I demonstrated this universal web by showing that the Movement is held together 
by ‘webbing’, which this thesis considers to encompass several features. The webbing is the 
Charter and the legal dualism of the sporting system, the Movement’s shared purpose of staging 
the Games and the checks and balances of the various Movement actors. Each of these factors 
shall be discussed briefly in turn here. This webbing compounds the unusual webbed 
framework into something more unique before law. 
The entire Movement has agreed to be bound by the Charter, therefore they share a 
common set of rules, or ‘law’. These Movement’s actors have thereby created international 
sub-state ‘law’ and legal dualism via their rules, presided over by the Charter, and enforced by 
CAS. All based on volition of the involved parties. This is recognised in the EU doctrine of the 
specificity of sport.4 This legal dualism and supremacy of the Charter is the seventh factor of 
Olympic Singularity and was shown in Chapter 4. It therefore accepts that states and IGOs are 
the entities that make international law, but submits that the doctrine of the specificity of sport 
allows exceptions to this. Therefore the Charter, which all Movement actors agree to, and the 
various ISF rules are law that unites all of those in the Movement.  
                                                          
4
 This thesis accepts that these are ‘law’ to an extent although this debate is beyond its scope. 
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This thesis adds to the European doctrine. It asserts that the collective Movement 
grouping is an exception to the monopoly on international law-making by states and IGOs, and 
their resultant capacity for action when it comes to making their own ‘laws’ or ‘rules’. 
However, this thesis challenges the doctrine by saying that the specificity of sport is amplified 
when considered in an Olympic setting due to Olympic Singularity. Some of the factors of 
Olympic Singularity overlap with the reasons for specificity, but the latter does not go far 
enough or assess the reasons sufficiently. It is this Olympic amplification that permits legal 
dualism for its own rules, and as Part II demonstrated, sets the precedent for extension into the 
field of peace, specifically the Truce.  
The Movement’s webbing was also shown in Chapter 2 as the entire Movement share 
the same purpose of facilitating the staging of the Games. This is the third aspect to Olympic 
Singularity and stands even if they have other non-Olympic purposes and roles, and are not 
directly involved in staging. All the actors, nevertheless, have a hand in facilitation of the 
Games. 
The Movement’s web framework was also confirmed in Chapters 2 and 4 by their 
demonstration of the power check that the various actors can impose on each other, especially 
on the IOC. This means that the Movement is a separation of powers, where the powers are not 
entirely distinct of each other. Consequently, the Charter is inaccurate when it states that the 
IOC is the most supreme and powerful Movement actor. This was contained within the fourth 
aspect of Olympic Singularity – the web framework.  
Part I, split over Chapters 2 – 4, showed that the first seven factors of Olympic 
Singularity were the reasons why the Movement should be viewed as a single organ, thereby 
answering the first research question, of ‘why should the Movement be viewed as a single 
organ’. These factors have shown that the Movement is a unique organisation because of the 
way its various atypical actors link up in a universal web brought together by a shared purpose 
under the umbrella of the Charter which has quasi-legal status. The actors are atypical because 
they receive special treatments giving them an elevated status and capacity for action, 
potentially on a par with states and IGOs and at least, the ICRC. The stage is therefore set for 
the Movement to be the suitable extraordinary actor to engage fully in the international sphere 
on a par with these heavyweight actors.  
This leads into the second research question, of ‘why should this singular Movement be 
given special dispensation to govern and sanction an Truce Treaty’? This second question is 
therefore linked to and in part answered by the first and consequently Part I. It is because the 
Movement is the right actor due to its Singularity - its extraordinariness requires its 
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consideration here as a relevant actor. Yet it is not as simple as the Movement being ‘special’ 
which enables it to govern and sanction a Truce Treaty. It is because this ‘extraordinariness’ 
means that the Movement is attached to the state system that enables its consideration as an 
actor here. Olympic Singularity, particularly the Movement’s singular universal web construct 
sticks the Movement to the state system. It is only however, when the Movement is this singular 
web, and not when it is broken down into its various cog actors, that it is linked to the state 
system. This thesis has therefore shown in Part I and in Chapters 5 and 7 that the Movement is 
not entirely separate to the state system. The collective Movement is therefore the right 
organisation to tackle the failing Truce as it can reach the places that the existing international 
state system cannot, due to this single webbed universality. 
 The second general research question is also answered by the claim that precedent 
allows its action here. The Movement is involved in international peace and security, whether 
indirectly (Chapter 7 – South Africa) or to a lesser extent, directly (Chapters 5 and 6 – the 
Truce and ekecheiria).5 This is because the Movement wishes to act in this sphere and has 
broadened its mandate via its 2nd Fundamental Principle and called for the Truce (Chapter 5).  
Whilst the Movement’s desire to act here is no legitimisation for it to do so, this ignores 
the fact that the Movement is already extensively and to greater and lesser extents, successfully, 
involved in international peace and security. And this is the final aspect of Olympic Singularity 
– the Movement is special and should have a special licence for action here because it has a 
mandate and a precedent for successful action in this field. This is discussed in Part II split over 
Chapters 5 – 7. 
Chapter 5 answered this second research question (why peace) by demonstrating the 
Movement’s already significant involvement in peace and security by its call for revival of the 
Truce. Such involvement is a near unprecedented mandate for a sports INGO.6 Therefore the 
Movement hopes to achieve its 2nd Fundamental Principle of using sport to promote peaceful 
societies via the Truce, and also through a variety of other measures. However, Chapter 5 
showed that the IOC was simply a complainer to the UN and it was the UN who actually 
revived the Truce by way of non-binding UNGA Resolutions. The Movement’s capacity for 
action here was limited by the traditional assumptions of it being an INGO and incapable of 
passing Resolutions or ‘law’. 
                                                          
5
 Whether voluntarily or involuntarily. 
6
 The Commonwealth and its Games were involved, as demonstrated in Chapter 7. 
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Nevertheless, Chapter 5 showed that these traditional assumptions are failing as the 
Truce is frequently breached, especially by Host Nations. Chapter 5 demonstrated that this was 
primarily because it is framed as a non-binding UNGA Resolution with no real sanctions 
attached. This Chapter also showed that the Truce is failing because the UN cannot sanction 
the international sporting system as it is out-with its jurisdiction. Therefore Chapter 5 
demonstrated that for the Truce to be successful, it firstly must be codified into binding Treaty 
law, limited in duration to an armistice, with real sanctions by a singular body that can act and 
sanction state and non-state actors alike. Therefore the body sanctioning this must have the 
power to bestow these sanctions. The UN is precluded from this as it lacks jurisdiction, but the 
Movement is not, if it receives UN legitimisation and state party consent via the Treaty, who 
would recognise it due to Olympic Singularity. The Movement would therefore be the right 
actor here as it can affect the sporting system and has stuck its web to the state system. 
Chapter 6 emphasised the important of a number of these features in the success of an 
Truce – that a Truce be framed as binding international law with real sanctions and controlled 
by a powerful singular actor that was able to act unilaterally. Chapter 6 demonstrated that 
ekecheiria was almost universally observed because of these factors being under the control of 
the state of Elis. It overcame the obstacles of the questionability of states and international law 
existing at the time, and showed that in the ancient Greek world, both states and international 
law existed. Therefore ekecheiria and the ancient Games were valid comparisons to make. 
Chapter 7 also answered the second research question of ‘why peace’ by again showing 
that the Movement’s has further established a precedent in such situations, and in turn again 
reinforces the eighth aspect of Olympic Singularity.7 This Chapter gave the example of the 
Movement’s involvement in the South African apartheid situation. This Chapter demonstrated 
that the Movement was involved in ending apartheid to an extent by way of its banning of SA 
and its 1988 Declaration Against Apartheid in Sport. However, it showed that the Movement 
on its own (as a group of different actors), was ineffectual. This is because apartheid’s end 
could be attributed to the Movement’s collegiate effort with the UN, states and other 
individuals and actors, as well as because of the circumstances of the day. Not all of these 
factors can be replicated to ensure success of the modern Truce, such as the east-west political 
climate of the day, but the collective UN-Movement working, with real international clout by 
Treaty codification and attaching sanctions can be. 
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 The UNSC deemed apartheid affected international peace and security. 
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The two research questions are therefore both linked to each other and are both 
answered by Olympic Singularity. Why should the Movement be viewed as a singular actor 
capable of enforcing an Truce Treaty?8 The answer is because of Olympic Singularity - eight 
unique and cumulative features of the various Movement actors and Games requiring their 
special treatment under international and domestic laws.  
Olympic Singularity groups these irregular core actors together due to the unique and 
universal web framework to form, unintentionally, a new and singular legal organisation – the 
Movement. This web then sticks this Movement to the international state system enabling it to 
govern and sanction an Truce Treaty and thus act in the field of international peace and security. 
Olympic Singularity is therefore that the Movement at the core and umbrella level is/are unique 
institutions.  
 
8.3 Solution  
 This thesis has advocated and demonstrated that the way to solve the failings of Truce 
observance is to codify it into binding international Treaty law. Parties would know observation 
was mandatory and that a lukewarm commitment would not suffice. This codification and draw 
proved successful in the ancient Greek world where ekecheiria was written down and accepted 
by poleis as international law, and in the 20th Century where ICAAS was the final nail in the 
coffin against apartheid. However, in both of these examples, codification under international 
law was not sufficient in and of itself to ensure observance of their relevant Treaty. Indeed, 
today the number of Treaties that are not observed shows the inherent problem of international 
law – observance. Both historically and today, international law that deals with sport and peace 
requires something more in order to be observed.  
This thesis has shown that observance of a binding Treaty occurred when the sporting 
system linked up to the state system. It was when the two systems and actors worked together 
to provide and implement real sanctions, whether in the form of Games fines or sporting 
exclusions, that the international law became effective. Each can reach and affect levels and 
actors that the other cannot. This is why the Movement requires singular treatment and 
sanctioning capacities under international law with regard to a Truce Treaty. 
This means that the singular Movement should be recognised by the UN as a partner 
organisation in the formation and sanctioning of a Truce Treaty. The signatories would be states 
and the entire Movement and therefore both would agree to be bound by the terms of the Treaty 
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 Rather than general legislative ability. 
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and the Movement’s sanctioning authority. It would bind states and Movement actors alike. Of 
course many conflicts do not involve state actors, and they certainly do not involve the 
Movement, however, the grassroots operation of the various Movement actors mean that it can 
target these low level conflicts and spark dialogue and reconciliation ensuring that it remains 
relevant to these conflicts.  
As mentioned, this Truce Treaty should have real Games related sanctions attached to 
it for its breach, either for conduct undertaken by states themselves or bodies within its 
territory.9 This would take the form of Games fines or Games bans on NOCs. The problem 
with this in addition to the nature of warfare now being sub-state level, is that the Olympic 
signatories to the Truce Treaty are divided from both states and other warring actors, it could 
therefore seem unfair on NOCs. After all, SA’s NOC was punished because it was practising 
sporting apartheid and not because its government did. But the suggestion of this problem is 
overly simplistic and naive – the two systems are not separate as this thesis has shown due to 
Olympic Singularity. This thesis has shown that the Olympic web unites the Movement 
together but also sticks it to the international state system. NOCs and certain ISFs cannot be 
considered and are not divided from the state in which they operate. They receive special 
recognitions and dispensations from them, legally and financially and often receive 
governmental funding. Hence it is submitted in this thesis that the liabilities and obligations of 
one be absorbed by the other, due to this linked web i.e. the notion of Olympic Singularity. 
This assumption of liability should be no truer than for Host Nations, where there is a direct 
rather than theoretical linking of the   Host government to the Movement by way of the Host 
contract.  
Therefore, bans should be placed on NOCs (and potentially ISFs). Any potential 
unfairness could be mitigated by affected athletes still being able to attend the Games by 
competing under the Olympic Flag - if they can show sufficient independence of their war-
mongering state or groups.10 Game’s fines could be placed on any of the actors within the 
Movement, but is specifically mentioned as a disincentive to states. These sanctions are 
therefore a real deterrent to those contemplating a Truce breach, with Games participation 
being a sufficient corollary incentive. This has been proven in this thesis from ancient times, 
to the cold-war, to the more recent use of the Games to validate statehood. International actors 
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 Which would still require the cessation of hostilities for the duration of the Games and a suitable time frame 
either side. 
10
 Such as not receiving funding from the state. 
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wish to participate in the Games and its draw is a sufficient enticement to prompt a Truce 
Treaty’s observance, if there are real sanctions for its breach. 
As mentioned in Chapter 5, the UN and the Movement’s reticence to commit to a 
binding Treaty must be considered. Both parties seem un-keen to move from non-binding 
Resolutions to binding international law. This thesis has demonstrated that this has been for a 
variety of legal and political reasons and has offered solutions to overcome these objections. 
Their legal objections comprise being constrained by traditional assumptions of international 
law, regarding jurisdiction, who its subjects are and who can act with regard to forming and 
sanctioning Treaties. This thesis has, under the concept of Olympic Singularity, challenged 
these traditional normative assumptions and justified the Movement’s propulsion to the 
international system to be able to sign and sanction a Treaty. The Treaty would be able to affect 
both the UN and the Olympic sub-state system and all levels of potential conflicts - a 
worthwhile solution. The political objections to a binding Truce Treaty could be contained if 
the Treaty were drafted sufficiently narrowly, both in its terms (being an armistice) and for it 
and its sanctions to relate only to the Games. A Treaty, that was less onerous in its terms than 
the current non-binding Resolution, would ensure that the desire to attend the Games would 
encourage observance. Sanctions might contravene the two institution’s recent trend of 
inclusivity, Chapters 6 and 7 have shown they are effective, especially when they operate inter 
and sub-nationally. Furthermore, removing the Treaty from UN to Movement control would 
lessen the ‘political’, albeit politicising the supposedly independent Movement. This thesis has 
also shown that the Movement is nevertheless, inherently politicised and linked to the state, 
and must therefore accept that it does not operate in a political vacuum if it is to move forward 
with this peace-building mandate.   
 
8.4 Future 
The 20th Century saw many developments in international law and in the Movement. 
Both have developed in institutional and magnitudinal terms. For example, the Games grew 
from a small competition of 14 nations where only men competed, to the ‘greatest show on 
earth’. Alongside this growth, has been the paralleled mushrooming of the Movement’s 
mandate under the Charter - at times this creep has been both deliberate and unintentional. 
Continued growth and development in the Movement’s mandate can be expected.  
With this historical growth and future potential growth of both the Movement and 
international law borne in mind, it is clear to see that the modern Truce Resolutions are failing. 
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If the international community are serious in their commitment to the Truce, then it must be 
accepted that a new solution is necessary, and this thesis offers one. There is historic precedent 
for codification into a Treaty, as sport and international law have in the past come together to 
produce binding international agreements before, and have attached sanctions – ICAAS 1985, 
GA77 and ekecheiria. These Treaties were successful in their aims, and ekecheiria was almost 
universally observed. Hence, 2000 years ago the Greeks recognised the necessity of a singular 
binding truce enforced by a single powerful actor. Yet the problem of combining sport and 
international law has been deliberately ignored today due to the difficulties involved in its 
rectification. There is now a need and a duty to formally accept the Olympic sporting system 
within the fold of (international) law. 
The problem of addressing state action with regard to the Games has become even more 
pronounced and necessary. This is because recently the link between the state and Olympic 
system has been conclusively forged with the Russian state’s knowledge and sanctioning of its 
athletes doping.  
This thesis has advocated for an extension of international law by recognising a new 
subject only in the field of international peace and security. It has limited its field because a 
similar INGO, the ICRC designated itself such a mandate and was granted an atypical subject 
status and limited personality. This thesis uses the ICRC as a precedent for the Movement 
based on Movement-ICRC commonalities - justifying extension of ICRC special treatments to 
the Movement. This study has been limited by this but future international law developments 
may extend this to other areas of human endeavour. 
 
8.5 Concluding Remarks 
There are many ways in which the Movement could and does achieve its 2nd 
Fundamental Principle mandate of peace through sport, at a multitude of levels. The Movement 
fulfils this mandate through grass roots community projects and at the international state level, 
via its indirect involvement in the Truce. This mandate in peace (the eighth factor of Olympic 
Singularity), when combined with the first seven factors, demand that the Movement be given 
sufficient attention and governance by international law. Such attention, that accurately 
identifies the actors, is long over-due, and is wholly necessary to clarify the muddied waters 
left by the specificity of sport and lacklustre approach of the UN’s Truce Resolutions. 
This thesis therefore submits a new way forward in which the Movement can fulfil its 
2nd Fundamental Principle mandate that is also an evolutionary step in tackling the failings of 
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adherence to and enforcement of the Truce.11 It submits a three-pronged solution: a singular 
Movement; in control of a clearly drafted Truce Treaty comprising an armistice; with 
sanctioning capacity. This solution rests on the international community recognising the novel 
concept of Olympic Singularity, which groups the Movement as a singular unique INGO actor 
capable of possessing quasi-personality due to its extraordinary powers, purposes, treatments 
and recognitions.  
 
 
 
citius, altius, fortius, pacis 
a new Olympic motto? 
  
 
  
                                                          
11
 And of international law generally, of course the Truce Resolutions are not international ‘law’. 
216 
 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
 
 
alytarches  special police force of the ancient Olympic Games 
barbaros  a foreigner or non-Greek in the ancient Greek world 
demos   commoners or the majority in ancient Greece 
dikastes  a judge in ancient Greece 
dromos  the aisle of an ancient Greek temple 
ecclesia  a plenary assembly in ancient Greece 
eirene   peace, named after the ancient Greek goddess of peace 
ekecheiria  the ancient Olympic Truce 
ephors   the executive political and judicial branch in Sparta 
hecatomb a religious ceremony of the ancient Olympic Games where 100 oxen 
were sacrificed 
hellanodikai  judges of the ancient Olympic Games 
homoioi  peer class in ancient Greece 
hoplite   an ancient Greek foot soldier 
hypomeiones  the lower classes in ancient Greece 
koine eirene  the common peace of Philip II 
lex sportiva  a sports law, a distinct branch 
mastigophoroi the scourge bearers, i.e. those who carried out punishments at the ancient 
Games  
nomophylakes  drafters and revisers of the Laws/Rules of the ancient Olympic Games 
ouroboros  an ancient symbol of infinity: a snake eating its own tail 
pankration  an ancient mixed martial art combining boxing and wrestling 
philotes  affection  
polis (pl poleis) an ancient Greek city state,  
rabdouchoi  the rod bearers who helped dispense punishment at the ancient Games 
spondophoroi  travelling Heralds who pronounced the Olympic Truce and Games 
stade   the ancient Games’ stadium 
synedrion  an ancient Greek council or senate with some judicial function 
xenos   a stranger or foreigner in the ancient Greek world 
xenophobia  a dislike or fear of foreigners 
zanes   statutes of zeus at Olympia, often bronze 
 
217 
 
LISTS OF TABLES 
 
Table 1 -  List of Olympic Games Host Cities 
Year Summer Games Host City/ State Winter Games Host City/ State 
1896 Athens, Greece - 
1900 Paris, France - 
1904 St. Louis, USA - 
1908 London, UK - 
1912 Stockholm, Sweden - 
1916 Cancelled (WWI) - 
1920 Antwerp, Belgium - 
1924 Paris, France Chamonix, France 
1928 Amsterdam, Netherlands  St. Moritz, Switzerland 
1932 Los Angeles, USA Lake Placid, USA 
1936 Berlin, Germany Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany 
1940 Cancelled (WWII) Cancelled (WWII) 
1944 Cancelled (WWII) Cancelled (WWII) 
1948 London, UK St. Moritz, Switzerland 
1952 Helsinki, Finland Oslo, Norway 
1956 Melbourne, Australia Cortina d’Ampezzo, Italy 
1960 Rome, Italy Squaw Valley, USA 
1964 Tokyo, Japan Innsbruck, Austria 
1968 Mexico City, Mexico Grenoble, France 
1972 Munich, West Germany Sapporo, Japan 
1976 Montreal, Canada Innsbruck, Austria 
1980 Moscow, USSR Lake Placid, USA 
1984 Los Angeles, USA Sarajevo, Yugoslavia 
1988 Seoul, Republic of Korea Calgary, Canada 
1992 Barcelona, Spain Albertville, France 
1994 - Lillehammer, Norway 
1996 Atlanta, USA - 
1998 - Nagano, Japan 
2000 Sydney, Australia - 
2002 - Salt Lake City, USA 
2004 Athens, Greece - 
2006 - Turin, Italy 
2008 Beijing, China - 
2010 - Vancouver, Canada 
2012 London, UK - 
2014 - Sochi, Russia 
2016 Rio de Janeiro, Brazil - 
2018 - PyeongChang, Republic of Korea 
2020 Tokyo, Japan - 
2022 - Beijing, China 
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Table 2 – List of IOC Presidents 
Years Appointed Name State 
1894 – 1896  Demetrius Vikelas Greece 
1896 – 1925  Pierre de Coubertin France 
1916 - 1919  Godefroy de Blonay* Switzerland 
1925 – 1942  Henri de Baillet-Latour Belgium 
1942 – 1952  Sigfrid Edstrom Sweden 
1952 – 1972 Avery Brundage USA 
1972 – 1980  Lord Killanin  Ireland 
1980 – 2001  Juan Antonio Samaranch Spain 
2001 – 2013 Jacques Rogge  Belgium 
2013 + Thomas Bach Germany 
 
* Acting President during WWI when Coubertin was enlisted 
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